Bogodukhov: The Mobile Storm (August 13-14, 1943)

The starting positions for Operation Rumyantsev as shown in a prior post.  Compare with the image below which shows the extent of the first eight days of the operation.

[Read Part One] [Read Part Two]  [Read Part Three]

Manstein attempted to coordinate three elite panzer divisions, the best the Wehrmacht had left in the East, to deliver the kind of hammer blow that had further elevated his reputation six months earlier. This was supposed to be mobile defense at its elegant best. Absorb the Soviet punch, let them overextend, then hit the flanks with concentrated armor and superior crew training. Cut them off and kill them. Classic Manstein.

Das Reich was striking from the southeast, Totenkopf from the south, and Grossdeutschland (GD) would complete the pincer from the west. Three veteran divisions, coordinated timing, overlapping fields of fire. All three were the victors of Prokhorovka in Manstein’s eyes. If it worked, they could trap major elements of the Soviet 1st Tank Army and 5th Guard Tank Army, maybe even force a local collapse that would buy enough time for the Germans to hit Kharkov and drive the Soviets back to their starting positions. The Germans were still very much thinking that they could deliver the kind of tactical masterstroke that could reestablish the situation.

GD was late. The division that was supposed to anchor the western claw of the pincer was still road-bound, still dealing with fuel shortages and traffic jams and the thousand small frictions that turn elegant plans into messy improvisations. While Das Reich and Totenkopf were getting into position to continue their attacks, GD was still awaiting most of its infantry and tanks. It already had the 503^rd Tiger Battalion on hand, however, which Manstein had sent earlier from Kharkov. If attacked it would blow whatever came at it away.

The delay probably came from that familiar cocktail of logistics, confusion, and wishful thinking that had been poisoning German operations since 1942. By dawn on August 8, only 50 of GD's tanks had managed to reach the area, the complexity of moving heavy Tiger tanks (they had about a dozen) adding to the difficulties of rail transport. Roads clogged with partisan activity and retreating units. Soviet Il-2s turned major highways into shooting galleries. There was some uncharacteristic confusion about exactly where GD was supposed to deploy and when.

The division's own infantry, moving up to the front lines, passed retreating remnants of LII Corps, some of whom shouted to them to go home and stop prolonging the war. Even worse, the planned coordination with 7th and 11th Panzer Divisions from the west kept getting pushed back because the reinforcements needed to release those units from defensive duties were repeatedly delayed due to the heavy fighting for Army Group Center. The Wehrmacht was running on improvisation and hope, and both were wearing thin. For the first time in the war, the Soviets coordinated not one but two successful major offensives simultaneously and both were taking ground. I am only concerned with Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev here.

So instead of three divisions hitting simultaneously, Manstein got two. Das Reich and Totenkopf would attack alone for a consecutive third day, without their western hammer, against Soviet tank armies that had been sitting in place, rotating units, and preparing for exactly this kind of counterattack.

Das Reich went in first, around midday on August 12. Their crews knew the ground pretty well by now, it had been reconnoitered and fought over for the two previous days. The division fielded about 70 tanks and assault guns, mostly Panzer IIIs and Stug IIIs, and hit Soviet forward positions northwest of Bogodukhov with characteristic SS aggression. The division attacked with coordinated rushes against exposed Soviet tank brigades, using every advantage of crew training and tactical coordination they could muster. For a few hours, it looked like vintage German armor doctrine. Small unit tactics that were still deadly, crew training that still mattered, equipment that could still punch holes in T-34 formations when used with skill and timing.

They knocked out dozens of Soviet tanks. T-70s mostly, but some T-34s and SU-76s caught in the open or isolated from their supporting infantry. Das Reich would claim 70 Russian tanks destroyed on August 12 alone, though given the intensity of fighting over previous days, some of these were likely vehicles knocked out in earlier actions. The kill ratios were impressive, at least 5 to 1, maybe 6 to 1 in Das Reich's favor. Tactically, they were doing everything right. But they were not causing them to retreat.

The Soviets didn't break. That was the new reality Manstein was still learning to accept. He was probably surprised by it. Soviet tank brigades that took heavy losses didn't collapse the way they had in 1941 or even 1942. They pulled back in reasonable order, regrouped behind infantry and artillery concentrations, and waited for fresh units to rotate forward. They were ready to attack the next morning.

At 0530 on August 13, a concerted 6th Guards Army attack began, immediately forcing Totenkopf to withdraw its overextended regiments. Ably supported by rifle divisions, the Russian tanks made repeated attacks and, despite extensive support from the Luftwaffe, the Germans were driven from their original positions. The Red Army had developed operational depth that could absorb tactical defeats without operational collapse. Losing a tank brigade was unfortunate, not catastrophic.

By evening on August 13, Totenkopf had joined Das Reich’s attack from the west. The division was down to about 60 operational tanks, mostly Panzer IIIm's, the latest model of that now outdated workhorse with the long 50mm gun, and half a dozen Tigers that were used like chess pieces, positioned carefully and moved reluctantly. In 1943, tactically speaking, Tigers still ruled the battlefield.

With its weary forces now attempting to cover a front line of about 30 miles, Totenkopf was not in a good position to deal with a major Russian onslaught. During the preceding night there were repeated probing attacks against the German defenders, which consisted mainly of the reconnaissance battalion of Totenkopf. These weren't full-scale assaults, but persistent pressure designed to identify weak points and disrupt German preparations.

Totenkopf deliberately chose a high-risk course of action, deploying virtually all of the division north of the Merchyk River while leaving only their reconnaissance battalion to screen south of the river. Small Kampfgruppen of Panzer IIIs working with panzergrenadiers, using terrain and coordination to multiply their limited numbers.

A major combined arms attack with tanks, infantry and artillery support at Nikitovka sent the Soviet 3rd Mechanized Corps reeling and smashed Katukov's left flank. They managed to isolate several Soviet tank companies, forced some temporary withdrawals, and for a brief moment created the kind of tactical chaos that had once opened doors to operational victory. The division succeeded in cutting off Russian tank brigades that had pushed too far forward, leaving them stranded without infantry support. After heavy fighting, some of these isolated units were destroyed, while others managed to slip away to the north under cover of darkness.

But the door stayed closed. Soviet corps and divisional artillery, which had been largely silent during the initial German counterattacks, began responding in strength. The Germans were fighting under a steel umbrella that made maneuver dangerous and concentration deadly. Every time they tried to mass for a decisive blow, Soviet spotters called in fire that scattered the formations before they could develop momentum.

The fighting became a deadly see-saw around key villages like Vysokopolye. On August 12, Soviet forces from the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade, supported by 16 tanks, managed to reach Vysokopolye by passing through gaps in Totenkopf's lines. By 1300 hours they had seized a small section of the rail line, cutting German communications. But Totenkopf cut these battalions off as well, isolating them from their supporting units. The town changed hands multiple times over the following days, with each side paying heavily for temporary control of a strategic crossroads that neither could hold permanently.

The tank battles around the villages southwest of Bogodukhov that afternoon were undoubtedly some of the most intense armor fighting of the entire war. Massive, swirling engagements spread across dozens of square kilometers, with armored formations maneuvering and countermaneuvering across a battlefield larger than Prokhorovka, larger than anything at Kursk. These weren't the massive formations that had clashed at Prokhorovka, but something more dynamic and fluid, company-level fights that escalated into regimental battles, tank brigades trying to outflank each other across open steppe that stretched to the horizon. German Panzer IIIs and IVs dueling with T-34s across wheat fields and around burning farmhouses. Stug IIIs ambushing Soviet tank columns from treelines and sunken roads. The occasional Tiger appearing like a steel angel of death, knocking out everything in its field of fire before withdrawing to avoid being swarmed.

The Germans were winning these individual fights. But winning tank duels and winning the battle no longer equated to anything like it did in 1941. The Soviets could afford to lose six tanks for every German tank knocked out. They had replacement brigades moving up from reserve, repair teams, and a supply system that, for the first time in the war, was beginning to function on the move at something approaching efficiency.

The Germans couldn't afford any losses. Every tank that threw a track or took a hit from a 76mm gun was difficult to irreplaceable. There were no fresh panzer battalions waiting in reserve, just a few replacement crews training behind the lines. Germany was manufacturing more tanks, ammo, and aircraft than ever before but it still was far short of the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union. Every tactical victory still cost something in losses and each loss was a step toward operational exhaustion.

This is the approximate Soviet breakthrough as it looks in the Ukraine '43 wargame.  That stage is set for one of the largest tank battles of World War Two. Compare with the map above.

By the evening of August 13, the German counterattack had achieved impressive local results and changed absolutely nothing about the broader situation. Totenkopf and Das Reich had bloodied the Soviet spearheads, forced some withdrawals, and demonstrated once again that German armor tactics were still superior to Soviet armor tactics. The tandem’s kill ratio was exceptional but they also burned through fuel they couldn't replace, lost tanks they couldn't afford to lose, and failed to dislodge the Soviets from Bogodukhov or seriously threaten to isolate them. These high kill ratios didn’t translate into anything anymore.

GD was finally arriving in strength by evening, two days late. The opportunity for coordinated action was already slipping away. The Soviets had absorbed the counterattack, called up reserves, and begun preparing their own response. Deep battle doctrine emphasized maintaining offensive momentum even under pressure, and the Red Army was learning to implement that doctrine with increasing sophistication.

August 14 brought Grossdeutschland into the fight at last. The division had spent the night moving into position southwest of Bogodukhov, finally ready to deliver the southern stroke that should have coordinated with the SS attacks the day before. GD was in better condition than Totenkopf or Das Reich. They'd had more time to refit after Kursk, better supply priority, fresher crews for more Tigers and the latest Panzer IVs. If any German formation still had the capability to change the tactical picture, it was GD.

When the division (with late arriving support from 7^th and 11^th Panzer Divisions) finally attacked on August 14, they were hitting Soviet positions that had been reinforced, reorganized, and prepared. Instead of catching overextended tank brigades in the open, they found defensive positions, overlapping fields of fire, and artillery concentrations that had been registered during the previous day's fighting.

The battle on August 14 was brutal and confused, a mobile storm of armor that may have been the fiercest fighting over the widest terrain in the entire war. Even counting Kursk, nothing matched the sheer geographic scope of these swirling tank battles. As German attacks against Bogodukhov subsided, the 6th Guards Army continued its assault on the German left flank, advancing less than 10 miles but reaching Otrada. But in doing so, the Soviet thrust dispersed its intensity, exactly the kind of tactical error the Germans were expert at exploiting.

To the west, First Tank Army was trying to outflank Totenkopf in a series of advances that saw the leading elements push about eight miles to the southwest. The Soviets were still thinking offensively. This forced the German division to extend its flank still further, and in order to release troops for counterattack operations, particularly to allow Totenkopf to concentrate sufficient forces, Das Reich had to take over sections of the line to the east and assigned a reinforced panzergrenadier regiment to Totenkopf to support its attack.

GD's attack developed in rolling waves, with Kampfgruppen of Panzer IVs and supporting panzergrenadiers trying to penetrate Soviet defensive lines while Das Reich and Totenkopf contained the Russians from the north and west. Alongside the units of Das Reich, battlegroups from Wiking provided right flank support, coordinating their movements in the kind of complex inter-unit cooperation that characterized German tactical doctrine at its best. The fighting spread across an enormous area, from villages like Okhrimovka in the north down to the approach roads toward Valki in the south, tank battles at company level escalating into divisional engagements, infantry fights for crossroads and treelines, artillery duels that shook the ground for miles around. But the Germans could not advance there.

Meanwhile, GD inflicted heavy losses. Their recently modeled Panzer IVs were deadly weapons in the hands of experienced crews, and their combined arms coordination was probably the best in Army Group South. They destroyed scores of Soviet tanks, overran several defensive positions, and created the kind of tactical pressure that had once opened operational opportunities. For several hours on August 14, it looked like the German counteroffensive might actually accomplish something beyond expensive tactical demonstrations.

But the trap never closed. Without tight coordination between all three divisions, the German attacks remained powerful but separate efforts. Das Reich and Totenkopf couldn't maintain their pressure indefinitely, especially against growing Soviet resistance and artillery fire. GD's attack, impressive as it was, arrived too late to take advantage of any tactical gains the SS divisions had created the day before. Further, and most telling, it did not prevent the Soviet 1^st Tank Army from probing and stretching out Totenkopf nor did it prevent further Soviet offensive actions. Both sides were attacking at the same time.

The Soviets used their operational depth to absorb and respond. Fresh tank brigades rotated into the fighting, artillery concentrated against German assembly areas, and the 5th Guards Tank Army began maneuvering to threaten the flanks of any German advance that pushed too far forward. Soviet commanders had learned the difficult lesson of trading space for time when necessary, then using their superior numbers to regain the initiative.

One area where the Germans continued to maintain an edge was the efficiency of their tank recovery and repair teams. A steady stream of repaired tanks allowed formations like Totenkopf to bring their panzer regiments back toward functional strength, at least temporarily. But even this advantage couldn't overcome the broader arithmetic of attrition.

By evening on August 14, the German counteroffensive had shot its bolt for the day. Totenkopf and Das Reich were down to about half their strength, exhausted and low on fuel. GD had taken significant losses and advanced far but without achieving decisive results. Yet the mobile storm wasn't quite finished.

At dawn on August 15, Das Reich and Totenkopf regrouped and struck hard one more time at 6th Guards Army units, slashing through 6th Tank Corps communications lines in a final spasm of tactical brilliance. The Soviet 2nd Air Army aircraft battered the German tank columns as they advanced, but despite this aerial punishment, 6th Guards Army's defenses collapsed under the coordinated assault. The three divisions had inflicted perhaps 300 or 400 Soviet tank and vehicle losses over two days of intensive fighting. In tactical terms, that was a substantial victory. In operational terms, it changed nothing.

The Soviets still held Bogodukhov. Their supply lines were still functioning. Their tank armies were still capable of offensive action, even after absorbing heavy losses. Most importantly, they still had the strategic initiative and the industrial capacity to replace their losses faster than the Germans could inflict them.

As Manstien planned it, the German counteroffensive around Bogodukhov was to be another superb pincer maneuver with the convergence of three elite panzer divisions. He wanted this to decisively end the Soviet attempt to attack Kharkov from the west, seal the brakethrough and then switch to Kharkov proper to drive the Soviets away and win another great operational victory. But that’s not what happened.

Still, the uncoordinated counterattack was probably the last time in the war that elite Wehrmacht formations had the opportunity to demonstrate their tactical superiority could translate into operational victory. But to now they always made the Soviets retreat, at least temporarily. And for that reason Kharkov would ultimately fall and there was nothing left to do but retreat, winning here and there now and again.

These massive swirling tank battles, stretching across about 100 miles of Ukrainian steppe, may have been the most dynamic armored fighting of the entire war. Experienced crews, proven equipment, coordinated combined arms tactics, local command initiative. Everything that had made the German army legendary was still present and still effective at the tactical level.

But the Red Army had finally grown into a force that could absorb tactical defeats while maintaining operational momentum even under intense pressure. Deep battle doctrine had matured from theory into practice, and the German mobile defense had finally met its match. Instead of retreating the Soviets kept attacking.

Manstein had rolled the dice with his three best divisions. They had won practically every battle and inflicted horrific casualties. And still the Germans were now definitely losing the war.

(to be continued)