Reading Twenty-five Hours To Tragedy: Part Two

Obeying direct orders from Hood, Bate had marched toward Franklin Pike.  By 5PM he was within 200 yards of it when a messenger from Cheatham arrived with orders for Bate to form a line on Cleburne’s left.  There was no broader explanation.  Bate was unaware of what Cheatham was trying to do and was “dumbstruck” by this contradiction of Hood’s verbal orders.  Meanwhile, as Brown was preparing to launch his attack, one of his brigade commanders, General Otho F. Strahl, who commanded Brown’s right flank, noticed that an undetermined number of Federal infantry extended beyond his right.  Brown received this information with apprehension.  Was he about to charge into a situation where he could be flanked?  

Further, Brown was promised that Forrest’s cavalry would protect his right, yet Forrest had just ordered that protection (Jackson’s division) on a raid north of Spring Hill.  The rest of his command being out of ammunition, no Confederate cavalry remained on the field at the moment Brown began his advance.  Brown, who, it will be recalled, was at half strength and whose men had endured a fatiguing off-road march, halted for clarification.  

The sun was now setting.  With darkness encroaching on clear sight, no Southern commander on the field understood that Cheatham’s Corps faced a mere three Union brigades. The Rebels outnumbered their opponent at least 2 to 1.  Only now, after an hour’s delay, did Stewart’s Corps receive orders from Hood to cross the creek, march north of Cheatham and block the pike.  Meanwhile, Bate was wrestling with conflicting orders of sweeping the pike southward (issued by Hood) and moving north to align with Cleburne (issued by Cheatham).

Gillum writes: “Unity of command – one commander directing the actions of the entire force – was the missing principle…This failure had begun with General Hood’s order for Bate’s Division to sweep south.  It appears that General Hood had not informed his subordinate – General Cheatham – of the order he had given one of Cheatham’s own divisions.  Now as time became more and more of a factor with the decreasing visibility, events began to spiral out of control.” (page 289)

It was now about 6PM.  Darkness had fallen.  Almost two hours had passed since Cleburne attacked.  Upon hearing Brown’s concern for his exposed right flank, Cheatham went directly to Hood.  The commanding general, angry that the attack was not occurring at that very moment, nevertheless understood Cheatham’s anxiety but explained that he had already ordered Stewart to Brown’s right.  It appears by this time that Hood had given up on launching an attack on Spring Hill.  That was never his primary concern anyway.  Instead it was something Cheatham had envisioned after Cleburne had routed Bradley’s brigade.  Hood believed Schofield’s forces were still at Columbia and that, if Bate and Stewart blocked the pike, he could fight a decisive battle the next day.

About 8PM Bate slowly maneuvered (away from the pike) through the darkness to connect with Cleburne.  In the meantime, Cleburne partially withdrew his division (away from the pike) perhaps to assist with his alignment with Bate.  Both commanders allowed their men to cook rations and make camp.  Then, around 10PM, Forrest reported to Hood that Cleburne had pulled back and that Cheatham was not in possession of the pike.  This surprised Hood, who had expressly ordered Bate to sweep the pike.  

Soon thereafter, Stewart, who was now confused about what Hood wanted him to accomplish, reported that he was unable to locate the pike in the dark and had halted his greatly fatigued corps for the night.  (Recall that the Southern infantry had been roused at midnight and so had by now been active about 22 hours.) This irritated Hood who didn’t want to hear Stewart’s excuses.  The commanding general abruptly turned to Forrest and asked if the cavalry could throw something across the pike.  Forrest stated he was out of ammunition but “he would do the best he could in the emergency.” (page 366)  Hood ordered Stewart to resupply Forrest and everyone was dismissed.  

Bate felt uneasy about his conflicting orders and decided to report to Hood personally between 11PM and midnight, just as Forrest was leaving.  The division commander stated that he was in the process of complying with Hood’s direct order when Cheatham countermanded it in favor of realigning with Cleburne.  Hood’s response was perhaps a mixture of exhaustion, frustration and overconfidence.  “It makes no difference now, or it is alright anyhow, for General Forrest, as you see, has just left and informed me that he holds the turnpike with a portion of his forces north of Spring Hill, and will stop the enemy if he tries to pass toward Franklin, and so in the morning we will have a surrender without a fight…We can sleep easy tonight.” (pp. 368 – 369)  Bate left feeling satisfied that all must be well.

“John Bell Hood was clearly still under the impression that the main body of the Federal army was in front of Columbia even at this late hour.  He had received no news to the contrary, and the report that the enemy was threatening passage up the Franklin Pike through Thompson’s Station was nothing more than a brigade of the enemy hoping to open communications to Franklin…There is no other reason why Hood would not have ensured the pike was securely blocked.” (page 372)

But, of course, Hood was wrong.  Schofield, constantly anxious about a possible Confederate attack (a vast number of Southern campfires were by now in plain view of Schofield’s marching troops), ordered one division after another and all the supply wagons in various groupings to march past the encamped Southern army all night long.  There were a few reports of skirmishers firing on the Federal troops as they tried to move quietly along the pike but nothing more came of it.  By about 4AM, the final division of General Jacob Cox’s 23rd Corps passed safely through Spring Hill.  Only the few regiments of the meager rearguard remained on the pike, force marching through the night up from Columbia. 

It appears that, among other command issues, Hood and Cheatham were never on the same page.  While Hood's primary objective was to block the pike to Federal movement, Cheatham's goal evolved into attacking Spring Hill after Cleburne had received fire from and then routed Bradley.  But Gillum’s purpose for producing this book is two-fold.  One is to spread the blame up and down the Confederate command chain and not place it squarely upon Hood or Cheatham.  Secondly, it is to inform us of little known facts to further clarify how this unparalleled confusion occurred.  An example of this happened the next morning (November 30) during the ride toward what would be the tragic charge at Franklin.

“General Hood’s understanding as why the operation had failed at Spring Hill the previous afternoon and night was made simple in his official report to the War Department."'Major General Cheatham was ordered to attack the enemy at once vigorously and get possession of this pike, and, although these orders were frequently and earnestly repeated, he made but a feeble and partial attack, failing to reach the point indicated.  Had my instructions been carried out there is no doubt that we should have possessed ourselves of this road.’

“Interestingly, this was Hood’s final evaluation of Cheatham, but this was only part of the story.  As Governor [Isham] Harris rode along with Hood and the rest of his staff toward Franklin, Hood continued to harp on Cheatham’s failure of the night before.  Lieutenant Colonel [A.P.] Mason asked Governor Harris to ride aside from the rest of the ensemble for a moment. Harris assented and the two cased away from the group.

“’As they rode along, Hood made some very harsh remarks about Cheatham’s not having attacked in the night as ordered, not blaming him at all the evening before.  Pen Mason said to Gov. Harris in a low voice: “Gov., Gen. Cheatham is not to blame for that.  I never sent him that order.” “My God, Col. Mason; why not?” “I fell asleep again before writing it.” “Well, Col. you ought by all means to mention that to Gen. Hood.  He has expressed his dis-satisfaction so publicly, that it must come to Gen. Cheatham’s ears, and may do much harm.” “Well, I will tell him.” Here the conversation ended.’” (pp. 430 – 431)

Frankly, I’m not sure how useful this bit of minutia might be.  Cheatham was certainly attempting to attack.  He ordered Brown to advance, which would have, as instructed, set off Cleburne again to be followed by Bate when he got into position.  Then Brown became spooked in the twilight by the (thin) extended line of Wagner’s division which caused Cheatham to confer with Hood.  If Hood was so adamant about the objective, why didn’t he stress this with Cheatham at that time?  On the contrary, at the time, Hood was sympathetic to Brown’s uncertainty and felt that he could just as well fight the battle the next morning.

"'If that is the case, do not attack, but order your troops to hold the position they are in for the night.' Cheatham's recollection was that the commanding general told him that he, '...had concluded to wait until morning, and directed me to hold my command in readiness to attack at daylight.'  Governor Harris's recollection was that General Hood ordered Cheatham to '...await and conform to the troops on his right.' [That would be Stewart's Corps.] Obviously General Hood had by this time given up on Cheatham initiating the attack.  It clearly appears that General Hood must have informed Cheatham that he would delay the attack on the Federal force until daylight." (page 317)

Gillum’s collection of reports and correspondences leads the reader to a number of questions.  Learning of how events unfolded doesn’t necessarily clarify everything.  For example, Forrest, certainly one of the most capable cavalry commanders of the war, probed the Union positions for most of the afternoon.  How could he have done this and not learned about the true strength of the Federals before him?  Why did he fail to communicate to Hood the nature of the opposition at Spring Hill?  

Further, why did Forrest merely assume his entire command was no longer necessary and withdraw Jackson when he was (apparently) ordered to protect Brown’s right flank?  For that matter, where in all the details Gillum provides is Forrest or Jackson so ordered to coordinate with Cheatham and Brown?  The order doesn’t exist in this book of primary sources and Gillum makes no effort to explain this omission.  Even more strange is the fact that (as is quoted at the end of Part One) Chalmers approached Brown directly and encouraged Brown to coordinate an attack with Cleburne.  To repeat, Chalmers stated: “I rode up to him and pointed to the retreating enemy, and told him I could pilot him to where he could cut off their retreat.”

How on earth did Chalmers possess so much information and (apparently) none of it be brought to the attention of Forrest or Hood?  It seems to me that the Confederate cavalry failed at Spring Hill as much, if not more so, than anyone.  Forrest chose to shoot up most of his ammunition against a spirited Federal defense before Cleburne ever reached the field rather than gather valuable intelligence about the size and disposition of the force he faced.  That should be cavalry’s primary objective in a situation like this.  

Yet, as facts are presented in this book, there was very little communication between Hood and Forrest until late in the day. How different would things have been at 3PM if Forrest had met Hood as he crossed Rutherford Creek with Cleburne’s division and informed his commanding general that he faced a bunch of supply wagons guarded by about three brigades of infantry, one of which was brought up only an hour or so ago?  Knowing he had two crops on hand Hood would likely have, among many other things, probably taken more personal attention in the attack toward Spring Hill.  More importantly, he could have ordered Stewart to cross the creek ASAP and march to the sound of guns.  

In my opinion, Forrest, again one of the most adept leaders of the war, should have commanded his force so as to better inform Hood.  This book makes it clear that Forrest just kind of did his own thing without communicating much with Hood.  This, it seems to me, is the foundation for the Spring Hill command debacle.  Moreover, there is the egregious matter of how Lee, who was reporting to Hood all afternoon, failed to inform Hood of Schofield’s withdrawal.  Lee was supposed to trick Schofield and it worked until Schofield’s infantry spied the long Confederate column marching straight north beyond the Yankee left.

In a turn of events, Lee became the one who was tricked by a few Federal regiments left behind because Schofield had already moved his army to the north side of the Duck River.  Basically, as long as these few regiments held on Lee was incapable of knowing anything at all about Schofield’s army.  This directly led to Hood believing all this time that Schofield was still at Columbia.  Lee never told him otherwise.

It seems to me that Forrest’s failure to adequately probe Wagner’s division combined with Lee’s failure to know what Schofield was up to created a blind spot for Hood, just as Forrest’s dispatch of Wilson’s cavalry had put Schofield in a fix on the morning of November 29.  Both sides were cautious because neither knew much about what the other was attempting.   At first Schofield was trying to comply with Thomas’ “preference” to keep Hood south of the Duck River another few days.  He thought he should hold Columbia as he sent the supply train back.  

After Hood began his movement, most of the guesses made by both sides were wrong, except Schofield knew he had to march two entire corps and 800 wagons past Spring Hill as quickly as possible (after he finally got word of the movement). Brown, for example, feared he faced an enormous fortified Federal army. At Spring Hill the Rebels were more afraid (timid) than the Yankees because they could not see well in the twilight and their cavalry had left the field.

But, as I mentioned, Gillum finds plenty of blame to pass around.

“One thing is certain; every commander on the field failed in one way or another that afternoon.  If in no other way, they all failed to take the initiative in a situation in which they knew they had the upper hand.  Cheatham failed to seize the pike before dark.  Bate failed to follow the orders of his corps commander until after dark.  Cleburne withdrew Granbury’s me from command of the pike.  Brown was hesitant to attack in the face an unknown threat on his flank.  Strahl brought it to his attention.  Forrest concentrated on the wagon park instead of blocking the pike and later explained to Stewart that the Federals were no longer taking the direct pike.  Stewart failed to reach his assigned position and ordered his men into bivouac.  [General Ed] Johnson protested when ordered to move up and command the pike.  Lee failed to press his pursuit from Columbia.” (page 443)

This initially seems like a complete checklist of the Spring Hill command debacle but it is misleading.  On the one hand Gillum states the Southern commanders “knew they had the upper hand.”  Yet, with the exception of Chalmers, nowhere in his book does Gillum quote anyone as understanding this on the field at the time.  Further, Gillum mentions Brown’s fear of “an unknown threat to his flank.”  For reasons I’ve just pointed out, Forrest’s cavalry could have and should have prevented this mystery.  Instead, Chalmers' conversation with Brown conveyed important information (that was disregarded) in almost an accidental, off-handed way.

Many of the mistakes mentioned by Gillum were the result of larger errors committed by others.  For example, was Bate really at fault for hesitating to disregard a direct order from Hood to seize the pike and sweep southward when Cheatham ordered him northward toward Cleburne?  I think not.  Was Cleburne really to blame for anything that transpired since he responded to direct fire on his right flank and proceeded rout one-third of the Union force on field?  The error here was precisely that the Confederate superior commanders had no clue that they had “the upper hand.” 

While Twenty-five Hours To Tragedy perhaps raises as many questions as it provides answers I certainly cannot fault Gillum’s superb effort of making this primary source material easily available to the general reader.  I learned a great deal while reading this book.  I discovered the important delay of an hour or more created by the late arrival and deployment of the pontoon bridge.  Had Cheatham’s Corps arrived on the field an hour earlier there would have been plenty of daylight for his divisions to see what they were doing and better understand the situation.  Likewise, I learned of the significance that detaching half of Brown’s division for picket duty had on that division commander’s frame of mind when he advanced at Spring Hill.  The book is filled with useful details.

And it is largely due to these fascinating details, many presented for the first time by Gillum, that some of my own questions were formulated.  Like so much of history, understanding certain aspects brings clarity while simultaneously triggering our curiosity to make further inquires.  Twenty-five Hours is the best single-volume available on the affair at Spring Hill.  Whether or not you think a failed battle attempt justifies such a massive undertaking of research, any student of military history will benefit from reading this scrapbook of first-person accounts.  If nothing else, it demonstrates the difficulties of command during the Civil War and how the best of plans (Hood’s original concept was indeed somewhat “brilliant”) can be ruined by poor communication. 

I am presently fascinated by the Spring Hill Affair.  It’s like a mind puzzle and a personal quest into previously unknown territory that is freshly entertaining to study and ponder.  I’ve been playing the Spring Hill scenarios from my old Embrace an Angry Wind game.  Wargaming always adds so much to my understanding of military history.  It’s like having an interactive map of the battlefield that allows you to explore the juxtaposition of forces and timing and terrain.  So it is a perfect time for me to read Gillum’s book.  If nothing else I learned that my previous considerations of the affair, as complicated as some of them were, did not match the complexity of the “real” story Gillum reveals by stitching all these narratives together. I salute him for that.