Reading For Cause & For Country: Part One
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| Proof of Purchase. One of the best books about the War Between the States that I've ever read. |
I have studied the American Civil War for over 40 years. As someone with a large collection of books, periodicals, and other resources I can say that my recent reading of For Cause & For Country (2006) by Eric A. Jacobson was both a surprise and a delight. (See great YouTube videos featuring him here and here.) It was a surprise in that I did not expect to learn as much as I did from this extremely well researched book. It was a delight that this compelling narrative is presented in such an organized and engaging way.
“Gripping” and “compelling” are overused words in book reviews, but they certainly apply to Jacobson’s efforts. This easily ranks as one of the best books on the war I have ever read. It begins with a 30+ page summary of the entire war in middle Tennessee, Kentucky, and Georgia in order to place General John Bell Hood’s ill-fate 1864 raid into Tennessee in context. It follows with a brief account of Hood’s maneuvers against General William T. Sherman after the fall of Atlanta in October up to the point where a frustrated Sherman decided to forget about Hood’s exploits, opting for his famous “March to the Sea” instead.
Hood felt he could draw Sherman away from Atlanta for a battle that would ultimately regain the city. When that fight did not materialize the Southern general formulated a grandiose dream for recapturing Nashville and driving to the Ohio River, a delusion that had motivated other Confederate military planners since the beginning of the war. This necessitated a change of supply base to Tuscumbia, Alabama.
I have often wondered how in the world Hood managed to put together enough supplies to make a strong raid into middle Tennessee in the dead of winter when the South was facing such impoverished conditions. Hood was a fighter (many say too much so) and he was not known for his administrative competence. The raid was made possible thanks in no small part to the logistical prowess of General P.G.T. Beauregard, who was appointed to assist Hood. Jacobson provides an extended account of how all this worked. Logistics being essential to any military operation, I was grateful for these details that I have found in no other source.
The reader can enjoy a lot of new details here. Jacobson is meticulous in his documentation of events. The campaign began favorably for Hood, thanks primarily to Union General John M. Schofield’s initial uncertainty about the Confederate intentions and to General Nathan Bedford Forrest’s superb cavalry work. Schofield’s Northern troops barely won a race to Columbia, Tennessee with Hood close behind. Then Hood implemented a clever strategy.
With Forrest clearing the way, Hood would move the two corps of Generals Benjamin Franklin Cheatham and Alexander P. Stewart plus the detached division of General Edward Johnson around Schofield, getting into the Federal rear at Spring Hill. Meanwhile, the corps of General Stephen D. Lee would keep the majority of Confederate artillery and the Army of Tennessee’s supply trains in front of Schofield at Columbia, making a demonstration that appeared to be the prelude to an attack.
With Schofield’s attention fixed on Lee’s artillery and fake maneuvers, Forrest tricked the Federal cavalry of General James H. Wilson into believing the Rebel cavalry was headed straight for Nashville, effectively removing the Yankee horsemen from Spring Hill. Thus Schofield was blind to what Hood was doing. The Union general ultimately realized Lee’s efforts were a ruse and ordered a retreat to Spring Hill, but only after the Confederates had time to begin placing their infantry into position at Spring Hill.
Schofield's ability to maneuver was encumbered by 800 supply wagons which had to be protected against possible Rebel attack. According to Jacobson, it was Hood’s intent to attack Spring Hill and place his army astride the pike from Columbia, trapping the Yankees and forcing them into battle. A great victory possibly awaited the Southerners. With Schofield destroyed, the march on to Nashville would be much more menacing. But that’s not what happened. Instead, the Confederate’s suffered one of the strangest command breakdowns of the war.
In brief, this is how Jacobson explains it. Hood instructed General Patrick Cleburne’s division, part of Cheatham’s corps, to lead the initial attack on Spring Hill and then wheel south, away from the town, to meet the eventual advance of the Federal infantry coming north from Columbia. Cheatham understood the orders to pertain more toward attacking Spring Hill than the pike. So there was fundamental confusion from the start. The importance of this slight misunderstanding would have dire consequences for Confederate prospects.
Supposedly, Cheatham was to personally place the division of General William B. Bate on Cleburne’s left. But he failed to meet with Bate, who proceeded as instructed anyway. By now it was late in the day on November 29, 1864, about 25 minutes before sunset. Cleburne’s division suddenly came under flanking fire from the meager Union garrison at Spring Hill. In response Cleburne wheeled his division north toward the fire and attacked, driving the Yankees back in confusion until Union artillery fire competently placed by General David S. Stanley brought Cleburne’s unsupported troops to a stop.
Colonel John Q. Lane shifted his Northern brigade to meet Cleburne’s threat behind the makeshift entrenchments protecting Spring Hill. At this point Cheatham, who thought his corps was to attack Spring Hill, ordered Cleburne to halt while he got the divisions of Bate and General John C. Brown into position to support Cleburne. Only then did Cheatham become aware that Cleburne had taken the initiative to “reform his division” to attack the Federals that were firing on him. So this required some adjustments by the other two divisions.
Cheatham then ordered Cleburne to resume his attack only after he heard gunfire from Brown’s division. But since Lane had shifted his troops in response to Cleburne, Brown now detected (falsely in the fading light of day) that his own flank was imperiled. As Jacobson puts it: “What [Brown did not] discern in the growing darkness, however, was that the Union force stretched out just north of Mount Carmel Road was not terribly significant. [He] had stumbled upon the extension of John Lane’s left flank, which without firing a shot, had halted an entire Rebel division.” (pp. 119 -120)
Brown did nothing. Cleburne waited anxiously to continue his attack. Bate could see the pike in the fading light, which was Hood’s primary target, but was ordered by Cheatham to fall back and line up with Cleburne’s altered facing. Bate questioned his new orders. The pike was very close with nothing blocking Bate’s path to cover it. But Cheatham felt he had to have his divisions attack Spring Hill in unified support of one another. Jacobson is critical of Cheatham for not better understanding why Cleburne wanted to press his attack without delay as well as failing to grasp that Bate had practically reached the pike.
It was now dark. Stewart's corps arrived and was ordered to march north of Spring Hill, to Brown’s right. While doing so, Stewart sent word to Hood that the pike was still open. Hood asked Stewart to “at the very least throw a brigade across the pike.” But Stewart claimed his men were too tired from the day’s forced march. Ultimately, no Confederate infantry blocked the pike.
Incredibly, during the night, under considerable stress and uncertainty, Schofield’s entire command, wagons and all, marched along the pike though Spring Hill and up to Franklin. All within a stone’s throw of the now encamped Southern army. It was one of the most confusing command outcomes of the war. Jacobson objectively analyzes the multiple causes for this confusion. The tactical mistake was Brown’s failure to attack, which would have certainly set off Cleburne (again) and Bate in turn. With Stewart coming up for support the situation would have been far clearer even though it was nightfall.
But, according to Jacobson, the operational responsibility rests with Cheatham for not understanding Hood desired the pike to be blocked whether Spring Hill was attacked or not. When Brown became inactive and the attacked faltered, Cheatham still could easily have blocked the pike. Strategically, Hood must take the brunt of the responsibility. The simple fact is, he never personally saw to it that his plan was properly executed. He kept to his bed even though his attempts at sleep were constantly interrupted by reports of confusion and failure.
Jacobson rightly gives praise where it is due to the Federal forces involved. “[General George D.] Wagner’s men often fail to get the credit they deserve. Had it not been for his three tough and solidly veteran brigades, Forrest and Cleburne might well have taken Spring Hill or the pike south of town rather handily. As it was, Wagner’s troops put up a defense so stiff that the Rebel offensive came unhinged, and when it did no one was able to get it back on track…If Lane did not take the initiative to reposition some of his men before dark, John Brown would not have detected an enemy force threatening his right flank. As corps commander David Stanley was superb. The race to Spring Hill had been close, but the Federal troops had as much to do with the outcome as anything else. They delayed Hood when time was something he had little of.” (page 182)
Of course, the Spring Hill “affair” is only the prelude to the main event at Franklin. Jacobson initially shifts perspectives to the Union side of things. Even though Schofield’s two corps, IV and XXIII, managed to elude potential disadvantage first at Columbia then at Spring Hill things were far from solid at Franklin. His divisions were greatly strung out along the pike and vulnerable as they marched. He was still burdened, in more ways than one, with all those wagons. The wagon bridge over the Harpeth River at Franklin had been destroyed. He ordered it rebuilt, which would take time. Hood was unpredictable and the Union cavalry was unable to provide him with scouting details. His repeated requests for reinforcements from Nashville were denied. General Jacob Cox found Schofield to be “manifestly disturbed.” As his troops filed into Franklin, they immediately began erecting breastworks by ripping down any nearby buildings and fencing they could find.
Forrest was hot on the heels of the Yankee rearguard on the morning of November 30. Hood awoke furious that Schofield had escaped. He was angry with everyone, especially Cheatham. Cleburne was incensed at having heard that Hood felt his division was partly responsible for the mess. But Jacobson points out that there is no indication that Hood remained in a foul mood. In fact the author attempts to dispel several rumors about Hood at this time. There is no evidence he fell from a horse and was bed ridden at Spring Hill for that reason. No evidence at all that he partook of any drugs or alcohol that may have impacted is mental or emotional state. According to Jacobson, by the time Hood got to Franklin he was commanding with a clear mind to best of his abilities.
(to be continued)
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