Reading About Chickamauga

My copies of David Powell's Barren Victory (1991) and This Terrible Sound (2000).  The later is probably one of my last printed wargame purchases as I have to greatly curtail the increasing demand for shelf space.  A copy of This Terrible Sound (1992) by Peter Cozzens, the best single-volume history of the Battle of Chickamauga, is also shown.  Powell's trilogy, The Chickamauga Campaign, is the definitive source today. That Powell entitled his regimental-scale game after Cozzens's book ties everything in this post together. 

Also while consuming Dostoevsky and my Vietnam histories in the first half of 2022, I read two histories in synchronicity about the Battle of Chickamauga.  Having visited that battlefield several times in my life (most recently in 2010), it is a captivating battle for me.  It was the second bloodiest battle of the War Between the States (after Gettysburg) and it featured some fascinating and incredibly chaotic fighting, particularly on the first day.

I read about the battle in Peter Cozzens's now classic account This Terrible Sound alongside David A. Powell's marvelous trilogy entitled The Chickamauga Campaign.  I have the Cozzens in hardback and Powell is loaded on my kindle app.  Cozzens offers a single 550 page account that is well-written and informative.  I bought it for reference purposes soon after it came out in 1992 but have never read it cover-to-cover until now.  Powell, with almost 1,900 pages to work with across three volumes, goes into even more detail.  I loaded up on these volumes in 2017 for $2.99 each.  A steal.  I knew I would read them some day.  Each author is insightful in their analysis of the fighting, which broadens my understanding.

With his superb trilogy, Powell has supplanted Cozzens as the ranking authority on the battle.  The first volume givens plenty of background leading up to the battle including a great overview of the Tullahoma Campaign.  This was a stroke of genius by Federal General William Rosecrans.  Without fighting a battle, he managed to maneuver Confederate General Braxton Bragg completely out of Tennessee.

Such an accomplishment would ordinarily be noteworthy but in the case of Rosecrans, his campaign came after the stellar twin Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg.  The Lincoln administration was expecting Rosecrans to finish-off Bragg and bring the war to a close.  Instead, Bragg escaped, even though he surrendered much territory to do so.  The administration was pressing Rosecrans to bring Bragg to battle.  Powell points out that Rosecrans bitterly resented the fact that his very real success was not acknowledged.

The initial volume continues into the first day of battle at Chickamauga.  It was “a mad irregular battle” with both sides attacking and counterattacking in the thick woods of northwest Georgia.  It was while reading this volume that I really understood for the first time the incredible number of flanking attacks by both sides during the first day.  It seemed that each time a Yankee or Rebel advance pushed the enemy back, it would be caught in its flank by an unsuspecting counterattack.  Neither side could see much of anything in the rugged woods and the few fields available were littered with bodies.

The Chickamauga Campaign trilogy by David A. Powell in my Kindle library.

The next volume deals with the second day's fighting which culminated in General James Longstreet's massive breakthrough attack and routing of the Union line.  This lead to General George Thomas's historic make-shift stand on Snodgrass Hill, which is also covered in extensive detail.  The breakthrough occurred largely due to Rosecrans attempting to shift his deployed army northward to support Thomas, who was holding the Union left flank against piecemeal but bloody southern attacks.  

Rosecrans was a micro-manager and issued so many orders simultaneously that he required extra aides to write and deliver them.  Unfortunately for the Yankees, some of his orders were based upon a faulty understanding of the situation.  He ordered a division out of the line to support Thomas when its support was not needed.  This division shifted just as Longstreet attacked its position, creating a gaping hole in the line that quickly spread panic through the ranks.

The Rebels rushed through the gap but the untimely wounding of General John Bell Hood created a void in the Confederate leadership at this critical moment.  The southerners were almost as disorganized and their northern counterparts and many attacks were made piecemeal.  There was no overall Confederate commander present to reorganize things.  Later Powell suggests Longstreet could have taken over but he responded late when he learned of Hood's wounding.  The chaos was unmanageable by then.

Thomas was grateful for this, recognizing that the Rebel follow-up assaults had no coordination at all.  Both Cozzens and Powell explain that Hood's wounding made the situation worse for Bragg's forces, although Powell points out that there were plenty of other things going wrong for the southerners as well.

In the end, the Yankees withdrew from Snodgrass Hill, partly by being forced from the position and partly due to the need to rejoin the rest of the army, routing toward Chattanooga as darkness fell.  The third volume of Powell's trilogy covers odds and ends pertaining to the battle.  The mistakes of Confederate cavalry leaders Joseph Wheeler (too slow and not aggressive) and Nathan Bedford Forrest (misunderstanding the Northern army after the battle), the actions of the Federal army in and around Chattanooga, and ultimately the failure of the Rebels to move aggressively against Chattanooga along with the dismissal of Rosecrans and his replacement by Thomas.  All in all, this trilogy is some of the finest military writing you will read on the War Between the States.

Most of this is covered by Cozzens as well but, again, not in as much detail.  Cozzens gives regimental details but Powell gets down into specific troop strength available.  Still, Cozzens should ne penalized simply because his book is shorter.  Both authors offer some of the interesting insights.  Powell's expansive narrative allows him to make of them.  An example of this is to consider an interesting incident that occurred in the middle of the initial Union rout.  Colonel John T. Wilder's mounted brigade was supplied with Spencer repeating rifles which could (and did) deliver a devastating concentration of firepower with the speed of a cavalry unit.  

At one point, Wilder found his command almost isolated on the southern part of the field, with the Confederate attack going away to the north following the panicked Federals running for Chattanooga.  He decided to strike Longstreet's forces in the rear, believing such an unexpected move would shatter the southern advance.

According to Cozzens, Wilder organized his brigade for an attack.  Wilder was certain his men could rout the Rebel breakthrough units and save the day.  His men were confident.  But, as they began their advance they came upon a lone figure.  Bizarrely, it was Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, who had been stationed at Rosecrans's Headquarters before the rout began.  Dana was exasperated.

“All was lost, Dana declared.  In rapid succession he told Wilder and [Smith D.] Atkins that 'our troops have fled in utter panic; that it was a worse rout than Bull Run; that General Rosecrans was probably killed or captured.'  Wilder explained his intention of taking his brigade to Thomas.  Absolutely not, Dana snapped.  He categorically forbade Wilder from making any attempt to cut his way through to the left and insisted that he withdraw at once.  Dana demanded an escort to Chattanooga.” (page 395)

Wilder was uncertain.  His rank was colonel but he had no idea how that related to an Assistant Secretary of War.  In truth, it had no bearing whatsoever.  Dana was a civilian and had no military authority to give orders.  Nevertheless, Wilder called off his attack, ordered an escort for Dana, and proceeded to gather scattered wagons and stragglers in his area and work them northward, going west of Thomas, who was at that very moment making his heroic stand on Snodgrass Hill.  Of course, Wilder had no way of knowing that for certain.  But things are always clearer in hindsight.

“To his dying day, Wilder believed he could have reach Thomas and shattered Longstreet's wing in the bargain. 'I would have struck them in flank and rear with five lines of Spencer rifles in the hands of the steadiest body of men I ever saw, and am satisfied we would have gone through them like an avalanche,' he wrote thirty years later...Atkins agreed and years later offered his measure of the two parties to the affair.  'Wilder was daring and desperate; Dana, a coward and an imbecile.'” (page 396)

Powell writes all that as well, but his deeper research and more expansive narrative reveals that Wilder's situation was more complicated than what Cozzens reckons.  For one thing, when one of his regiments went to fetch their horses they discovered that they were missing.  It turns out that a “squad of rebel cavalry had dashed in” and killed a half dozen mounts and scattered the rest before the two companies guarding them were able to drive the Rebs away.

Moreover, Wilder had no support.  The Federal units around him were too disorganized to offer any.  That meant he would have to use much of his brigade to protect his flanks as he galloped into unknown territory.  That would reduce his firepower.  Plus there was the fact that, technically, despite the Union rout, Wilder was still under orders.

“It is also important to note that Wilder’s last instruction from General [Alexander] McCook was to protect [Philip] Sheridan’s flank and rear—which he had done admirably by appearing at the Widow Glenn’s in so powerful and timely a fashion. Were not those instructions still in effect? Sheridan and [Jefferson C.] Davis were still trying to reform their commands on the hills to the west. Protection while this effort was underway would be necessary, and Wilder’s command was the best situated to do so. Moreover, Lt. Col. Gates Thurston of McCook’s staff was present and 'advised [Wilder] that I had better fall back to Lookout Mountain.'” (II, Page 311)

These are the sorts of details that were not readily available to Cozzens when he did his research 30 years ago.  Consequently, the Wilder incident serves as a good example of the manner Powell's trilogy gives a broader, deeper account of the battle.  Again, the Cozzens book is the best single-volume account of the battle available and well worth reading.  Powell demands more effort because he covers a lot more facts and situations, particularly before and after the battle.  There are even dozens of short biographies of each commander on both sides when they are first introduced.  The effort is worth it.  You get the definitive history of the Battle of Chickamauga.

One thing leads to another, as I have always said.  While reading these books  I pulled out my old copy of the wargame Barren Victory and began setting up the scenarios in it.  The same David Powell that so recently wrote the trilogy designed this very wargame over 30 years ago.  I played it a bunch back in the 1990's but haven't touched it in about 20 years.  

I was already reacquainted with the basic rules because it is part of the Civil War Brigade Series, which is the system used in Embrace an Angry Wind which I played some the last couple of years.  But in reading volume one of Powell's account, I became more aware of the crazy, erratic nature of the first day at Chickamauga.  It was literally every brigade for itself in a wild attack, counterattack and further counterattack situation.  It was some of the most confused fighting at this large scale during the war.

What suddenly struck me was how many regiments were cautiously concerned of having themselves attacked in flank, which happened many times that day.  Even when it didn't occur, regiments planned for it and were consequently more cautious to the point of becoming sometimes separated from the rest of the brigade, a disjunctive influence on the line.  I realized that Barren Victory, while insightful and a really fun game to play (being so confusing, Chickamauga is always a fun battle to recreate), I realized that this battle might perhaps be better gamed at the regimental level for the first day's fighting.

This, in turn, led me to take a peek at the wargame This Terrible Sound (also designed by Powell who named his game after the Cozzens's book) which is a regimental treatment of the battle.  I did not buy this game when it came out over 20 years ago because I tended to stay away from all the detail of regimental combat systems.  But, for the first time, I realized that with Chickamauga this minute detail is actually an enhancement.  So, I recently bought a “like new” copy of it and added it to my wargame collection.  It will probably be the last printed game I purchase for awhile.  I haven't had a chance to do anything more than read the rules so far.  I hope to play it in the near future.

I also plan a trip to the Chickamauga battlefield later this year and will post more about that battle and the battlefield whenever that happens.  In the meantime, thanks to the books and games, there is plenty to ponder about this fascinating battle, the second bloodiest ever fought in all of North America.  

Note: In creating links for this post I discovered that there is a Barren Victory II game with outstanding artwork looking for a publisher.  This would be a reprint (I think) of Dave Powell's original design.  It would be outstanding if this happens and it would definitely be a game I would make room for.  The original game never got a second printing and, therefore, the graphics with it are first-generation quality for what the The Gamers were producing back in the day.