Chasing Battlefields: Chickamauga - The Second Day

(Note: Read the Introduction post one and First Day post in this series.)

General Hill's early morning attack did not occur.  The pause of a couple of hours allowed General Rosecrans to send General Thomas more troops.  As events unfolded, some of the  troops moving north toward Thomas had to be replaced in the Union line.  General Thomas J. Wood was ordered to fill the gap.  All of these troops involved different commands of the Union army.  Brigades from different Divisions and Corps were being mixed around.  Thomas was benefiting but it was confusing for the other Corps and Division commanders.

Meanwhile, General Bragg was even more livid.  Could no one follow orders anymore?!  By this time Polk had contacted Hill and the two had gotten into an argument with each other.  If the Northern command was confused, the Southern command (or the right wing of it) was contesting itself.  Both led to dysfunctional decisions.

This marker is located on the grounds of Breckinridge's mid-morning attack that opened the second day's fighting.

Finally, at about 9:30 AM General John C. Breckinridge's division of Hill's corps got into position and attacked into McDonald Field near where the park's visitor's center is located today.  This field extended beyond Thomas's left flank but he had used General John Beatty's brigade, a reinforcement, to “refuse” his flank defensively.  Beatty was facing Breckinridge's troops across LaFayette Road as the attack hit.

Breckinridge overlapped Thomas's line and so naturally turned south and slammed into Beatty, who routed.  Captain Cuthbert H. Slocomb's artillery battery was placed to assist Breckinridge.  I stood at this battery location and studied the area with particular interest this trip to the battlefield.  Next, Breckinridge hit Colonel William Grose's brigade and routed it.  Slocomb's battery assisted.

Actually, Beatty had only half his brigade on hand when he routed.  His other two regiments were up by 10:30 AM and holding their ground.  They were reinforced by two additional brigades.  The Southerners pressed forward into the woods beyond the range of their artillery.    They reached the northern side of Kelly Field and were routed from both here and near McDonald Field.  It was a tough moment for Thomas's extreme left, which managed to bend back upon itself and repulse the Rebel advance.

By this time General Cleburne attacked toward Kelly Field but he bogged down fighting in the woods, never reaching the field.  General Stewart launched an attack across Poe Field.  Like Cleburne, he was bogged down in the woods across the field.  Thomas's troops held all positions with the Confederates remaining close by in the woods near the fields.  One last assault by Breckinridge about noon with support from General Walker was also beaten back by the reinforced Federals.   

The first attacks of the second day stuttered to a start.  Stewart, Cleburne, and Breckinridge all began their assaults at different times.  Though, between 10:30 and 11 AM, all three were attacking in unison.  Nevertheless, there was ample time and reinforcements for Thomas to check each advance, especially that of Cleburne, who hardly advanced at all.

The site of Colonel Slocomb's artillery battery position in McDonald Field near the park's visitor's center.  The four Napoleon 12-pounders are historically accurate.  The only inaccuracy is that Slocomb had six of them, not four.  From this position Slocomb supported Breckinridge's attack on the morning of the 20th.  A Federal counterattack late in the day forced them to withdraw from here.

Look closely.  The inscription on this cannon indicates that this Napoleon was manufactured by the Revere Corporation of Boston, MA in 1863.  So this actual cannon was made in a Northern foundry.  Likely, it was not present at Chickamauga, but that's not the point.  It is a real representation of the artillery type used by Slocomb's Southern battery.  Compare it with the artillery piece I photoed at Murfreesboro.  This is a "smooth bore" barrel, which had less range than a "rifled" cannon but it fired a larger shell.  Canister shot from this piece was terrifying and deadly at close range.

Meanwhile, Longstreet was readying his massive simultaneous attack at 11 AM.  It was at this moment the most critical decision of the battle occurred.  Rosecrans had been weakening his center to reinforce Thomas all morning.  General John M. Brannan had already ordered one of his brigade's northward the report to Thomas.  Now Brannan received an urgent request from Thomas to follow with the other two brigades.  Only 30 minutes before, however, part of Brannan's line had repulsed part of Stewart's attack on Poe Field (where the large Georgia Monument stands, see intro post).  It was decided that the movement was too risky and would expose the left flank of Wood's brigade in the Union line.  Given the proximity of the Rebels, Brannan decided to remain in place. 

Brannan sent a courier to Rosecrans informing him of the consequences of his supposed move.  Unfortunately, the courier was not recalled when Brannan changed his mind, so Rosecrans was incorrectly informed that there was a gap in his center line.  Rosecrans immediately ordered Wood to “close-up and support” the unit to his left on the other side of the nonexistent gap.  Wood had been skirmishing with the Rebels as well and considered getting clarification.  But ultimately he decided to shift left out of line.  

He apparently thought “close-up and support” meant to form a reserve beyond Brannan's division behind General Joseph J. Reynolds's position.  Why else would he be ordered to move when Brannan was still in place? Rosecrans simply intended for him to stretch out his line to cover the gap where, in fact, Brannan's troops still stood.  

Accordingly, two of Wood's brigades were sent northward.  His third brigade under General Buell was heavily engaged with Longstreet's skirmishers and remained in place which was covering most of Brotherton Field.  But the northernmost part of the field and the woods just north of there were now being abandoned.  No one sought clarification about anything.  Then Longstreet struck.

The battlefield marker where the center of Brannan's line was located on the 20th.

A closer look at the map on the marker showing Wood's maneuver out of position near Brotherton Cabin just before Longstreet unleashed his attack.

This is the interpretative marker on the spot where Wood pulled out of line.  This gives the essential facts of the affair, merely stating, correctly, that Wood took Rosecrans's order "literally."

Looking across Brotherton Field from the marker location.  The cabin is between the two trees in the left foreground.  Bushrod Johnson's division crossed this field virtually unopposed about 11:15 AM.

Had Polk attacked in a timely manner as Bragg intended he might well have turned Thomas's left flank.  Beatty would not have yet been in place.  Even though Breckinridge routed him, it was a speed bump in what would have otherwise been a running advance across an open field.  But because Polk, through command confusion, delayed for a couple of hours it actually gave Longstreet additional time to complete his preparations.  Unlike Polk, Longstreet formed an attack in depth, with multiple lines of troops.  At 11:15 AM General Bushrod Johnson's division rushed headlong into Brotherton Field.

Buell's brigade was driven back and Brotherton Field fell to the Southerners.  This set off a chain reaction along the Union line.  General Jefferson C. Davis's division was flanked by Johnson to the north and General Thomas Hindman's division to the south.  Davis was overwhelmed.  Likewise, north of the gap created by Wood's move, the Yankees were outflanked and routed.

Hearing the gunfire to his rear, Wood halted his move and turned about-face to the enemy north of Dyer Field.  Croxton shifted to support him.  General Benning attacked about 11:45 AM and was repulsed by Croxton just west of Poe Field.  Meanwhile, to the south of the breakthrough, General Sheridan's division counterattacked into Dyer Field.  One of his brigades was outflanked and routed.  The other two stood their ground in heavy fighting near Dyer Field.  About 12:15 PM, one of Sheridan's standing brigades lost its leader.  General William H. Lytle was killed attempting to rally his men as they, too, gave way. 

A view of Dyer Field looking north from the position where General Lytle was killed on the afternoon of the 20th.

A marker located near where the Union right flank was routed by Longstreet's attack.

Dyer Field with the same marker in view.  On the early afternoon of the 20th this field was filled with running Yankees and pursuing Rebels.  In the far distance on the ridge line directly above the marker you can barely see the location of General Rosecrans's headquarters.  Seeing his troops panic, Rosecrans and his staff ran for Chattanooga too, leaving Thomas as the only major Federal commander left on the field.

The spot where General Hood was wounded during the Southern pursuit.

Looking north across Dyer Field from the point where Hood was wounded.  General Kershaw's South Carolina brigade marched toward and took the hill in the distance.  The treeline hides the South Carolina Monument from this location.

The South Carolina Monument from the small parking space nearby.  This is the point Kershaw's troops attacked and captured.  Facing west.

The South Carolina Monument.

Facing south looking across Dyer Field from the base of the monument.  Kershaw's men charged directly toward this spot.  Hood was wounded along the distant treeline to the right just out of view.

At this point Colonel Wilder's cavalry, on the extreme right of Rosecrans's army, counterattacked the onrush of Hindman's division.  Catching his exposed left flank, he drove part of the division back.  By now Sheridan was aware of the breakthrough and ordered his disorganized brigades to retreat.  Wilder did not budge and continued to threaten Hindman's advance, thereby slowing the Rebel pursuit.

Meanwhile, Johnson's advance continued into and across Dyer Field, smashing the few Federal regiments in his way.  Law's advance ran into Wood's reformed brigade about 12:15 PM.  The Yankees provided aggressive fire and routed the Texas brigade.  It was at this point the General Hood was wounded, which created disorder in the Confederate command at a critical moment when the breakthrough was being exploited.  General Joseph B. Kershaw's South Carolina brigade countercharged across the open expanse of Dyer Field and up a hill into Wood's troops, forcing their retreat to Snodgrass Hill about 1 PM.  This is where the South Carolina monument is placed on the battlefield today.

The Wilder Monument is the largest memorial in the park, surpassing even the Georgia Monument.  It contains a winding staircase that gives you a panoramic view of the surrounding terrain.  Unfortunately, it was closed for the season during my trip this month.  This was the first time I have visited the park and not been able to climb to the top.

The view of Brock (Glenn) Field from the base of the Wilder Monument.  Wilder's cavalry charged the left flank of Hindman's division as it advanced across here from right to left on the afternoon of the 20th, routing a Rebel brigade and disrupting the overall pursuit.  The line of pines in the distance was not there during the battle and the field was open to the space beyond making it larger than it is today from this perspective.

The location on the edge of Kelly field where Colonel King was killed on the afternoon of the 20th.  At 5:30 PM Confederates occupied this position.

A view of the Kelly cabin facing north across the length of Kelly Field.  Parts of Stewart's and Cleburne's divisions drove from one end of this field to the other between 5 PM and 6 PM on the 20th. 

Kershaw wasn't finished.  His men drove on past the knoll they had captured and hit the Union line on Snodgrass Hill and two other hills known collectively as Horseshoe Ridge.  A couple of attempts failed to dislodge four disordered but superbly reforming Federal brigades from the ridge and Snodgrass Field.  By 1:45 PM Thomas had taken command of a solid line formed by Brannan, Beatty, and Wood.  Kershaw's long sweeping assault finally became disorganized and he ordered a retreat to regroup.  

It is important here to explain the critical and timely arrival of fresh Union reinforcements, which basically saved the North from an even worse calamity.  General Gordon Granger and General James B. Steedman had spent the morning to the north protecting Rossville Gap.  But, as the sounds of the chaos of battle increased, Granger decided to detach Steedman from the rest of his command and to personally accompany Steedman's two brigades southward toward the sound of guns.  This initiative by Granger made all the difference.

They had a brush with Confederate cavalry on their march south but no serious effort was made to stop them, which was a mistake by the Confederates.  As fate would have it, they arrived in the rear Thomas's line at Horseshoe Ridge.  Thomas immediately ordered them to march over the wooded hilly terrain toward the Northern right flank, which was unprotected past the ridge.

Granger and Steedman were still probing with about 3,000 fresh troops when Hindman's and Bushrod Johnson's Southerners attacked about 2 PM.  Hindman's division made a poor showing here and was repulsed without ever becoming seriously engaged.  Suddenly finding himself unsupported, Johnson's troops tried to go on alone.

Had Granger delayed his march south another half hour, Hindman's and Johnson's divisions would have been unopposed and able to encircle the entire position along Horseshoe Ridge.  As it was, the 21st Ohio regiment had to shift to protect its flank on Horseshoe Ridge just as Steedman's two brigades arrived.  

A desperate fight ensued for possession of terrain on Thomas's extreme right.  I took photos of this position as I hiked the length of Horseshoe Ridge.  It should be noted that the 21st Ohio was armed with Colt repeating rifles, giving them amplified firepower against the hard charging Rebels.  This was a second instance (after Wilder's brigade) of advanced (for the time) weaponry having success at Chickamauga.  See a painting of the 21st firing their Colts at the Rebels on the cover of David Powell's wargame and Peter Cozzen's excellent book here.

Steedman counterattacked and drove Johnson back.  Once again, the long Southern advance had caused a gradual disorganization in the ranks.  (The same could not be said of Hindman's men, who apparently were simply not willing to attack.)  Steedman's men aggressively halted the enemy's advance.  Kershaw made another try at 2:30 PM as Johnson reformed.  After an extended fight on the very ridge of the hill, he was driven back by the line held partly by 2nd Minnesota and the 11th Michigan regiments, both of which I took photos of while walking the wooded hills.

An inevitable lull ensued as the Rebels resupplied themselves with ammo.  The Yankees were running low as well but the Union logistics were so chaotic at this point that they had to make use of what ammo they had left.  General Archibald Gracie's Southern division was sent forward.  It marched around and through Kershaw's recovering men and attacked.  Gracie's first charge was repulsed but his second managed to capture the first hill of the ridge, driving the 11th Michigan's part of the line back in the process.
 
That was shortly before 5 PM.  The sun was getting lower in the sky when Johnson attacked Steedman, this time with support from two Southern artillery batteries that had struggled into position through the rugged terrain.  Hindman was once more lackluster and did not move forward.  Nevertheless, after an extended firefight, Steedman broke.

Brannan was aware of this began to retreat under fire.  Beatty and Wood would later follow, the latter brigade covering Snodgrass Field.  On the Southern side, Gracie was so disorganized that he withdrew from both the captured hill and Snodgrass Field.  By 6:30 PM five Union regiments were isolated on the third hill.  These were ultimately surrounded and captured about 7 PM.  The piecemeal remnants of the Union line (mostly on and around the second hill) continued to resist until about 7:30 PM.

The Snodgrass cabin situated between Snodgrass Hill and Snodgrass Field.

The location of the 21st Ohio regiment represents the westernmost extent of the Union right flank along Horseshoe Ridge before Steedman's troops arrived late in the day.  These troops were armed with deadly Colt revolving rifles enabling them to deliver the concentrated firepower of a unit much larger (and deadlier) than their actual size.  They repulsed every Southern attack against them and retreated in good order.

General Granger hastily set up his headquarters at this point on Horseshoe Ridge as Steedman guided his troops off to the left of this photo.  He did not remain here long but his timely arrival may have saved the entire Federal position from being attacked in its rear.

The 2nd Minnesota Monument on Horseshoe Ridge.

The 11th Michigan Monument on Snodgrass Hill.  This position was taken by the Confederates about 4:45 PM but the Yankees remianed nearby and kept up a murderous fire.  The Rebels withdrew about an hour later to regroup.  The Union troops retreated and did not attempt retake the hill so, for a brief time, it was no man's land.

Wood's brigade defended Snodgrass Field.  This was the only instance of a field being successfully defended in the open during the battle.  The Union abandoned this position beginning about 7 PM.

This marker tells the story of the final shots fired in the battle along Horseshoe Ridge about 7:30 PM.

Meanwhile, Thomas had ordered his “regular” command around Kelly Field (the only portion of the Union original line still organized) to begin retreating.  Colonel Edward King, a Union brigade commander, was killed by Confederate sharpshooters at long range at this time.   As the first stage of the retreat was preparing, Stewart renewed his attack. Though not routed, the southern part of Thomas's line rushed away in retreat before Stewart could seriously engage them.

Simultaneously, the Federals launched an attack of their own on the northern part of line.  As part of the retreat, the Federals first cleared McDonald Field.  Hitting two Rebel brigades in flank, they routed them along with Slocomb's battery position, securing the field and protecting the road by which the rest of Thomas's reinforced corps was retreating.

But at 5:30 PM, General Lucius E. Polk's brigade of Cleburne's division routed a Federal brigade across Kelly Field.  At 6 PM, the whole Confederate wing lunged forward and either hit open air or routing Yankees.  By this time, divisions that had retreated were moving back to Chattanooga in a semi-orderly fashion.  But the other two-thirds of the Army of the Cumberland was in shambles, either straggling, routing or being captured.

The Confederates won the field and the battle but most of the almost 40,000 causalities had been on the Southerners.  The carnage was horrific.  Rather than follow up on his victory, the depressive Bragg only saw that significant parts of his army were a shattered mess and that Polk had failed to carry out orders yet again.  Bragg had no reserves and no interest in sending any of his units that had been engaged.  The day was too much for him.  He became despondent and that cost the South dearly.  Chattanooga would not be retaken.

I have read, studied, simulated, and hiked the Battle of Chickamauga since elementary school.  The heavy fighting in thick woods particularly intrigues me.  Largely, no one could see each other.  The fields were anchors for a line of battle but ultimately they benefited the attacker more.  With one exception, neither side successfully defended any field while exposed in the open.  Fields were instead defended from the opposite wood line.  The weapons where accurate enough to hit masses of men as they crossed the open field.  The hail of gunfire (along with the threat of being flanked in the woods) worked almost every time in this battle.  The lone exception was the Union line held on to Snodgrass Field as the day ended.

This battle was decided in the woods.  There the vicious fighting was necessarily at close range, which meant you could not see when you were about to be outflanked.  Flank attacks were a surprise and they occurred several times on both sides.  The crazy way each side could successfully counterattack and rout the other in this battle is fascinating to me.  Also, the woods concealed Longstreet's careful deployment of his wing in close proximity to the Federal lines without them knowing it.  

My trip to the Chickamauga battlefield was a wonderful experience.  There's no excuse to not visit there more frequently.  I'll go back again in the next couple of years.  I plan on playing David Powell's game on the topic (I bought it last year) at some point in 2023.  I have a desire to step inside this battle as only a great wargame can allow; by using my knowledge of the terrain and my reading to put myself into the positions on the game map and fire away.

Of course, there are still many, many other battlefields to chase.  Somewhere down the line I want to make it back over to Shiloh.  I have visited there twice before I ever started this blog. Shiloh is just as compelling to me, again partly due to the heavily wooded nature of the battle but also to the importance of that battle to the future leadership of both sides in the war (as explained in an essay I wrote long ago here).  In my immediate future, the Atlanta Campaign lays before me.  I look forward to learning something new the next time I chase the ground where a battle was fought.