Reading Hue 1968

 

Proof of purchase.

 

I am not a “grunt” military history enthusiast.  That is, I have only an abstract interest in tactics.  I am interested in strategy and operations far more than I am about the detailed stories of soldiers.  War is terrible everywhere it is fought.  It is not difficult to find heroic and horrifying grunt stories to tell but that is not the perspective of military history that I prefer.  

The work of authors like Keith William Nolan and Mark Bowden are exceptions.  The former wrote many interesting accounts soldiers fighting in campaigns of the Vietnam War.  The latter has most famously written Black Hawk Down, which is a fine read (and was later made into a good movie).

I bought a first edition of Bowden's Hue 1968 when it was published back in 2017.  But it has sat on my book shelves until recently.  I bought it because I figured I would get around to reading it sometime.  That time turned out to be just before my recent trip to Destin.  I had finished rereading a lot of Tolkien and was ready for something completely different.  

Hue 1968 does not disappoint.  It is a terrific weaving of the stories of several different people representing all perspectives in the fighting for Hue during the Tet Offensive.  Bowden masterfully follows several Viet Cong members/supporters as well as many America soldiers and marines of diverse ranks, the civilians of the city, as well as the American military leaders and politicians that all became engulfed in three weeks of often savage fighting for Hue, the most important city in Vietnamese culture.

As background, the Communists orchestrated a massive nation-wide offensive at the beginning of Tet, the Vietnamese New Year celebration.  Almost every major city was attacked simultaneously throughout South Vietnam.  The fighting was over in about three days in most places.  The Viet Cong failed everywhere.  

Their attacks within the capital city of Saigon were captured by American television.  The fighting there lasted about a ten days. Long enough for the images of the war to jolt the American people, who had recently been told by America's military and political leaders that the war was entering its final phase.  Victory would soon be ours.  It did not appear that way on television.

Saigon was secured and the Viet Cong were decimated everywhere.  But, as Bowden details, the “main” Communist attack was at Hue because of the city's cultural significance and the fact that it was previously untouched by the war.  The Communists intended to shock the American public with Tet in general and at Hue particularly.  The fighting there was heavy and lasted a little over three weeks, supplying American homes with even more frightful images of war.  Hue 1968 is about the “high water mark” of the Tet Offensive and its impact upon America.

Before I evaluate Bowden's insights in the book, I want to give an example of how he uses the personalities of actual people, most of whom he personally interviewed, to tell the story of the Battle for Hue in 1968.  I have chosen Marine Captain James Cooligan who starts the book assigned as an adviser to a South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) battalion.  With Coolican is Frank Doezema, a radio specialist.  When Tet strikes, Doezema has just 39 days left in his tour of duty.  These are some random samples of Bowden's excellent, novelist-like writing.

“In the fall of 1967, there had been frequent violent clashes in this sector, and contrary to the poor reputation of South Vietnam's forces, the men Coolican and Doezema served with were aggressive and competent.  During those months, the two tall Americans saw far more combat than most of their countrymen, and despite their size, neither had been hit.  In time, they felt lucky to be paired.” (page 13)  The much taller height of most American soldiers compared to the shorter Vietnamese made them obvious targets for Viet Cong and North Vietnamese (NVA) snipers.

“With the ARVN troops he 'advised,' he was the ignorant and inexperienced one.  The very idea of a college boy from suburban Philadelphia having something worthwhile to impart about combat was laughable.  The Vietnamese officers Coolican served with were far better soldiers than he was.  They had been at war for years.  The only important thing he had to offer them was Doezema's radio, the ability to dial up American air and artillery – a game changer.  This was why he was so important to them, not because he had knowledge to impart.  Without his radio, he was nothing more than a tall marine who drew fire.” (page 15)

With Doezema being a “short-timer” he was withdrawn to the US military compound in Hue.  Coolican requested and received a transfer to the ARVN's elite fighting force, the Hac Bao, which was subsequently furloughed for the Tet holiday. Coolican paid Doezema a visit at the American military compound in Hue.  Doezema was on tower guard duty.

“At once Doezema could see NVA soldiers moving in the streets below, hundreds of them.  Most seemed to be congregated in the shadow of Hue University.  When they advanced with rifles and rocket tubes, Doezema raked them with an ear-shattering blas of his machine gun.  Those that did not fall dragged the others back.  A few minutes later they came again, he raked them once more, and once more he drove them back.  He draped a white towel over his neck, checked his weapon, and waited.” (pp. 114 – 115)

“Doezema opened fire again.  He was working hard when a rocket exploded against the tower's roof.  His gun went silent.  

“Coolican ran to the tower and climbed the narrow platform to reman the position.  The grenade has sent shards of tin slashing straight down on Doezema.  The marine captain found his friend badly sliced and bleeding heavily.  One leg was nearly severed.  When he tried to move Doezema, putting him over one shoulder to carry him down the ladder, the mangled leg prevented them from threading the opening.  So Coolican laid him back down on the tower floor.  He took the towel Doezema had draped around his neck and used it as a tourniquet.  He then injected two shots of morphine, and with his combat knife cut through the remaining tissue attaching Doezema's leg.  He then put him on his shoulders, threaded through the trap door, and carried him to the ground.

“He put one hand oh his friend's chest and leaned down.  He wasn't sure, perhaps of the morphine, that Doezema could even hear him.

“'Frank, we are going to get you out of here,' he said.  'And when I get home I'm coming to see you in Kalamazoo.  I've got to go.'

“He ran for one of the grenade launchers he had collected the previous day on his trip down to Hue, he grabbed several bands of machine gun ammo, and climbed back up to the tower.”  (page 116)

“In fact, after the flurry of initial attacks, the enemy seemed to have backed off.  The Americans knew it couldn't last – but it did.  It amazed Coolican, who could see how vulnerable they were.  But he took advantage of the lull to turn the tower over to others and climbed back down to raise Phu Bai on the radio.  For the time being, he told the command center there, the compound was secure.  They needed help, but there was no immediate crisis.  More urgent was the need to get some of the wounded men out, like Doezema.  He wasn't going to make it if he didn't get to a hospital.” (pp.  117 – 118)  

Tragically, Doezema dies from his wounds, mere days before he was scheduled to go home.  Meanwhile, the battle unfolds.  To begin with, the American military does not believe the situation in Hue is a big threat.  “A few enemy platoons” were causing problems.  Initially, the American focus was nationwide and then specifically upon Saigon.  Hue seemed like a sideshow that the ARVN should be able to handle.  After all, Hue had never been attacked before.

Eventually, however, the size of the Communist force in Hue became known, as did the fact they they controlled practically the entire city.  After Saigon was resolved, the American media immediately headed for Hue, the last bastion of the offensive.  It was soon obvious that the fighting there was stubborn and deadly.  As American reinforcements arrived, the new commanders thought they knew best how to handle the situation in Hue.  But Coolican knew better.  

“That night, the major consulted with Coolican.  After his heroic efforts in defense of the compound on the first night, the captain had rejoined the elite Hac Bao unit as soon as he could get a chopper into the fortress.

“Coolican has stayed despite freighting news from home.  Soon after he got there, he was told that he needed to call home immediately.  Such a message could mean only bad news.  Patched from [South Vietnamese General] Truong's headquarters through the MACV to Hawaii and then to Camp Pendleton, Coolican was linked to his wife, Jean, in a radio call – only one could speak at a time.  Jean told him that their seventeen-month-old son had just undergone emergency brain surgery.  She heard shooting and explosions in the background when her husband spoke.  She had no idea exactly where in Hue he was, but it sounded like a tough spot, and she knew from watching the evening news that fighting in the city was fierce.  She had already received official notice days earlier that her husband had been wounded there – a minor injury, but marines had their protocol.  Given the crisis with their son, she knew that he could probably qualify for emergency leave, but she made a decision on the spot to urge hi to stay.  Given the intensity of the battle, she worried that trying to get out might be more dangerous than staying.  The surgery was done and their son, while in critical condition, was recovering.  Her husband was due to come home in just six weeks anyway.

“'I'm dealing with this situation here,' she told him, 'and I don't want to be dealing with another situation there.'

“Which was good, because Coolican didn't want to leave.  It was a critical time in the battle.  He'd invested so much of himself in it, and expected the Hac Bao to be in the thick of things at the finish.  The ARVN had been unable to push back very far, but Coolican knew they were far more experienced and skilled at city fighting than the newly arrived marine battalion.” (pp. 405 – 406)

“Like most American officers, the major expressed a dim view of the fighting abilities of the ARVN.  Coolican urged Thompson to consider coordinating closely with them, but the major just wanted them to stay out of his way.  Truong had had his chance; now the marines were going to show him how things were done.  This attitude – and the detachment it fostered – was about to contribute to a tragic misunderstanding.  Thompson believed – he would always insist he had been told this by Truong – that a battalion of South Vietnamese airborne troopers were holding a defensive position several blocks south of Mang Ca, along Mai Thuc Street...

“In fact, the ARVN battalion along the street...had departed the previous day.  They had been ordered out.  The battalion had assembled at the compound that day on broad daylight, boarded helicopters, and flown off to Phu Bai...For whatever reason, Thompson believed it was still there, and Coolican didn't know enough about all the troop movements at that point to correct him.

“'So here is what we will do,' Thompson told the captain.  'We will jump off at eight hundred hours.'

“He pointed out on the map the streets his two companies would march down, and where he wanted ARVN troops to stay, off their right side.

'''No,' Coolican told him, bracing himself – he was outranked but clearly more experienced.  'That is not going to work.  First of all, do not go down the road at any time because you will get killed, because every house is occupied.  Second, we fight at night, because when you are moving you want to move in the dark.  You do not want to move in the daytime.'

“'Well, if you are afraid,' Thompson said, 'then I will take the road,' meaning he would cover his own flank.

“Coolican was insulted, but he knew better than to argue.  He had wasted breath often the previous week trying to talk sense to Task Force X-Ray.  He and the Hac Bao would not wait for morning.  They would move stealthily down and into position while it was still dark.  They would be waiting when Thompson's mean came down the street in the morning.”  (pp.  407 – 408)

Thompson's companies end up pinned down in a hellish gunfight with multiple causalities on both sides.  Eventually, he manages to call in enough support firepower to move forward and capture his objective, at the cost of many soldiers and literally destroying everything around him.  Ultimately, the Tet Offensive was a military disaster for the Communists.  Coolican helped recapture control of the Citadel in Hue and was elated with the possibilities.  With its adversary whipped, America could now invade North Vietnam and win the war.  

“With unshaken conviction about the rightness of America's mission, he was convinced when the Battle of Hue ended the United States would follow up on its hard-won victory by launching a major offensive into North Vietnam itself.” (page 532)  But, instead of triumphantly invading the North, the American public protested the war more than ever before.  President Lyndon B. Johnson paused the war effort in hopes of bringing in North Vietnam to achieve a peaceful settlement.

The phrase “peaceful settlement” made Coolican's heart sink.  “'I realized then that we had just lost the war,' said Coolican.  'Because the North Vietnamese, they were slammed during the Tet Offensive, and we could have gone after them.  We did not do it, and then my thought was...we had no intentions of winning the war.'” (page 533)   

As one of more than a dozen stories Bowden combines, Coolican's perspective is interesting for several reasons.  Though most ARVN units were corrupt and incompetent, there were still some South Vietnamese soldiers who could fight quite well when supported by American firepower.  Many, if not most, American soldiers at the beginning of 1968 did, in fact, feel there was something worth fighting for in South Vietnam.  Bowden makes this clear as well as some other important points.

That the American military did not follow up Communist failure at Tet with aggressive action was due to the impact the sizable offensive had on American politics.  The televised images and news reporting made the war less acceptable to American voters.  Our military had promised that we were entering a time when “the end comes into view” and yet the whole country was engulfed by war, if only for a few days.  Finally, the fighting in Hue lasted a couple of weeks longer than that in Saigon.  The intensity of that combat made it seem American strategy in Vietnam was all wrong and even deceitful.  American commanders seemed “clueless.”

Through Coolican and many others persons, Bowden gives us insight into the bravery and tragedy of the Battle of Hue.  It is first-rate reading that is historically accurate and has the feel of a Tom Clancy novel.  I enjoyed the book both at home and during my beach trip.  What I struggle with are Bowden's end assumptions, which are simply the standard suppositions just dressed-up in the lives of those who participated in the battle on all sides.  We were, so it goes, not winning the war even before Tet.  We were losing it and Tet simply pointed out that fact.  

Certainly, the televised images and reporting on Tet and Hue appalled Americans.  This set off a chain-reaction leading to Johnson's decision to not seek reelection and to dial back military operations in favor of possible peace talks.  That decision seems reasonable given the standard narrative of the war as Bowden presents it.  I'm not sure he is correct, however.  I finished the book some time ago but it has taken a few weeks for me to work through it mentally.

Before I draw my own conclusions, I want to step back and look at the book above the narrative level, of which Coolican provides a glimpse.  Bowden does a great job of articulating the strategic military and political situation throughout the book in addition to his masterful grunt stories.

Bowden introduces to us how Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces operated in the war, including the arduous task of backpacking with heavy loads for about four months through Laos and South Vietnam in order to get in position for the Tet offensive.  Outside Hue the Communists were issued new uniforms so they would have a bit of “spit and polish” when they made their attacks.  They were expecting a national uprising and wanted to display their professionalism as an army.  They thought they would capture Hue and its population of about 140,000 people would back the “liberation.”  With such clout they would be able to end the war with a great victory.  

But that is not what happened.  They attacked in their new uniforms and captured the city but the population, while not hostile, was not supportive either.  South Vietnamese tried to go about their lives but were soon caught-up in the street fighting.  Thousands were killed but the exact number is in dispute.  Many of those who were killed were sentenced to death by impromptu courts set up by the North Vietnamese during their control of the city.  Anyone known to have previously supported or been a part of the South Vietnamese government was put to death.

Meanwhile, the American response toward Hue was lackluster.  General William Westmoreland refused to believe the city had fallen, even though it had.  He repeatedly misled the press about the status of the city.  In a war where the enemy usually operated in small units with hit and run tactics, our commanders could not comprehend that so many enemy troops had assaulted the city.  It was their largest concentration of the war so far so it seemed ridiculous to believe it was happening.  

In fact, the American disconnect from reality at Hue allowed the Viet Cong to maintain control of the city for a couple of weeks, which is how they could set up trials and commit executions while simultaneously fighting to possess the city.

As Bowden explains, only a few months before, Johnson was showing off Westmoreland to bolster support for the war.  The message to the American public was clear.  Not only were winning the war, according to a variety of metrics including dead body count, the “end was coming into view.”  Westmoreland believed the war would end in the next two years.  

Westmoreland also believed a major attack was brewing by the enemy and that it would come at Khe Sanh, a remote marine artillery base near the Laotian border.  The North Vietnamese did indeed attack at Khe Sanh but that was not their true objective.  They were going to capture Hue and trigger a national uprising.  So, according to Bowden, both sides were wrong about what was going to happen.

Bowden addresses the conditions facing the citizens of South Vietnam.  More than anything they feared the North, which is why there was no national uprising.  Yet, they were governed by a weak and corrupt system where most of the army did not have faith in the national leadership.  There was the inherent friction between Buddhists and Catholics in South Vietnam.  All of this led to a disjointed national identify floundering against resilient revolutionaries and with a flood of American aid that created a bloated system of corruption.

Stellar CBS News anchorman Walter Cronkite visited South Vietnam during Tet to report from the front lines for a CBS special report on the war to be aired around the end of February 1968.  He arrived at Hue and conducted some interviews as well as tour safe areas of the battle zone.  Cronkite's report, while not anti-war, documented the uncertainty of knowing exactly where we stood in the war.  

Hue did not seem to be an indication that America was winning the war.  In fact, it indicated that the Communists had surprised our military and political leadership while simultaneously destroying one of the country's most treasured cities.  It was the personification of the chaos of war and Cronkite reflected that in his special report.  The American public, fed weeks of images of fighting from Saigon and Hue, was mostly dismayed by the whole offensive.  The President saw his legacy in peril and eased-up on the war.

Bowden is right to highlight all this.  Making it the broader narrative while stitching together the personal stories of so many involved with Hue allows Bowden to generally sum up the entire war in this one vicious battle.  The subtitle for the book is “A Turning Point of the American War in Vietnam.”  That is accurate as well.  

The Battle of Hue cost about 250 American lives while another 1,554 were wounded.  ARVN losses were 458 dead and 2,700 wounded.  The Communist Front lost between 2,400 and 5,000 troops.  Adding the civilians that died the total easily tops 10,000 causalities.  Bowden states that no other battle in the war comes close to Hue in its destructiveness.  He admits that Khe Sanh was just as deadly but that fighting took place over the course of six months compared to just a little over three weeks at Hue.

Bowden's conclusion is that though militarily a failure, the Tet Offensive and the Battle of Hue amounted to strategic victories for the Communists.  Obviously, the impact of the offensive was successful in undermining American support for the war effort.  That is what I call the standard interpretation of the war.   While Hue was a Communist defeat for the national uprising, it was simultaneously deflating to the American will to fight.  So North Vietnam actually won despite being mauled.

This is where I have a bone to pick with Bowden and the standard interpretation as presented in Hue 1968.  Bowden writes compellingly about the importance of Hue and to why the main Communist effort was intended for there.  He aptly depicts the caution and fear with which the Front was received in South Vietnam and why there was no national uprising.  And he depicts in detail the how the Viet Cong were systematically eliminated across the country with tens of thousands killed.

But Bowden determines this to be a defeat because the American public was suddenly turned off by the war.  The shock of the Tet offensive and the added weeks of news coverage of heavy street fighting in Hue left the impression that America was fighting a losing war even though American troops had just practically wiped out the Viet Cong.  And this is what I don't understand.

There is nothing controversial about Bowden's book.  It offers a straightforward, front line coverage of some very bloody fighting.  The Johnson Administration had made an effort in late-1967 to say that we were winning the war and it would likely end in about two years.  The Battle of Hue indicated the enemy was strong and did not leave the impression that we were winning the war.  The American public turned against the war.  This forced Johnson toward peace negotiations instead of victory.  And you know the rest of the story.

But the fact remains that the Viet Cong were practically wiped out in three weeks of fighting.  Never before had they been so soundly defeated.  The NVA were also defeated over a longer period of time at Khe Sanh.  Why would we allow the televised grotesqueness of Hue cheat of us of the victory we had so clearly won?  What does that say about America?  I mean, we are talking only three weeks of fighting in one city and the whole tide of the war turned against America?

These questions have puzzled me off and on for decades and reading Bowden's book just reopened the baffling history for me.  America saw defeat (or at least a stalemate) precisely when the Viet Cong and NVA were at their lowest point.  Oddly, the morale of both sides dropped even though it was a one-sided victory for America.

I find myself agreeing with Captain Coolican.  We should have been gun-ho and invaded the North.  It was our best chance of winning the war.  But, at the time, Johnson feared the Chinese, who had previously attacked us in Korea, would reinforce the NVA and the conflict would escalate between major powers.  That, too, is part of the standard interpretation.

But Johnson was wrong about China.  They resented the strong NVA association with the Soviet Union.  They likely would not have come to the aid of North Vietnam had America limited the invasion to the southern part of the country, to push the NVA back to where it could no longer infiltrate South Vietnam.  To cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail at its head, around Vinh.  That was certainly an option discussed by the military in prior years.

With North Vietnam on its heels, they would nevertheless have fought tenaciously, and it would have cost many American lives.  But the war went on to kill some 25,000 more Americans after the Tet Offensive anyway.  A few thousand casualties to gain ground in North Vietnam would have been the equivalent of victory – with far fewer deaths.

How much stronger would America's hand at the negotiation table have been if the withdrawal of American forces from North Vietnam itself was a condition that had to be negotiated?  There would have been no question of the legitimacy of South Vietnam nor of American resolve.  The North would sue for peace to get their country back and America would have left South Vietnam.

Of course, the North would probably have attacked the South again at some point anyway after we left.  I do not claim that an American invasion of the North would have ended that North's hunger for national unification.  I claim that we could have “won” our part of the war and gotten ourselves out of Vietnam with fewer casualties if we had invaded after Tet.  Few seriously take up this perspective because what I have outline as the standard interpretation is now taken as the gospel.  

But skilled soldiers like Captain Coolican, who understood the South Vietnamese better than typical American commanders and politicians, saw the aftermath of Tet as an opportunity for victory, whereas the American public simply wanted peace.  It seems to me that the American public defeated itself at the price of many more American dead in the years that followed.

Of course, this speculation is beyond the scope of Bowden's excellent narrative.  So, it is a bit unfair to critique him for not making a point that is not directly related of the Battle of Hue.  I only mention it because the book made me ponder the war from a strategic perspective again and it contains a strategic component, albeit weak.  In fairness, Bowden seems to understand that the standard narrative still leaves a bad taste in everyone's mouth.

“The entire Tet Offensive was driven by grandiose misconceptions.  Hanoi hugely overreached when it took Hue.  More pragmatic North Vietnamese leaders including Ho Chi Minh and General Vo Nguyen Giap tried to stop it, and professional soldiers down the ranks saw right through the party's propaganda.  They knew they could take the city but that they could not hold it for long.  They lost the argument but were proven right.  A top Communist general, reflecting on the whole Tet Offensive years later, wrote, 'We did not correctly evaluate the specific balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy,' and called the objectives, 'beyond our actual strength...in part on an illusion based on our subjective desires.' [...]

“The takeover of Hue was a huge success for Hanoi in only one way: it achieved complete tactical surprise, despite [Westmoreland's] claims otherwise.  Conversely, it represents perhaps the worst allied intelligence failure of the war.  That's true of the entire Tet Offensive, and particularly true of the attack on Hue.  Hanoi spent months amassing an army around the city without attracting notice.  And although it is true that after three weeks of heavy fighting the enemy was driven off, it was the impact of the initial blow that resonated most loudly.” (pp. 524 – 525)

It seems to me fair to add that viewing Tet and the fighting at Hue as representing a defeat to America was a negative “illusion based on our subjective desires” as much as any fantasy North Vietnam entertained.  The whole of Tet and its afterward was a tragic illusion for both sides.  But it did not have to be.  And the consequences of America's illusion of defeat were telling.

“Still, there is no question that the Vietnamese people lost something precious when Hanoi won the war.  One young woman from Ho Chi Minh City, born decades after the war ended, told me that her generation looks to Seoul and Tokyo and asks, 'Is this what we would have been if we hadn't chased the Americans away?'  And while the Communist Party has relaxed its hold on the economy, to great effect, Vietnam remains a strictly authoritarian state, where speaking your mind, or even recounting truthful stories of your own experience, can get you in trouble.” (pp. 527 – 528)

I recommend Bowden's Hue 1968 as the definitive account of this important struggle and its wider implications for both sides.  For me personally, it brought into sharper focus how both sides misinterpreted the situation, the North before and America after the Battle of Hue.  Both sides fell victim to their own illusions.  The North overreached and was badly punished.  Meanwhile, it seems to me, America failed to reach far enough in the aftermath.  Regardless, this is a terrific, action-packed, thought-provoking read.  Which is exactly what I expect from well-written history.