Reading Twenty-five Hours To Tragedy: Part One

Proof of Purchase.

My visit to the Franklin battlefield and subsequent reading of For Cause & For Country only whetted my appetite for a better understanding of what happened immediately before the Battle of Franklin, the so-called Affair at Spring Hill.  This is arguably the strangest and most inept study in command one can undertake about the War Between the States.  

As I posted before, Eric Jacobson does an admirable job of examining what happened at Spring Hill but I wanted to delve deeper.  This led to my re-reading of Wiley Sword’s excellent Embrace an Angry Wind (now published under different title).  I plan to review that book in the near future.  But even Sword’s superb interpretation of the events is only part of a larger story he is telling – perhaps the greatest story of the war.  I wanted to really get into the minutia of Spring Hill, however, and a book by Jamie Gillum does just that.

Twenty-five Hours To Tragedy (2014) has a subtitle that explains exactly what the book focuses upon.  “The Battle of Spring Hill and Operations on November 29, 1864: Precursor to the Battle of Franklin.”  I initially hesitated to buy it.  I questioned the legitimacy of the work.  Gillum is not a historian.  His qualifications are only slightly better than my own, both of us having studied the war about the same length of time in our lives.  He has no academic degree in history, though he took some courses.  But he spent 14 years in the Marine Corps, which counts for something as far as understanding military history, and he collected material on Spring Hill for over 26 years, which, I’d wager, is more than anyone else has.

My interest in Spring Hill overwhelmed my hesitancy, to my great delight.  Gillum offers very little of his own insights into the happenings of November 29.  Instead, he quotes prolifically from primary sources, the official records and various autobiographies, articles and correspondences of the participants themselves.  In his introduction he expresses a preference for this as opposed to reading the interpretations of historians, whether he agrees with those interpretations or not.  

Twenty-five Hours To Tragedy is more like a scrapbook of quotes from various primary sources meticulously gathered over many years and structured chronologically so the reader can see the situation at Spring Hill unfold in all its complexity.  And that is one of the many things I learned from this work, it was a complex situation and not as simple as saying Generals John Bell Hood and/or Benjamin Franklin Cheatham screwed up.  

One of the few times Gillum ventures away from presentation of the information into his own interpretation of the facts is in his “author’s note” at the beginning.  In part, he states: “Spring Hill was a mess, and most of the participants - Yanks and Rebs alike – were perplexed as to how and why it turned out the way it did….there were no singular individuals responsible for either the failures of the Confederates or success of the Federals on that fateful afternoon.  While numerous mistakes were made by the Confederates, Federal initiative and confidence in their troops led to the destruction of the well-devised – but poorly executed – plan of John Bell Hood.” (page 17, Gillum's emphasis)  

Certainly, the Union forces did their part to create confusion and uncertainty  in the minds of Hood’s commanders.  Both of Sword’s and Jacobson’s works acknowledge the valor of the Northern troops at Spring Hill.  But the bulk of Gillum’s book naturally concentrates on the Southern side of things, since virtually all the mistakes were made there.  I am grateful for Gillum’s efforts to make all this excellent eye-witness information readily available to the reader.

There is a lot to consider in Twenty-five Hours.  The content weighs in at over 440 pages, 54 of which are photographs and maps.  You might wonder how there can be so much material on a “battle” that basically involved less than 30 minutes of fighting between a couple of brigades, but a great deal led up to that small assault and even more happened (or failed to happen) after it.  This, then, is how events played out in and near Spring Hill, Tennessee according to primary sources by curator Gillum.

We begin two days before, on November 27, 1864.  Union General John Schofield’s two army corps won a race against time, arriving at Columbia, Tennessee ahead of Hood’s Army of Tennessee.  Hood devised a plan for his three corps.  One corps under General Stephen Dill Lee would remain at Columbia with most of the Confederate artillery and all the supply wagons.  His job was to hold Schofield in place by feigning a Rebel attack.  Meanwhile, Hood’s other two crops under Generals Cheatham and Alexander P. Stewart would cross the Duck River and force march toward Spring Hill, getting behind Schofield and cutting off the road north to Nashville.
  
His path of retreat blocked, Schofield would be forced to either attack Hood, who slightly outnumbered him, or he would be in such a desperate situation that Hood’s three corps could crush him from front and rear.  After defeating Schofield it would then be easier for Hood to continue his campaign to Nashville where mostly ad-hoc Federal troops under General George Thomas were waiting.  With all this in mind, Gillum ventures into interpretation a little bit.  He calls Hood’s plan “not only practical but brilliant.” 

“Understand that Hood had planned his circuitous envelopment of Schofield for two full days before he began to execute it.  His commanders were aware of the situation and the mission and were prepared to execute it, but due to unfortunate circumstances, the movement failed.” (page 24)

General Nathan Bedford Forrest’s cavalry led the way to Spring Hill, driving off the prying eyes of Yankee cavalry under General James H. Wilson.  The Army of Tennessee spent the afternoon of November 28, 1864 preparing for the force march with Lee positioning two divisions and most the artillery as if to attack.  Hood’s pontoon bridge was ordered northward from Florence, Alabama to be placed across the Duck River east of Columbia so the Confederate infantry might pass quickly.

From here on, things began to go wrong with Hood’s “brilliant” plan.  A detail of 100 men were ordered to march three miles to the fording site and assemble the pontoon bridge, but (for reasons Gillum does not provide but are detailed in Wiley Sword’s account) the pontoon did not arrive until 1AM November 29.  That was an hour after most of the Confederate infantry were roused from sleep to break camp and march down to the ford.  General Patrick Cleburne’s division led Hood’s advance and was first to the pontoon.  But, due to the bridge’s late arrival, the detail of men were unable to finish its construction on time.  Cleburne was furious and ordered his own men to assist with the completion.

Gillum offers another insightful interpretation.  “Arrival time at Spring Hill would prove to be (perhaps) the deciding factor in the events as they later played out.  Time was of the greatest importance, and only good condition of the roads could make up for the time already lost.  Unfortunately for the Confederates, they would find the road a muddy quagmire, and with thousands of men marching in column, the poor conditions intensified as more and more men trod through the deep mud.” (page 48)

Unbeknownst to Hood, prior to executing his Spring Hill plan, Schofield presciently decided to move the bulk of his two corps over to the north side of Duck River, still holding them in the vicinity of Columbia, just in case Hood attempted exactly what he had planned.  Thomas, Schofield’s superior at Nashville, requested that Schofield hold the Duck River as long as possible.  Thomas was hopeful Hood could be delayed long enough for adequate reinforcements to reach Nashville.  For this reason Schofield could not just cut loose from Columbia and flee northward.

Schofield’s move to the north bank allowed him the option of either defending Columbia should it be attacked or making a prompt retreat since he had already crossed the river.  It should be noted that the Federal forces were encumbered by an 800-wagon supply train that could only move slowly and required constant protection.  Getting the train on the other side of the river prompted all of Schofield’s other considerations.  He left a token force of several regiments entrenched south of Columbia to hold back the Rebels and give the impression that he would fight for Columbia.  

Having not received a report from Wilson’s cavalry, Schofield detached a brigade of infantry to probe eastward from Columbia to verify that his flank was safe.  About 9AM November 29, General John C. Brown’s division crossed pontoon bridge, following Cleburne.  At this same time, a scout reported to Hood the movement of the Northern brigade toward the crossing.  

Hood considered the possibility that his movement was detected and that the Yankees might attack his exposed left flank during the march.  For this reason he ordered half of Brown’s division into picket duty.  The other half of the division was ordered to align itself as a “supporting column” for Cheatham’s advance.  This took what remained of Brown’s division off the muddy roads and into muddy fields, greatly fatiguing the marching men and further slowing the overall advance.  Meanwhile, the Federal brigade spotted the Confederate column and sent word back to Schofield, though he would not receive this information for several hours.  

Schofield was blind.  Forrest’s cavalry completely fooled Wilson’s, resulting in the Union horsemen moving north, away from Columbia and ultimately Spring Hill itself.  Wilson thought Forrest was heading directly for Nashville and organized his force accordingly, thus denying Schofield of his “eyes” that could warn of the movement Hood was undertaking.  The two Union corps sat with all their wagons just north of Columbia. 

About 12:30 General James Chalmers division of Forrest’s cavalry engaged a mixed group of Union infantry and cavalry regiments garrisoning Spring Hill.  His troops chased the Yankees back to their breastworks east and south of Spring Hill.  He withdrew to regroup, believing the force before him was much larger than it actually was.  Fifteen minutes later two batteries of Union artillery rolled into town, giving Chalmers reason to reconsider another cavalry charge.  

By this time Forrest was on the field with a second division of cavalry, General Abraham Buford’s.  Also by this time, two Union brigades arrived at Spring Hill under the command of General George D. Wagner.  They hastily established defensive positions behind breastworks.  Forrest repeatedly probed the Federal defensive line for weaknesses as the first portion of the Union supply train moved into town.  The skirmishing intensified as Forrest attempted to capture the wagons.  This continued for a couple of hours, long enough for Forrest’s troops to begin to run low on ammunition.
  
Meanwhile, back at Columbia, Lee’s Corps (minus one division) marched troops back and forth, positioned snipers and fired artillery at Columbia, feigning an attack.  But Schofield, finally alerted of a Confederate column marching to his east by the infantry brigade he sent out earlier, realized the artillery fire was a ruse and began to withdraw up Franklin Pike.  His five divisions and all those supply wagons were widely disbursed (and vulnerable) along the pike between Columbia and Spring Hill.  It turned out that Schofield’s modest rearguard was even more effective than Lee’s feign.  Lee still believed that the Yankees were massed at Columbia and reported so to Hood.

Hood with Cheatham’s Corps, Cleburne in advance, crossed Rutherford Creek and arrived at Spring Hill around 3PM.  Here is where the central controversy of the day occurred.  According to Hood, he ordered Cheatham to attack the Union wagons and troops moving along Franklin Pike.  Cheatham later claimed that Hood could not have issued such instructions because there was no such movement at that hour.  But the fact is that by this time Wagner’s third brigade under General Luther Bradley arrived and was positioned southeast of Spring Hill.  Also, the first wagons of the Federal supply train were parked nearby.  Whether or not Hood saw these movements (and when) is a matter of conjecture.

Cleburne was present at this discussion between Hood and Cheatham.  Whatever was actually said, Cleburne prepared to advance.  “Cleburne’s formation was arranged in an echelon left formation – one that suggests he would eventually wheel his entire command to the left once reaching the pike thus forming a solid division line facing south to confront any advance of the Federal forces from Columbia.” (page 158)  Cleburne would not have made this disposition without orders from someone.

General William B. Bate’s division crossed Rutherford Creek behind Cleburne.  At this point Cheatham and Hood were riding around separately and this seems to be the primary source of all the confusion.  Cheatham ordered Bate to form a line of battle on Cleburne’s left then Cheatham rode away to meet Brown as his division crossed the creek.   

Meanwhile, Hood was already at the creek.  He issued orders to Brown as he was crossing, then, in a sort of comedy (or tragedy) of errors, Hood rushed to Bate as Cheatham left Bate and moved to observe Brown.  Hood, not seeing Cheatham present, ordered Bate specifically “to move to the turnpike and sweep toward Columbia.”  Gillum states: “This order from the commanding general may have commenced the series of miscommunications and blunders that unceasingly continued as the night progress.” (page 162)

The head of Stewart’s Corps arrived at the creek around 4PM just as Cleburne began his advance.  Even though Hood was apparently riding all over the place no orders were left for Stewart.  He waited.  Meanwhile, General Mark P. Lowery’s brigade led Cleburne’s formation.  Suddenly, Lowery was fired upon by Bradley’s infantry on his right flank.  Given that he was enfiladed, Cleburne immediately ordered Lowery to wheel to the right along with General Daniel C. Govan’s brigade for support.

Cleburne’s realignment was such that now the Confederate’s threatened Bradley’s flank.  Seeing the situation develop, Cleburne confidently ordered Lowery and Govan to charge Bradley.  Bradley’s troops were recent recruits, inexperienced in battle.  Cleburne’s veterans hit them hard and routed them.  A vigorous pursuit caused Lowery and Govan to become intermingled and lose cohesion.  

The Yankees continued to run away from the Rebel onslaught until one of the Federal artillery batteries, well-positioned by General David S. Stanley, blasted the Southern advance to a halt.  Cleburne’s men withdrew to regroup as he attempted to align his third brigade under General Hiram Granbury with Lowery and Govan for another assault.  Cleburne was now facing north toward Spring Hill and parallel to the pike, which was southwest, to his left.  Granbury was only about 300 yards from the parked Federal supply wagons when was ordered to halt and reform with the rest of the division.  Even so, Cleburne’s division remained was less than 200 yards from the pike.

It was now about 4:30 and sunset was approaching on this November day.  Hearing the heavy gunfire, Cheatham was alerted by Cleburne of his division’s “change of front.”  This resulted in Cheatham ordering Brown to shift his axis of advance to line up with Cleburne’s right.  Desiring to attack Spring Hill with his entire corps, Cheatham ordered Cleburne to halt and only proceed after he heard the sound of Brown’s guns attacking.

A lull ensued as Cheatham attempted to realign his divisions for a full-on attack of Spring Hill.  Forrest, whose troops had been fighting all afternoon and were very low on ammunition, felt that Hood’s infantry could now handle the situation.  He took the initiative to order General William H. Jackson’s division to raid the rail station north of Spring Hill and “intercept the enemy.”  “This change of position would directly impact events that transpired over the next hour.” (page 265)

Of course, Chalmers had been fighting the Union garrison at Spring Hill since noon.  As he was moving his command off the field for rest and eventually to resupply with ammunition, he “became keenly aware of the cessation of movement along the infantry front.”  He approached Brown.  “I remember very distinctly seeing Gen. John C. Brown at Spring Hill…I know it was near a house on hill from which could be seen the retreating wagon trains of the Federals moving rapidly up the pike toward Nashville.  I rode up to him and pointed to the retreating enemy, and told him I could pilot him to where he could cut off their retreat.  He replied that he had no orders to attack the enemy.  I replied to him that at Shiloh I had attacked the enemy without orders, and won compliments by it, and he could do the same.  He replied: ‘I would prefer to wait for orders.’ I do not remember the exact hour of the evening, but there was enough time to have struck a decisive blow to the enemy in my opinion.” (pp. 267- 268)   
 
(to be continued)