Confederate Defeat at Chattanooga: The Backstory
The Rebel army was whipped. The conduct of his troops was “unexplainable” according to Braxton Bragg. George Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland pierced the Confederate center on Missionary Ridge in the late afternoon of November 25, 1863 for one of the most decisive Union victories of the war. Two months earlier, the Yankees were routed at Chickamauga. Now they were triumphant. How did the Southern forces go from grand victory to ignominious defeat so quickly?
Of course, the resilience of the Northern forces had something to do with it. Thomas’s army endured near-starvation and brutal weather conditions while besieged in Chattanooga. It made the most of its opportunity in the assault, despite Ulysses S. Grant’s attempt to limit its advance and William T. Sherman’s failed attacks against Patrick Cleburne on the north end of the ridge. But, in this case, the principle reasons for Confederate defeat were self-inflicted. The South lost Chattanooga because its primary leaders, Bragg and James Longstreet, failed in their duties as commanders. They bickered and grew distant from one another, failing form a coherent strategy, implement effective countermeasures and inspire their troops.
In a strategic rail movement, Longstreet was sent from Virginia to Georgia just in time to launch the breakthrough attack in the Battle of Chickamauga. Longstreet, along with Nathan Bedford Forrest and others, encouraged Bragg to pursue the routed Yankees immediately. But, Bragg, in typical fashion, was worried about a multitude of things, not the least of which was how bloodied his army was. In victory, he had just lost more troops (about 18,500) than had the defeated Union army (about 16,000). Routing the Army of the Cumberland did not inspire him to become a conqueror. That was his and the South’s ultimate undoing.
Instead, Bragg brooded. He was despondent. And he was crass to everyone around him. Bragg rejected Longstreet’s advice in an abrasive manner that surprised Robert E. Lee’s “old warhorse.” Longstreet and his veteran Virginia divisions thought themselves superior to the western Confederates. They had been led by Lee, of course. They had won many victories. And now they came to Georgia and won the only clear victory for the Army of Tennessee during the entire war. That Bragg dismissed Longstreet’s advice so abruptly created a rift between the two that only widened in the days ahead.
Longstreet was not finished, however. He put together another offensive proposal in early October as the Confederates attempted to isolate the Federal army at Chattanooga. By then it was known that the North was sending Joseph Hooker with a corps of infantry from Virginia. Longstreet wanted to seize the Federal base at Bridgeport, Alabama and cut off Hooker’s intended reinforcement route before his troops landed.
But Bragg did not want to do anything with his army at all. Again, he rejected Longstreet’s counsel and relations between the two commanders grew icy. Bragg’s hesitancy about wider offensive actions was partly due to his own supply problems. His army was on half-rations due to the shoddy Southern rail line from Atlanta. What wagons he had were mostly in bad repair. Longstreet’s additional thousands of men had been railed in from Virginia with no wagons. This influx of troops had to be fed and supplied even though Bragg’s logistical situation was near collapse.
Further, Chickamauga was a staggering victory. Bragg had lost a tremendous number of troops. The fresh infantry of Longstreet’s corps, arriving late by rail, offered reinforcement at a time when the Federals were barely surviving while fortifying their precarious position at Chattanooga. Still, he had less effective strength now than before Chickamauga.
Furthermore, even though Bragg knew that the Union troops were fortifying, he thought they would give up Chattanooga without a fight. They only had six days rations left. They were badly whipped and demoralized. His cavalry informed him (incorrectly) that the Yankees were retreating. Why risk the chance to let his own army rest and recovery? Chattanooga would fall on its own.
To make sure of that, Bragg sent part of his cavalry under Joseph Wheeler into middle Tennessee, north of Chattanooga, to raid and destroy the Union rail lines. In the process Wheeler captured or destroyed more than 700 supply wagons. Surely this would crush any thought the Yankees might still have about holding on to the city. Also, Bragg ordered Longstreet’s superb artillery commander, Edward Porter Alexander, to use Lookout Mountain to shell the city repeatedly. In truth, though the shelling was loud and looked impressive, it caused little damage from so far away.
Bragg made his headquarters atop Missionary Ridge overlooking Chattanooga and the surrounding valley. He ordered Longstreet to command his left flank from the ridge to Lookout Mountain. Longstreet gladly took advantage of this to isolate himself upon the mountain, lost in his own thoughts and frustrations. He rarely bothered to communicate with Bragg.
For his part, Bragg was content with what was happening. He did not feel the need to pursue his enemy immediately after the battle. Nor would he try to move his logistically fragile army around the beaten Federal army. Instead, other matters occupied his mind. Bragg was going to rid himself of many of his generals and restructure the whole army as it sat before Chattanooga.
The festering mess among the commanders of the Army of Tennessee began back in 1862. Some of them thought he had handled the Battle of Perryville badly. After the Battle of Murfreesboro, even more commanders felt Bragg had botched his opportunities there. Bragg asked his commanders for written comments on his conduct of operations and was shocked when he received frank criticism.
By early October 1863 many of his commanders had signed a memorandum asking President Jefferson Davis to dismiss Bragg. But Bragg was a favorite of Davis. So the president decided to visit the army and speak with everyone personally. To show how "tone-deaf" Davis was to the state of affairs, he brought along John C. Pemberton to see if he could be of use to Bragg.
This produced immediate outrage and ruined the conciliatory tone Davis hoped to create. Pemberton had just surrendered Vicksburg on July 4, 1863. To consider him for duty at Chattanooga was unthinkable. Even Bragg could see that and did not accept Davis's suggestion.
Longstreet took this opportunity to present his Bridgeport plan and Davis endorsed it. But, after the president left, Bragg did nothing. Instead, Bragg was empowered by the fact that Davis had expressed full support in him. Bragg dismissed several generals. Inside the divisions which were lead by commanders who opposed him, he shifted the brigades around to more cooperative divisions so that the opposition was diluted through his ranks.
All of this took a toll on the soldiers of the Army of Tennessee. For weeks they had failed to follow-up on their great victory. The men knew about the in-fighting among the army leadership. They already despised Bragg for his past failures. They resented him for their hunger and their impoverished conditions. With the weather turning colder, many of them had no boots and their uniforms were threadbare. Now, he was moving many regiments to new commanders, splintering old alliances and friendships forged in battle. Morale suffered.
Things got worse as October continued. Longstreet became reclusive and, in his arrogance, felt he knew precisely what the Yankees were up to. Hooker would land at Bridgeport and proceed to the southern part of Lookout Mountain, advancing so as to take the mountain from Longstreet’s rear. Longstreet was so certain of this that he failed to respond aggressively to the Battle of Brown’s Ferry. He thought it was but a feint designed to draw his attention away from Lookout Mountain. Thus, the supply line was opened to the Northern troops without any serious counterattack. Longstreet, despising Bragg and certain that he understood everything of importance, simply ignored Bragg’s orders.
Longstreet was wrong. Hooker astutely marched up Lookout Valley and reinforced Brown’s Ferry, further solidifying what was now Grant’s main supply line. Bragg ordered Longstreet to attack with his entire corps. But Longstreet only made a half-hearted effort, committing too few troops to the Battle of Wauhatchie, accomplishing nothing.
Bragg was furious and ultimately sent Longstreet and his troops (about one-third of his total infantry) off to East Tennessee to deal with a secondary threat near Knoxville by Ambrose Burnside. So, Bragg’s army shrank in size as Grant’s forces grew more massive with the arrival of Hooker and Sherman and, most importantly, regular supplies.
September had been dry but October and November turned wet. The Confederate soldiers, on picket duty around Orchard Knob and digging rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge, were drenched in the wet, cold weather. Still low on supplies and without any strategic purpose except to just sit and wait, their morale plummeted even further. The Army of Tennessee began to desert to the Union side in greater numbers. Hundreds each week, sometimes each day, gave up and became prisoners of war rather than continue to serve under Bragg.
By the time of Hooker’s attack at Lookout Mountain, a little over two months had passed since Chickamauga. The elation of a resounding Southern victory had faded into despair due to inaction, confusion, and poor logistics. Instead of facing Longstreet’s corps, Hooker faced only Carter Stevenson’s dispersed division. Though Cleburne managed to hold Sherman at bay, Thomas overran the rifle pits and sliced through the Confederate center with surprising ease and suddenness. The Rebels were completely demoralized before the Union ever fired a shot.
That is the twisted story of the Confederate defeat at Missionary Ridge. While there was certainly a great deal of heroism on the Northern side, but for Cleburne’s efforts it was largely met by Southern ineptitude. Bragg was removed from command on November 30, 1863. Exactly one year later, Cleburne was killed in the Battle of Franklin.
Sources…
Peter Cozzens, The Shipwreck of Their Hopes, 1994 – overall, this is the best book available on the Chattanooga Campaign
Wiley Sword, Mountains Touched With Fire, 1995 – contains a lot of interesting details that you won’t find in the account by Cozzens
David Powell, Battle Above the Clouds, 2017 – features an excellent account of what Rosecrans accomplished before Grant took over as well as a good perspective on Hooker’s actions
David Powell, All Hell Can’t Stop Them, 2018 – a quick-read overview of Missionary Ridge with useful suggestions for touring the battlefield
Thomas L. Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 1971 (pages 230 – 278) – an outstanding classic history of the Army of Tennessee
Judith Lee Hallock, Braxton Bragg and Confederate Defeat, Volume 2, 1991 (pages 80 – 149) – useful insights into Bragg’s character, or lack thereof
Of course, the resilience of the Northern forces had something to do with it. Thomas’s army endured near-starvation and brutal weather conditions while besieged in Chattanooga. It made the most of its opportunity in the assault, despite Ulysses S. Grant’s attempt to limit its advance and William T. Sherman’s failed attacks against Patrick Cleburne on the north end of the ridge. But, in this case, the principle reasons for Confederate defeat were self-inflicted. The South lost Chattanooga because its primary leaders, Bragg and James Longstreet, failed in their duties as commanders. They bickered and grew distant from one another, failing form a coherent strategy, implement effective countermeasures and inspire their troops.
In a strategic rail movement, Longstreet was sent from Virginia to Georgia just in time to launch the breakthrough attack in the Battle of Chickamauga. Longstreet, along with Nathan Bedford Forrest and others, encouraged Bragg to pursue the routed Yankees immediately. But, Bragg, in typical fashion, was worried about a multitude of things, not the least of which was how bloodied his army was. In victory, he had just lost more troops (about 18,500) than had the defeated Union army (about 16,000). Routing the Army of the Cumberland did not inspire him to become a conqueror. That was his and the South’s ultimate undoing.
Instead, Bragg brooded. He was despondent. And he was crass to everyone around him. Bragg rejected Longstreet’s advice in an abrasive manner that surprised Robert E. Lee’s “old warhorse.” Longstreet and his veteran Virginia divisions thought themselves superior to the western Confederates. They had been led by Lee, of course. They had won many victories. And now they came to Georgia and won the only clear victory for the Army of Tennessee during the entire war. That Bragg dismissed Longstreet’s advice so abruptly created a rift between the two that only widened in the days ahead.
Longstreet was not finished, however. He put together another offensive proposal in early October as the Confederates attempted to isolate the Federal army at Chattanooga. By then it was known that the North was sending Joseph Hooker with a corps of infantry from Virginia. Longstreet wanted to seize the Federal base at Bridgeport, Alabama and cut off Hooker’s intended reinforcement route before his troops landed.
But Bragg did not want to do anything with his army at all. Again, he rejected Longstreet’s counsel and relations between the two commanders grew icy. Bragg’s hesitancy about wider offensive actions was partly due to his own supply problems. His army was on half-rations due to the shoddy Southern rail line from Atlanta. What wagons he had were mostly in bad repair. Longstreet’s additional thousands of men had been railed in from Virginia with no wagons. This influx of troops had to be fed and supplied even though Bragg’s logistical situation was near collapse.
Further, Chickamauga was a staggering victory. Bragg had lost a tremendous number of troops. The fresh infantry of Longstreet’s corps, arriving late by rail, offered reinforcement at a time when the Federals were barely surviving while fortifying their precarious position at Chattanooga. Still, he had less effective strength now than before Chickamauga.
Furthermore, even though Bragg knew that the Union troops were fortifying, he thought they would give up Chattanooga without a fight. They only had six days rations left. They were badly whipped and demoralized. His cavalry informed him (incorrectly) that the Yankees were retreating. Why risk the chance to let his own army rest and recovery? Chattanooga would fall on its own.
To make sure of that, Bragg sent part of his cavalry under Joseph Wheeler into middle Tennessee, north of Chattanooga, to raid and destroy the Union rail lines. In the process Wheeler captured or destroyed more than 700 supply wagons. Surely this would crush any thought the Yankees might still have about holding on to the city. Also, Bragg ordered Longstreet’s superb artillery commander, Edward Porter Alexander, to use Lookout Mountain to shell the city repeatedly. In truth, though the shelling was loud and looked impressive, it caused little damage from so far away.
Bragg made his headquarters atop Missionary Ridge overlooking Chattanooga and the surrounding valley. He ordered Longstreet to command his left flank from the ridge to Lookout Mountain. Longstreet gladly took advantage of this to isolate himself upon the mountain, lost in his own thoughts and frustrations. He rarely bothered to communicate with Bragg.
For his part, Bragg was content with what was happening. He did not feel the need to pursue his enemy immediately after the battle. Nor would he try to move his logistically fragile army around the beaten Federal army. Instead, other matters occupied his mind. Bragg was going to rid himself of many of his generals and restructure the whole army as it sat before Chattanooga.
The festering mess among the commanders of the Army of Tennessee began back in 1862. Some of them thought he had handled the Battle of Perryville badly. After the Battle of Murfreesboro, even more commanders felt Bragg had botched his opportunities there. Bragg asked his commanders for written comments on his conduct of operations and was shocked when he received frank criticism.
By early October 1863 many of his commanders had signed a memorandum asking President Jefferson Davis to dismiss Bragg. But Bragg was a favorite of Davis. So the president decided to visit the army and speak with everyone personally. To show how "tone-deaf" Davis was to the state of affairs, he brought along John C. Pemberton to see if he could be of use to Bragg.
This produced immediate outrage and ruined the conciliatory tone Davis hoped to create. Pemberton had just surrendered Vicksburg on July 4, 1863. To consider him for duty at Chattanooga was unthinkable. Even Bragg could see that and did not accept Davis's suggestion.
Longstreet took this opportunity to present his Bridgeport plan and Davis endorsed it. But, after the president left, Bragg did nothing. Instead, Bragg was empowered by the fact that Davis had expressed full support in him. Bragg dismissed several generals. Inside the divisions which were lead by commanders who opposed him, he shifted the brigades around to more cooperative divisions so that the opposition was diluted through his ranks.
All of this took a toll on the soldiers of the Army of Tennessee. For weeks they had failed to follow-up on their great victory. The men knew about the in-fighting among the army leadership. They already despised Bragg for his past failures. They resented him for their hunger and their impoverished conditions. With the weather turning colder, many of them had no boots and their uniforms were threadbare. Now, he was moving many regiments to new commanders, splintering old alliances and friendships forged in battle. Morale suffered.
Things got worse as October continued. Longstreet became reclusive and, in his arrogance, felt he knew precisely what the Yankees were up to. Hooker would land at Bridgeport and proceed to the southern part of Lookout Mountain, advancing so as to take the mountain from Longstreet’s rear. Longstreet was so certain of this that he failed to respond aggressively to the Battle of Brown’s Ferry. He thought it was but a feint designed to draw his attention away from Lookout Mountain. Thus, the supply line was opened to the Northern troops without any serious counterattack. Longstreet, despising Bragg and certain that he understood everything of importance, simply ignored Bragg’s orders.
Longstreet was wrong. Hooker astutely marched up Lookout Valley and reinforced Brown’s Ferry, further solidifying what was now Grant’s main supply line. Bragg ordered Longstreet to attack with his entire corps. But Longstreet only made a half-hearted effort, committing too few troops to the Battle of Wauhatchie, accomplishing nothing.
Bragg was furious and ultimately sent Longstreet and his troops (about one-third of his total infantry) off to East Tennessee to deal with a secondary threat near Knoxville by Ambrose Burnside. So, Bragg’s army shrank in size as Grant’s forces grew more massive with the arrival of Hooker and Sherman and, most importantly, regular supplies.
September had been dry but October and November turned wet. The Confederate soldiers, on picket duty around Orchard Knob and digging rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge, were drenched in the wet, cold weather. Still low on supplies and without any strategic purpose except to just sit and wait, their morale plummeted even further. The Army of Tennessee began to desert to the Union side in greater numbers. Hundreds each week, sometimes each day, gave up and became prisoners of war rather than continue to serve under Bragg.
By the time of Hooker’s attack at Lookout Mountain, a little over two months had passed since Chickamauga. The elation of a resounding Southern victory had faded into despair due to inaction, confusion, and poor logistics. Instead of facing Longstreet’s corps, Hooker faced only Carter Stevenson’s dispersed division. Though Cleburne managed to hold Sherman at bay, Thomas overran the rifle pits and sliced through the Confederate center with surprising ease and suddenness. The Rebels were completely demoralized before the Union ever fired a shot.
That is the twisted story of the Confederate defeat at Missionary Ridge. While there was certainly a great deal of heroism on the Northern side, but for Cleburne’s efforts it was largely met by Southern ineptitude. Bragg was removed from command on November 30, 1863. Exactly one year later, Cleburne was killed in the Battle of Franklin.
Sources…
Peter Cozzens, The Shipwreck of Their Hopes, 1994 – overall, this is the best book available on the Chattanooga Campaign
Wiley Sword, Mountains Touched With Fire, 1995 – contains a lot of interesting details that you won’t find in the account by Cozzens
David Powell, Battle Above the Clouds, 2017 – features an excellent account of what Rosecrans accomplished before Grant took over as well as a good perspective on Hooker’s actions
David Powell, All Hell Can’t Stop Them, 2018 – a quick-read overview of Missionary Ridge with useful suggestions for touring the battlefield
Thomas L. Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 1971 (pages 230 – 278) – an outstanding classic history of the Army of Tennessee
Judith Lee Hallock, Braxton Bragg and Confederate Defeat, Volume 2, 1991 (pages 80 – 149) – useful insights into Bragg’s character, or lack thereof
Comments