Patrick Cleburne's Death Sentence

A memorial to General Patrick Cleburne which I saw at Winstead Hill a week ago today.

Patrick Cleburne was an exceptional general, sometimes referred to as “the Stonewall Jackson of the West.”  His early actions as an Arkansas brigade commander at Shiloh, Richmond (Kentucky), and Perryville were all exemplary.  He was promoted to division commander partially at the request of Confederate President Jefferson Davis himself, who was responding to General Braxton Bragg’s enthusiasm for Cleburne’s qualities of leadership.  His division led the initial attack at Stones River and Cleburne was successful in driving back all Federal opposition he encountered.

But Cleburne’s opinion of Bragg grew unfavorable after the large battle at Murfreesboro.  By the Battle of Chickamauga, he was part of the unofficial coalition within the Army of Tennessee questioning Bragg’s competence.  This became a moot point when Bragg resigned after his army was routed at the Battle of Missionary Ridge.  Cleburne’s division was one of the few units that maintained cohesion that day and he covered the retreat of the army with a repulse of pursuing Union troops at the Battle of Ringgold Gap.  His conduct in that battle was lauded by everyone across the South including the Confederate Government.

Bragg was replaced by General Joseph E. Johnston in late December 1863.  The process of refitting the battered Army of Tennessee proceeded throughout that winter, with Cleburne holding regular classes for his brigade commanders on the art of strategy and tactics in addition to supervising the continued improvement of his division.

After the disaster at Missionary Ridge, Cleburne considered the bleak prospects for Southern Independence.  This resulted in a radical idea.  In a lengthy, thorough treatise justifying his perspective he wrote: “Adequately to meet the causes which are now threatening ruin to our country, we propose…that we immediately commence training a large reserve of the most courageous of our slaves, and further that we guarantee within a reasonable time to every slave in the South who shall remain true to the Confederacy in this war.”  The resulting increase in troops, he reasoned, would put the South on parity with the greater Northern armies, perhaps even outnumbering them, thereby enhancing the probability of victory on the battlefield.  

The treatise was cosigned by 13 other Confederate officers including two of his Brigadier-Generals.  Other supporters included Cleburne’s corps commander, General William Hardee, though he only committed to it verbally.  Hardee thought it important enough to share with the other principle generals, which he arranged on January 2, 1864.

Cleburne’s Assistant Adjutant General, Irving A. Buck wrote an insightful memoir entitled Cleburne and His Command in 1905 where Buck includes the entire proposal to arm the slaves prefaced by a letter Buck had written in 1897 recollecting its reception.  Cleburne’s chief of staff, Major Calhoun Benham, was immediately opposed to the proposal and wrote a respectful but firm dissent regarding it.

“Later a meeting of the general officers of the army, including its commander, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, was called at General Hardee’s headquarters and the paper submitted.  It was received with disapproval by several and before this assembly Major Benham read his letter of protest.  Not having been present, I am unable to state the individual sentiment of the higher officers, but my impression is that Generals Hardee and Johnston were favorably disposed, though the latter declined to forward it to the War Department, on the ground that it was more political than military in tenor.  This was a sore disappointment to Cleburne, who supposed his opportunity of bringing it before the President was lost, and he was too good a soldier and strict disciplinarian to think of sending it over the head of his superior.” (page 189)

Of those present, General Thomas Hindman ventured to support Cleburne’s proposal, stating that the only alternative was to draft “boys and old men” into the army.  Generals William Bate, Patton Anderson and W.H.T. Walker all opposed the plan outright.  Afterwards Johnston tabled the matter insisting that the content and discussions remain secret. The next day, against orders, Walker requested a copy of the proposal from Cleburne.  Thinking this was his chance to get his grand idea before President Davis, Cleburne happily complied with Walker’s request.

In a roundabout way, the proposal made it to General Bragg and ultimately to Davis himself.  Bragg already detested Cleburne since he was among the generals who failed to support Bragg’s conduct while commanding the Army of Tennessee.  Davis was unpleasantly surprised by Cleburne, whom he had earlier insisted upon promoting.  The President felt the proposal was taboo and sequestered it.  It would only be made available to the public about 35 years after the war.

Now, all this happened as Bragg and Davis considered who should fill the open corps commander position in Johnston’s army.  Wiley Sword takes up the narrative at this point: “Bragg and Davis conferred.  A new, prestigious face seemed to be needed to restore confidence in the West.  Pat Cleburne appeared to be the ablest general, yet Cleburne had written that damning proposal about arming the slaves.  There was also the matter of Bragg’s detractors.  Discredited in Davis’ eyes and regarded much as a traitor by Bragg, Cleburne was quickly and summarily passed over.  Instead of Cleburne the Army of Tennessee obtained as a new corps commander John Bell Hood.” (pp. 21 - 22)

Buck recalled attempting to dissuade Cleburne from presenting his proposal specifically because he felt Cleburne was first in line to be the next corps commander.  “That one of the corps of our army was without a lieutenant-general; that he, General Cleburne, had lately achieved a signal success at Ringgold, for which he received the thanks of Congress, and stood in reputation first among the major-generals, and might just expect to be advanced to this vacancy; that I felt assured the publication of the paper would be used detrimentally, and his chances of promotion destroyed.  To this he answered, that a crisis was upon the South, the dangers of which he was convinced would most quickly be averted in the way outlined, and feeling it his duty to bring this before the authorities, he would do so irrespective of any result to himself.” (pp. 188 – 189)

Little did Cleburne know what that result would ultimately mean.  It meant that, with Hood further elevated to commanding general of the army at Atlanta and devising a raid into Tennessee afterward, Cleburne would be on the field leading his division on November 30, 1864 instead of occupying a place further back while commanding an entire corps to which he was militarily justified in being promoted.

Buck wrote about Cleburne scoping out Schofield’s forces from Winstead Hill before the attack at Franklin.  It is moving to read this recalling that I was standing on that very hill myself a week ago today (see previous post). 

“Upon his arrival at Winstead’s Hill, whilst awaiting the formation of his command, he ascended to the summit, rested his field glasses upon a stump, and gazed long at the enemy’s entrenchments.  He simply remarked, 'They look formidable.'  Seating himself upon the stump, he wrote rapidly for a few minutes in a small blank-book, which he returned to his pocket.” (page 281)

His horse was shot out from under him that day.  A staff officer quickly provided him with another but it was killed as Cleburne mounted it.  He continued on foot, encouraging his men to close on the routed Yankee outer defenders and to use them for protection.  “Go into the works with them!” was his final order.  He was shot through the heart several yards from the Union line.

Buck concludes from the same page: “He had doubtless noted down his impressions as to the situation, and it would be interesting and valuable to know what these were, but after his death his body was robbed, and the book lost.”  It is true, in all the dense confusion of Franklin, someone stole Cleburne’s boots while his clothes were opened up and all items removed, most likely by straggling, hapless  Confederate soldiers themselves.

In March 1865 the Confederate Congress approved a bill authorizing the enlistment of blacks into the army.  It did not promise those who served any freedom.  A couple of companies were formed and trained briefly around Richmond before the war ended about a month later.