Concerning Điện Biên Phủ: Reading The Last Valley

I bought The Last Valley for my kindle app.

Shortly after I posted "Concerning  Điện Biên Phủ" last year I purchased a book from 2004 of which I was previously unaware.  The Last Valley by Martin Windrow completely absorbed me and only now have I had time to reflect and review it.  Simply put, this is the best military history book I have read in several years.  Although its 700-plus pages mainly deal with the Battle of Điện Biên Phủ, there are a lot of details about the First Indochina War included, especially in the first 300 or so pages.  

The book casts this broader scope in order to contextualize the events surrounding the French debacle at  Điện Biên Phủ.  It succeeds brilliantly in allowing me to understand why the French took up their position there in late 1953, other significant events in the war prior to this and as the battle took place, along with insights into the battle itself.

Windrow begins by pointing out that what the Vietminh accomplished at Điện Biên Phủ was unprecedented.  “This was the first time that a non-European colonial independence movement had evolved through all the stages from guerrilla bands to a conventionally organized and equipped army able to defeat a modern Western occupier in pitched battle.” (page 41)  That seems obvious now that it is pointed out but I had never thought of it that way before.  The book is filled with “I never thought of that” moments.

Rather than follow the traditional narrative and characterize the whole thing as an incompetent French failure in the face of a resourceful Vietnamese opposition, Windrow shows how close the battle came to being a “Pyrrhic victory for General Vo Nguyen Giap.”  The French strategy was actually thoughtful and sophisticated while the Vietminh were close to being broken by effective French combat skill.  This is the true story of how bravery and perseverance by both sides resulted in narrow victory that became perceived as a major defeat.  

We begin with the isolated French strongpoint at Nà Sản in December 1952.  Repeated human wave night attacks by large numbers of Vietminh troops were beaten back and eventually repulsed by a handful of companies augmented by effective French artillery and air strikes as well as American supplied transport aircraft.  This major French victory marked a turning point in their strategy to fight the war.

Since the First Indochina War began in 1946, it had possessed a specific, largely unchanging character.  The French controlled most of the Red River Delta lowlands of Tonkin and the major cities all across Indochina, assisted by American monetary and logistical aid.  The Vietminh roamed freely through the mountains and jungles with supply and assistance increasingly coming from the secured northern border with Communist China.

With the victory at Nà Sản, the French had shown that they could take the war into the previously controlled Vietminh areas.  By establishing strongpoints they could impede the movement of Giap's forces while launching patrols out of these zones, supported by paratroop drops, to attack the Vietminh where they previously found sanctuary.  On the other hand, Giap learned an important lesson from Nà Sản as well.  If his forces could not control the battlefield's high ground, he would break off the attack.  In the face to French firepower, his greater numbers were useless in taking high ground or fortified positions.

Windrow then backtracks to the beginings of French colonialism in the region and the emergence of Ho Chi Minh as a nationalist communist leader of the Tonkin region.  This is the standard history.  The French wanted their colonies back after World War Two.  Vietnam wanted independence.  War broke out with irregular fighting occasionally punctuated by brutal intensity such as the fight for Route Coloniale 4 (RC4) in 1950.  French society was shocked when thousands were wiped out the Vietminh in this brutal attack.

Both sides committed atrocities against civilians.  The fighting was mainly contained to the northern part of the country.  “While certain areas in the south and central Vietnam were always dangerous (perhaps most notoriously the 'street without joy' on RC1 between Hue and Quang Tri in the waist of Annam), major ambushes of military conveys were particularly typical of the Tonkin/China frontier zone.” (page 102)

Windrow gives a decent overview of fighting throughout the country while concentrating on major operations in the north.  I learned a lot about the war outside of Tonkin that I did not find in other books I read and reviewed last year.  That was part of why the book was so hard for me to put down.  There is a wealth of knowledge given on the evolution of Vietminh tactics and the development of its strategy in the southern portions of Vietnam.  Still, fighting in this large area to the south was isolated and sporadic.  Most of the Vietminh tactics were on the level of terrorism with an occasional company-sized attack that destabilized the region but never was able to seriously threaten French control.

Meanwhile, Giap formed several divisions of infantry in the north, supplied, trained and advised by the Chinese.  The French built a complex array of strongpoints and fortifications along the Red River Delta and the war settled into control of two separate regions with the French controlling in most of the wetlands and cities and the Vietminh controlling everything else.  The governing and operations of the People's Army (Vietminh) is given considerable treatment with the Maoist doctrine of revolution involving political, cultural, and military aspects superbly detailed.  

Particular attention is given to the “self-criticism” that Ho, Giap and the Vietminh subjected themselves to in order to learn from their mistakes.  With a few notable exceptions along the Chinese border, however, whenever the Vietminh attacked out of their region of control they lost.  Whenever the French launched operations outside of the Delta, such as Operation Lorraine, they were beaten back.  The Delta was too vast with its thousands of villages for the French to control completely, but the inroads made by the Vietminh were never more of a nuance.

The French Expeditionary Corps is likewise detailed from its origins in the 1940's up to the fighting all around the Delta.  Initially, French troops landed in Saigon in what was then called the Cochinchina region in the far south where their control was unquestioned.  Details are provided on how the French organization and tactics changed as various generals rotated in and out of the country through the years.

Windrow points out that the Indochina was never given top priority by Paris.  It always had to struggle for trained troops, adequate support and supplies.  Part of the reason for this was because the decisions about logistics were not made by the Ministry of War Department but by the Ministry of Overseas Affairs.  So politics in France were basically in discord for the whole of the war.  The French fought with a mixture of infantry from their African colonies which were of uneven quality, a few top-quality paratroop battalions and the French Foreign Legion of which about half were, in fact, German.

France was weary of its never-ending obligation in Indochina by the time General Henri Navarre, “the air-conditioned general,” arrived.  His assignment was not to defeat the Vietminh but “to create the conditions for an 'honorable way out' – to achieve a position of military advantage that would allow France to negotiate a favorable peace.” (page 205)  (It is interesting to note that American society and the Nixon Administration found itself in exactly the same position about 15 years later.)  

Navarre had no experience at all with fighting in Asia.  He was seen as a brilliant strategist but aloof and uninspiring (hence his being christened with the “air-conditioned” moniker).  He correctly believed that he could not accomplish his mission simply sitting on the defensive.  He wanted to attack and the previous victory at Nà Sản seemed to reveal a method for taking the war out of the Delta and into the mountains and jungle.

The focus switched to the Thai highlands when Giap sent a division into that region.  Navarre wanted to harass and possibly destroy this unit before it could prepare for whatever Giap had in mind.  Meanwhile, Navarre simultaneously planned a larger offensive operation to the south in Annam that was intended to relieve pressure placed on the Delta by the Vietminh.  He hoped to fix their attention away from Tonkin.

The position at Nà Sản would be abandoned in favor of a larger position at Điện Biên Phủ that would also be closer to Giap's new theater of operations.  This was largely in a region where Thai tribal partisans had been resisting the Vietminh for several years.  It was also the most agriculturally cultivated area in the highlands.  So there were multiple reasons for putting a fortified base at Điện Biên Phủ.

Meanwhile, Giap felt that the Vietminh did not have the resources for a large campaign against the Delta and began to shift more divisions to the highlands.  It is unclear as to whether the French move to Điện Biên Phủ drew the Vietminh or Giap's activities in the area gave Navarre the green light for Operation Castor.  But that is sort of an irrelevant question.  Both generals fed into each other's expectations with unrelated operational plans.

The book then settles into the build-up in and around Điện Biên Phủ that is standard to most other histories I've read on the subject.  Both sides faced unique challenges.    Heavy equipment was brought in by both sides.  The French completely underestimated the Vietminh capabilities.  Millions of man hours by the Vietminh counteracted the air dropped and supplied developments by the French.  But the standard narrative is supplemented with fascinating details and insights into both sides I have not read elsewhere.

I learned a great deal more about Operation Atlante.  The French offensive in Annam involved far more troops than were stationed at Điện Biên Phủ.  From the French perspective this was to be the main effort.  To destroy the Vietminh in central Vietnam as they supposedly battered themselves pointlessly against the French fortifications to the north.  It is vital to understand what was in Navarre's mind to properly contextualize the intended situation at Điện Biên Phủ.  It was basically to be the “anvil” while the other, larger operation was to be the “hammer.”

“‘Atlante’ was planned as a six-month offensive unfolding in three phases, the numbers of troops committed increasing with each phase as they penetrated deeper and spread out. The first, Operation ‘Aréthuse’, would open with landings on the coast around Tuy Hoa and last from three to four weeks, involving 25 infantry and three artillery battalions with supporting troops. At the beginning of March they would be reinforced for ‘Axelle’, to 34 infantry and five artillery battalions; this phase was to last six to eight weeks. Finally, in May, 45 infantry and eight artillery battalions would undertake Operation ‘Attila’, envisaged as lasting for another two months. In sheer numbers, then, ‘Atlante’ dwarfed Navarre’s commitment to the High Region. The great majority of these troops would be Vietnamese, supported by French spearhead and specialist units.” (page 279)

Tucker-Jones only mentions Atlante in passing.  Davidson devotes a couple of pages to it which serve as a great general overview but he does not supply the reader with insightful details the way Windrow does.  The goals and execution of Operation Atlante make France's effort at Điện Biên Phủ much more comprehensible.  Windrow keeps the reader up to date with the progress (or lack thereof) of this important operation and even much smaller actions closer to Saigon as he focuses on the activities by both sides at  Điện Biên Phủ.  This an example of what makes the book a compelling read for me.  Windrow brings the overall drama of the French dynamic strategic vision to the forefront as well as the daily specifics of the fighting around the French strongpoints.

For example, Davidson points out that the French air force was too small to support multiple operations simultaneously.  But I never knew the extent of those “multiple operations.”  The French attempted to support this large offensive while defending the Delta, Điện Biên Phủ, and striking Giap's logistical supply routes.  Now I can easily understand the magnitude of French expectations and Windrow goes into splendid detail on how this strained their entire war effort.

At the same time, the initial victories by the Vietminh on the French strongpoints of Beatrice and Gabrielle at the beginning of Giap's siege offensive came at a horrific cost.  As they days went on Vietminh morale was on the edge of collapse.  Giap may have been confident of victory but his troops certainly weren't.  This was the book's biggest surprise for me.  Though the Vietminh gradually gained more ground with each attack, their morale was sinking due to the enormous number of causalities they were taking, the lack of food and medical supplies, the scarcity of fresh drinking water among other factors.  

For the French the situation was flipped.  While their commanders became increasingly discouraged (especially with the knowledge that Operation Atlante was unsuccessful), the majority of their fighting troops continued to believe that they would eventually triumph.  As late as a few days before the French surrender, the paratroopers and legionnaires felt the punishment they were dishing out would halt the Vietminh before the last fortress fell.  If Điện Biên Phủ were a debacle it certainly was not one in the eyes of these French soldiers, while it seemed like one to the Vietminh!  Quite unexpected.

It is worth noting that many times the French successfully counterattacked and retook positions that the Vietminh paid a heavy price for.  Later, the positions were either retaken by the Vietminh, at additional heavy cost, or they were held but willingly abandoned as the French decided to regroup and reorganize.  Windrow also details a few successful French attacks on Vietminh positions that I previously did not know about.

These passages provide some insight into Windrow's writing and analysis regarding the question of morale...

“It is extraordinarily hard to grasp the fact, attested by many survivors, that well into the first week of May many of these soldiers believed they could still break the enemy and win this battle.  Lieutenant Bergot recalled that those who had been in the valley from the first were sometimes surprised to learn from newly arrived volunteers of the pessimism which reigned in Hanoi.” (page 537)

“By contrast, Viet Minh morale was flagging.  Before one even considers the impact of their heavy casualties, their daily conditions had become harder with the beginning of the rains.  […] Very few of them had mosquito nets, and malaria was the norm; [they] suffered attacks usually lasting a week – sometimes two attacks in a month, sometimes at longer intervals.  They had very little quinine to treat it, and several men would pass around a cup of water in which one tablet was dissolved. […] Many soldiers of the assault battalions had survived the experience of seeing their units slaughtered around them by shocking French firepower – some of them, during several separate actions on different strongpoints.  They, too were disheartened by having to leave their dead and dying behind them.  General Giap's infantry had by now suffered about 50 per cent casualties in six weeks.  Although the blood tax had not fallen on all units equally, many soldiers were now surrounded in the ranks not by trusted comrades but by bewildered and half-trained boys.  French intelligence believed that in terms of numbers the losses had been replaced, and more.  However, prisoner interrogations revealed that some replacements had only been drafted in early March.  They had walked to Dien Bien Phu in groups of about 100, and when they reached their units each recruit had been put with two veterans to teach him the ropes.” (page 538)

All this disrupted Vietminh plans which was part of the basis for optimism among French troops in the trenches up to the very end.  “The slump in Viet Minh morale in the second half of April is a credible reason for Giap's delay in unleashing his third offensive phase.  His logistic preparations were complete by 26 April at the latest.  In theory he could thus have opened his thrid offensive then, to coincide with the opening of the Geneva Conference.  But he chose to wait:  the conference was the ultimate reason why he could not afford to launch an assault prematurely – to fail under the eyes of the world would have incalculable consequences.” (page 540)

For me, this puts the whole affair in a different light, though the outcome is precisely the same, of course.  Windrow points out that the fighting at Điện Biên Phủ involved 60 per cent of the People's Army in Vietnam as opposed to less than 4 per cent of the total French forces. The French were not incompetent.  The Vietminh were not superhuman.  It was a bloody test of wills and while the Vietminh evaded the large battle Navarre had hoped for in Operation Atlante, they pushed their troops to their absolute limit at Điện Biên Phủ.  Windrow shows in his splendid telling that the victory was not overwhelming to anyone except the commanders and politicians on both sides.

I discovered   at the height of my interest in the First Indochina War last summer.  As I mentioned, I read this book obsessively, quickly.  It was one of those books I simply could not put down.  Windrow's superb telling of this epic saga incorporates much of the complexity of the wider war in Indochina at this time and how Điện Biên Phủ fit into that dynamic whole.  He offers what were for me unexpected revelations within the standard narrative and rich details of the expectations, mistakes, bravery and suffering on both sides.

He also does a wonderful job of expressing what the fighting was like fro a purely military perspective; the weapons, resources and tactics involved as well as the experiences of the grunts without losing sight of the operational and strategic considerations involved.  This makes The Last Valley the best kind of military history.  I cannot recommend this book highly enough to anyone interested in this war.  I plan to offer some extended quotes from the book as examples of his superior writing and of his command of history in my next post.