Backfire, Again: The Collapse in Afghanistan

As the epic final victory of the Taliban descended upon Afghanistan these past few weeks I happened to be thumbing through the Vietnam War section of my library.  I finally read a couple of books that I had only skimmed before and I reread several passages from books that I studied off and on for years.  One of those books was Backfire by historian Loren Baritz.  In attempting to sum up America's involvement in South Vietnam the author writes: “If the allegiance of a people to its government was a key, as it always is with counterinsurgency, it becomes self-defeating to support a narrowly based regime whose chief claim on our support might otherwise be its mere stability.” (page 232)

Remember that word, counterinsurgency, because it is the same strategy we used for most (not all) of the War in Afghanistan.  It is the strategy implemented by the best military generals America had to offer.  As in Vietnam, counterinsurgency was our way to keep the Taliban beaten back with minimal casualties on our part between 2007 and 2015, the middle years of the war.  

Seen this way, we can divide the war generally into three phases of often repetitive activity.  Phase One (2001 through 2006) saw America neutralize the Talbian's control of Afghanistan in a brilliant conventional war, forcing the Islamic extremists into guerilla warfare while we sought Osama bin Laden.  Phase Three (2015 through the present) was the transition of the war from American counter-insurgency and patrol operations to training and equipping the Afghan army to fend for itself.

The sudden collapse of that American-trained army and, consequently, of the Afghan government reflects how little the population in Afghanistan actually supported that government.  Vietnam and Afghanistan are tribal countries in distinct ways.  In both countries the vast majority of the people do not care for what is happening outside their village or province.  These are not natural cultures for America to unify into a nation.  For that reason both countries collapsed after the US pulled out.  Only in the case of Afghanistan the collapse is happening all around us while we are still there.  In fact, President Biden sent 5,000 troops back into the country in the last couple of weeks to protect a single airfield, the only escape route for thousands of civilians.  

The comparisons of the fall of Kabul with the fall of Saigon in 1975 are prevalent in the media and are easy to make.  Both ended with a desperate airlift, partly with the same model helicopter still in service over these 46 years.  Both involved American “nation-building” by supporting a government America largely invented led by local leaders without the popular support of the people.  Both involved American troops fighting in counter-insurgency mode and effectively neutralizing the enemy (over and over again) except for some terrorist attacks.   We ultimately lost both wars because the American-trained indigenous army caved-in to an aggressive, fast-moving counteroffensive by our enemy.
 

These events were sudden, but they began weeks ago and one effect of that is recently I reviewed my primary posts on the War in Afghanistan on this blog.  It seems it has not been the main subject of any post since 2015.  In September 2009, I blogged a remembrance of the whole need to go to Afghanistan to begin with.  In that post, and others since, I pointed out that “there has never been a successful 'shotgun democracy' in history.”  In other words, a democracy created by America and forced upon a culture that was otherwise not conducive to democracy.

Clearly, this is and was the case in Afghanistan and its peoples.  It is a land of tribes that are either united against a common “invader” or fighting each other for the control of the country.  This factors in to a post I made in June 2010 about President Obama's understandable yet absurd decision to ask General Stanley McChrystal to resign because of a Rolling Stone hit-piece on McChrystal.  Joking remarks were made, chiefly by his staff, about then Vice-President Joe Biden and the view of the war by the American grunt officers.

Quoting the article I wrote: “When McChrystal arrived in Afghanistan to begin his mission his staffers joked that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), as western forces are collectively known, stood for 'I Suck at Fighting' or 'In Sandals and Flip-Flops.'” Such humor is not uncommon in war and certainly is reminiscent of American grunts in Vietnam.  The article concludes: “So far, counterinsurgency has succeeded only in creating a never-ending demand for the primary product supplied by the military: perpetual war. There is a reason that President Obama studiously avoids using the word "victory" when he talks about Afghanistan. Winning, it would seem, is not really possible. Not even with Stanley McChrystal in charge."

When McChrystal was dismissed I posted my dissatisfaction with the decision.  I was particularly displeased with way Michael Hastings wrote the Rolling Stone story.  Essentially, President Obama chose to let a journalistic hit-piece dictate American foreign policy.  What a sad shame reflecting the poor leadership of an inexperienced president.  

At the time I wrote: “The McChrystal story was basically nothing more than a report about private jokes made by staffers reflecting frustration. In that sense the media of our society has become the worst joke of all. Hastings chose to elevate the common, flip attitude of precision military killers over and above the importance of the mission they were setting up. Hastings reported the trivial at the expense of the critical.”

That could be Afghanistan in a nutshell – elevating the trivial and unimportant at the expense of the critical leadership by the few American generals who understood what could and could not be accomplished.  But it wasn't all bad news.  We did achieve some victories, particularly when we killed Osama bin Laden, the whole reason we went to Afghanistan to begin with. In “Sometimes A Victory” I pondered whether or not Pakistan was “another Cambodia,” a safe haven for the Taliban the way the Vietcong and North Vietnamese used sanctuaries in Cambodia during the Vietnam War.  At the time, I didn't think the comparisons were a clear-cut as they might seem.  But my thinking has evolved on that since.

Marking the ten year anniversary of the war, I wrote “Forever War” detailing the transition of military leadership from McChrystal to General David Petraeus.  Overall strategy and several operations were discussed at the time.  Kill-Capture was the most prominent one I mentioned.  And I noted that where McChrystal sought to minimize artillery support and air strikes in favor of not killing Afghan civilians as collateral damage, Petraeus loosened these restrictions in order to make the Afghan army (such as it was) more confident.  This, of course, brings back the ghosts of Vietnam and “free-fire zones” and the incompetent corruption of the South Vietnamese army.  In both wars, counter-insurgency on behalf of an unpopular government was our answer.

This was followed with “We Can't Win It Long Enough”, a post that ended up being my last word on the war from a personal perspective until now.  At the time, I was wrestling with myself over the whole situation, trying to better articulate what I thought about the conduct of operations.  McChrystal had stated that, after ten years, we were only half way through the war.  He turned out to be spot-on but the end was nothing like he envisioned, of course.

At the time I opined: “But, here’s something feasible, if indeed the war needs to last another decade as McChrystal says. A brigade of regular infantry (4,000-5,000 troops) remains in three or four remote areas of Afghanistan protecting a handful of bases out of which an additional 1,000 or so special forces troops are deployed on continued kill-capture missions. An Afghan force of 200,000 troops (advised by teams of American military staff with modest American security forces – 1,000 more officers and instructors with a few good fire teams alongside to protect them) patrols the country and prevents organized insurgents from massing and controlling provinces as they did as recently as 2009.

“That may be wishful thinking. The uncertain component here, of course, is can the Afghan’s do their part? We are militarily winning the war as of this post, though the press is doing all it can to misinform otherwise. The price-tag of America's continuing its presence in Afghanistan after 2014 along the lines of what I mention above is affordable. So, we can economically afford to remain there. But, the Afghan’s have to become a significant military force for this scaled back approach to work. Right now, there are many challenges to training the Afghan security forces anything beyond the basics in self-defense. They have no true offensive, striking capability.

“But, where I become truly conflicted (which muddles my articulation) is that this still results in a 'shotgun democracy'. I just don’t think such democracies last. Eventually, Afghanistan will most likely revert to some sort of central, tribal power. This has been the case for centuries there. So, while America might continue to fight the war, I do not think it can lessen the karmic weight of cultural history. In that sense Afghanistan is  a winnable but ultimately unsustainable war. We simply can’t keep winning it long enough.

“In this way Afghanistan is most like Vietnam. But, in the sense of a possible lasting presence it is more like Korea. America has maintained an usually large military presence in South Korea (as well as in Germany since 1945) since that war’s cease-fire. (The Korean War has never officially ended. Both nations are still, diplomatically speaking, at war 60 years later.) But, for decades deployment to Korea has meant a peaceful tour whereas deployment to Afghanistan would be to initiate and support kill/capture missions. A different thing indeed. So, we rationally snake our way back to a similarity with Vietnam. Even when American troops were used “defensively” they were harassed and attacked by enemy fire (think the 1968 TET offensive, simultaneously a decisive American military victory, yet political and cultural defeat).”

Finally, in 2015 I reviewed a prophetically titled book Why We Lost, a retired general's account of our military misadventures in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  Much of that post quoted from the book by Daniel P. Bolger.  Part of it was my own opinion: "'A sensible look at American military strengths in 2001 showed a clear alternative to grinding counterinsurgency campaigns. As a joint force and as individual services, the US military recognized the value of short, decisive conventional conflicts waged for limited ends: Panama in 1989, Iraq in 1991, Bosnia in 1995, and Kosovo in 1999. Force composition and training reflected this short-war bias. Employed thusly, American airpower and SOF in Afghanistan in 2001, and airpower and armor in Iraq in 2003, worked as advertised.

"'Had that ended our efforts, we would have been fighting well within our means. Admiring war colleges would have studied the brilliant opening rounds as models of lightning war. But here success undid us. Rightly impressed by the innovation and speed of the initial attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq and thoroughly convinced of the quality of our volunteer troops, successive generals in command at the four-, three-, and two-star levels signed on for more, a lot more, month by month, then year by year. In doing so, we did not heed Sun Tzu's caution. We did not understand our enemies.' (page 429)

“So, after decades of attempting to culturally redeem ourselves from our loss in Vietnam, with some limited success in the 1990's, we find ourselves today reflecting with General Bolger on two lost wars and two fragile societies on the verge of either deteriorating into the control of our sworn enemies or, having fought the good fight to excess, new enemies have emerged partly created by our own efforts. Why We Lost is a fascinating read. Bolger is an articulate, blunt, military mind, his opinions are solidly grounded in facts.

“The most troubling fact of all is that we fought these wars and attempted to end both of them but American forces remain committed to both countries. Like a quagmire, we are bogged down in situations that have lost context with our original intent and Bolger demonstrates why this is so. I feel after reading his book that it is unfinished, just as our involvement is unfinished. Bolger offers a fine perspective on how we got into this shoddy fix. He offers no suggestion as to where we go from here. From a strictly military perspective, we have gone too far already.”

Since then, like most of America, I rarely thought about Afghanistan.  I did not expect victory.  I did not expect the Afghans (or the Iraqis for that matter) to project meaningful power and protect their shotgun democracies.  I really didn't think much about Afghanistan at all.  Until a couple of weeks ago when the Taliban began to rapidly overrun the country.  Suddenly, everything America had worked for with the Afghans collapsed into pathetic nothingness.  I didn't expect that either.  Though certainly President Trump began the draw-down that placed America in an awkward situation, it is on President Joe Biden's watch that this debacle occurred – without warning and seemingly without expectation.  Tragically, everyone ignored a memo from American diplomats in Kabul sent weeks before warning of the need to begin evacuating civilians.

This is worse than Vietnam.  At least South Vietnam continued to exist for a couple more years after America left the war.  In Afghanistan, the Taliban recaptured the whole country before we could even leave.  America has never been beaten like this before and Biden will have to shoulder the blame – or collapse under its weight.  By the time Saigon was captured in 1975 President Gerald Ford had little association with events and the personal political fallout was minimal.  Here we still have troops in-country, our enemies have recaptured almost everything and now we apparently have to wait for September 11 to officially exit while allowing for the escape of American civilians and as many Afghans who supported us as we can get out.

What a pathetic mess.  I am shocked.  Why did we not respond to the diplomatic memo?  Biden certainly has no clue what is happening and, frankly, looks shell-shocked.  He has already looked confused and out-of-touch during the first seven months of his bold but poorly organized, shoot-yourself-in-the-foot administration.  Fumbling incompetence seems the only distinguishing quality of his leadership.  I have seen no indication that anyone in charge of anything military-related in Afghanistan saw this coming.  We spent hundreds of billions of dollars training and equipping the Afghan army for nothing.  Worse than nothing.  Defeat.  The Taliban has all our arms and equipment.  Michael Hastings could not have contrived crap this deep for the Rolling Stone.  Yet here we are at the end of another Vietnam.

Like Vietnam, the War in Afghanistan was a conventional army fighting a “war of attrition” against what would classically be labeled as an irregular army.  The Taliban never had any tanks or helicopters with which to fight the war.  Instead, they used standard guerrilla actions not all that different from the Vietcong.  The Taliban and the Vietcong are clearly cousins in the history of contemporary warfare.

Like Vietnam, the “host” government was setup by America, reflected American values, and never had the support of the indigenous population.  You might think that someone would have read what Loren Baritz wrote about counter-insurgency and culture back in 1985 and said, “yeah, let's not try that again.”  Yet, somehow we did try that again.  Aside from Afghanistan being more expensive and Vietnam being more deadly for Americans, the situations are mirror images reflecting the fact that America and its military have not fundamentally changed like they thought after Vietnam.

Strangely, unlike Vietnam, there was never a major anti-war movement against Afghanistan and that may have cost us the war.  We had all agreed we went in there because that was where Osama bin Laden was.  It took us almost ten years to kill him and even then it was in another country, but instead of declaring victory we were all tied up with “nation-building” with an impossible culture – again.  

You'd think if there was ever a reason to oppose this war it was how much it already resembled Vietnam before our final collapse.  But American opposition to the war was minimal.  Our longest war kept going out of general apathy about being there.  Because there were no mass cries for peace, the war continued and went on and on until we lost it.   Without civilian pressure generals and politicians lose their minds.

My theory is that this is because there is no draft.  And in a crazy way, Afghanistan is the best possible argument for a national draft.  Those that died for their country in Afghanistan were volunteers.  That is a important difference between this war and the Vietnam War.  In Vietnam, mother's sons who did not volunteer, who were required to serve their country, died by the tens of thousands.  The 2,354 American dead in Afghanistan were all volunteers.  

Of course, all mother's grieve when their sons and daughters are killed in combat, whether or not they volunteered.  But with a draft, mothers can rage against the system that sent their babies to war with the added spice of “we did not ask for this.”  Because draftees died without requesting to serve their deaths are felt differently.  If enough mothers experience this “we did not ask for this” rage it can start an anti-war movement in a way that definitely happened in Vietnam (Another Mother For Peace) but was never even an issue in Afghanistan.       

But perhaps that is reason for hope too.  Since that “we did not ask for this” rage never really materialized in America maybe Afghanistan will not be another Vietnam.  It went on so long and so far away with so much apathy by the American people that perhaps it will not damage our national psyche the same way Vietnam did.  Or perhaps since we lost in Vietnam it makes losing in Afghanistan easier to take.  That's not really a hope so much as a realization.  We wake up to the fact that no one knew what we were doing in Afghanistan.  And after we killed Osama bin Laden nothing else seemed especially urgent until it all fell apart. 

Maybe it only looms big right now because it is so fresh and sudden and inexplicably weak.  That will hurt us in terms of foreign policy.  And it definitely hurts Biden politically – thereby, paradoxically, strengthening Trump's 2024 possibilities even though it was Trump, not Biden, who dangerously drew-down our forces.  He bragged about it recently.  Too bad his base will instantly forgive him and everyone else will tend to forget what he said.  Instead, burned into our minds are the images of a confused Biden, distanced at Camp David, presiding over a virtual conference about the collapse.  It is too surreal to believe.  All so remote and disconnected.  I keep thinking that I'm sleeping and this all just a really screwed up dream.  But, alas, I am awake and it is reality that is screwed.