Powell's The Atlanta Campaign, Volume 3

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Volume three of David A. Powell’s outstanding history of the Atlanta Campaign came out about three weeks ago. I devoured it greedily when my copy arrived. The book opens after the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain. Confederate officials are concerned about retreating below the Chattahoochee River. To lose the rail line to Alabama would isolate the resources of the Southern heartland from both General Joseph E. Johnston’s Army of Tennessee and Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.

Brig. General Francis Shoup, like many Southern soldiers and officers, was frustrated by Johnston’s constant retreating. He proposed to build a line of fortifications north of the river that could be held “by one division” against General William T. Sherman’s combined Union armies. This would obviously free up enough infantry to allow Johnston to strike with his full weight against any weakness in the Northern advance. Johnston authorized Shoup to begin construction in June, before Kennesaw Mountain.

Meanwhile, Sherman advanced cautiously, using superior skirmishing and artillery to take the next ridge or crossroads or ford. Then the next. Confederate artillery could not answer the Union fire rate as they were now becoming low on ammunition and could only fire in defense and for attack, if ordered. That left the Yankee guns to fire many times without threat of counter-fire, supporting the skirmishers and advancing the line.

Sherman believed Johnston would retire beyond the river but he didn’t. Johnston took a risk at Smyrna and then by using Shoup’s fortified line once it was completed. Sherman was surprised both times and immediately set about outflanking each position.

Shoup’s line was unique and misunderstood by practically the entire Army of Tennessee. It consisted of a series of wedge-shaped forts. Each threesome of forts had interlocking fields of fire and was heavily fortified with walls too high to scale without ladders. They were designed not for shooting anyone attacking the individual fort but to shoot at other forts under attack as those forts shot at whoever was attacking it. It was an ingenious answer to giving the Rebels parity to launch a counterattack elsewhere.

Johnston did not appreciate them, though some like General Patrick Cleburne saw the brilliance of it. With just a few infantry the Confederates could expose all attackers to a vicious crossfire similar to what they experienced at Kennesaw Mountain, with possibly the same results.

Sherman only realized how strong the line was later after Johnston retreated. But he was not thinking of attacking the entrenched Rebels anyway. He merely skirmished the line and worked part of his army toward Roswell where it could cross the river unopposed. For several days the Union forces were across in two weak positions but Johnston, not understanding that he could withdraw the bulk of his army to strike these other points, guarded the fortified line designed to be held by far fewer troops. It was a wasted opportunity and the last such opportunity Johnston would get.

Powell does not play the “what-if” game much. But it is obvious that he was impressed with the “Shoupades,” as General Gustavus W. Smith dubbed them. Had the design been followed, most of Sherman’s largest army, General George Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland, would have been held up at least for a few days by two divisions and some cavalry at most. 50,000 Confederates could have swung up to Roswell and hit McPherson’s 30,000. Who knows what might have happened? Such is war.

Powell devotes a chapter to a little known but effective Federal cavalry raid through Alabama commanded by Major General Lovell H. Rousseau. The raid destroyed over 30 miles of railroad, several depots and “great quantities” of stores and cotton. The raid hit a weak area in Southern defenses and exploited it, creating precisely the kind of disruption and destruction Sherman desired.

Meanwhile, Johnston “remained inexplicably passive” from July 10 – 17 while Sherman established two weak bridgeheads over the Chattahoochee. Johnston had promised key supporters in the Confederate government that he could hold this river for up to 60 days. He did so only for about three weeks, prompting Georgia Senator Benjamin H. Hill to insist that no other resources were available. “You must do the work with your present force. For God’s sake do it.”

By this time Confederate President Jefferson Davis, never a great supporter of Johnston, had lost all patience. He decided on July 16 to replace the commander of the Army of Tennessee as there was no indication he was going to fight to save Atlanta. Although Johnston did not make this clear until after the war, Powell points out that Johnston felt that Sherman was getting weaker as he came further south and as random Southern raids attacked his supply lines. This was wrong.

In fact, Union hospitals were far better than Rebel ones at returning wounded troops to the line while raids on his supply lines were never as effective as believed. These important facts meant that Sherman was winning the war of attrition even as he maneuvered Johnston out of one position after another.

As he ordered yet another retreat, this time south of the Chattahoochee, he instructed General Alexander Stewart to “‘go find the best position...on our side of Peach Tree Creek for our army to occupy. Do not entrench. Find all the good artillery positions and have them cleared of timber.’ According to Stewart, Johnston ‘did not say he would attack Sherman on the crossing of Peach Tree Creek, but...his dispositions were evidently made with a view to so attack and were inconsistent with any other purpose.’” (pp. 231 – 232)

That was on July 17. Johnston was relieved of command on July 18. Although Powell does not flat-out say this, his summary of subsequent events shows the timing could hardly have been worse.

Federal forces were moving cautiously in stages. By now, Sherman knew he not only had greater numbers but he also had better artillery and skirmishers. So he ordered his three armies, of the Cumberland, of the Tennessee, and of the Ohio, to leverage those assets in addition to his cavalry, which he did not place much faith in. Union troops were converging on Buckhead, just a few miles north of Atlanta, and were approaching Decatur and Peach Tree Creek.

The Army of Tennessee was turned over to General John Bell Hood, though Hood, Stewart, and General William H. Hardee sent a collective telegraph to President Davis asking him to rescind the order temporarily as all commanders and much of the army itself were expecting to finally give battle. Johnston actually continued to order troop movements (in Hood’s name) into his pre-selected positions.

The idea was to concentrate the corps of Hardee and Stewart against any crossing of Peach Tree Creek while Hood’s former corps (now temporarily commanded by General Benjamin Frank Cheatham) covered the Confederate right flank toward Decatur where General Joseph Wheeler’s cavalry was skirmishing against McPherson’s advance.

This was all according to Johnston’s design, not Hood’s. Had Johnston been more forthcoming about his apparent intention to strike Sherman he might not have been replaced, especially as battle was to be given within a couple of days. But that is conjectural. All Powell points out is that Johnston failed to adequately communicate his intentions regarding a vital strategic objective, which made the threat seem inadequately addressed. In other words, Johnston’s lack of clarity left an obviously exasperated Davis to call on Hood to actually do something.

Sherman knew none of this, of course. His plan was to press down on Atlanta simultaneously from the north and the east with his entire army. Just after midnight on July 19, Thomas’s powerful corps were ordered to prepare separate crossings on the creek. These movements began about 6 am.

The first encounter came at Moore’s Mill, where Union Brig. General Jefferson C. Davis (no relation to the Confederate president) tried to force a crossing with his division. Powell covers it in some detail. The fighting lasted there until 10 pm. Summarizing: “Jefferson C. Davis’s Federals had suffered a surprisingly stiff rebuke in trying to seize a bridgehead across Peach Tree Creek, thanks primarily to the alert and aggressive leadership...[of the Southern commanders]. Had either Rebel command been backed up by a more substantial force, Davis’s crossing might have well been a wholesale disaster.” (page 299)

The rest of the Army of the Cumberland cautiously established solid footholds south of the creek with several more infantry divisions while Davis was attacked at Moore’s Mill. “Once again, the Federal skirmishers dominated their Confederate counterparts by seizing key terrain, discomfiting their opponents, and inflicting significant losses, including the capture of the better part of three infantry companies without heavy loss to themselves.” (page 315)

Moore’s Mill was the exception. What happened to the rest of the Confederate attack? Well, about 2pm on July 19, as Hood was understanding Johnston’s disposition of the army and beginning to command events, Wheeler decided now was a good time to update headquarters that he had encountered heavy skirmishing near Decatur for the past two days. Although everyone knew he was engaged, no one knew the extent of it. Hood immediately chastised Wheeler for not presenting timely information.

Wheeler sent more alarming reports and Hood dispatched General Patrick Cleburne, his elite reserve for the attack on Peach Tree Creek, to support Wheeler. He needed to ensure the Yankees didn’t walk into Atlanta from the east side while he concentrated his army along the creek for an attack to the north west of the city.

Though Cleburne’s division was never engaged, Hood dispatched General John Brown’s division and 1,000 more cavalry to shore up the Rebel right as McPherson took Decatur and started ripping up the railroad, advancing on Atlanta from the north east. Sherman had his entire force moving across the northern expanse before Atlanta. Hardee’s and Stewart’s two corps were ordered to attack the Yankee crossings of the creek at 1 pm the next day, July 20.

But on the morning of July 20, even though neither Cleburne nor Brown were engaged, “Hood made a fateful decision,” according to Powell. That’s almost an understatement. Cheatham’s corps was already stretched thin and Hood wanted it to extend all the way east to protect the railroad and the line of fortifications well constructed in that area. To do this, he ordered his entire line shifted sideways the length of one-half division.

Of course, this turned out to be highly disruptive, especially when the shift turned out to require over double the specified distance. Cheatham could now cover his area but Hardee and Stewart were much further east than where Johnston had placed them. In fairness, Hood had no way of knowing whether or not Wheeler could hold the Federals back. Reports made it seem that he could not arrest their advance at all.

Powell also astutely points out that much of the eastern fortifications included a large salient in the north east corner which need not be filled, since there was a fall-back position. Had Cheatham not filled the outermost defenses, he would have had sufficient forces and not forced Hood to make the shift. “While it is true that collapsing that salient might have allowed Sherman to reconnect his two wings more easily, the Federals could not have done so before battle was joined.” (page 329)

So, there was a risk and it would have required some improvised thinking but such an understanding would have gotten the Battle of Peach Tree Creek off at Hood’s designated time. Instead, the Army of Tennessee’s confusing shift made them unable to advance until 4 pm. More importantly perhaps, it altered how the attack unfolded against the Northern line by placing it further east than Johnston had envisioned and Hood originally intended.

Powell concludes at one point that “The Federal threat of Decatur derailed any chance at a Confederate offensive against Thomas on July 19.” (page 316) And this brings me to one of the aspects of the campaign that has puzzled me all my life. Would Johnston have attacked on July 19 had he not been relieved of command? And to what extent did the exchange of command impact a July 19 battle? The reason this has always been of interest is that Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland would have been disrupted to some extent in the act of crossing the creek. They would have been vulnerable. Far more so than they were on July 20 when the battle finally took place. I’ll come back to this.

Powell devotes about 120 pages of detailed, regimental analysis of how the attack developed, the brief Southern successes and the general Northern solidity. It is true some Union divisions were roughed up and one even routed but the Confederates had nothing with which to follow up and generally the Federal artillery outperformed the Confederate in supporting the battle. Also, the terrain favored the defenders because much of it was rougher, less maneuverable than the ground originally chosen by Johnston.

Casualties for the battle were comparatively light, however. Powell does not speculate on this much. By his telling this was a hard fought battle and the number of casualties does not reflect the intensity of the combat along most of the line. For July 20, a little over 1800 Union troops were killed and wounded compared with over 2300 Confederates.

Hood had gambled and failed. Nevertheless, “The battle was a shock to many Federals. Certainly, it signaled an abrupt change in tactics, even though the lanky one-legged Army of Tennessee commander’s first attack ended in failure. Despite a few moments of localized success, the Confederate attacks were beaten back all along the line. A. P. Stewart, in his first battle as a corps commander, had reason to be proud of his new command, for they fought exceedingly well.” (page 451)

Getting a bit more granular but making an important point: “In Walker’s Division, Stevens’s Brigade was mauled in a poorly timed frontal attack while the brigades of Gist and Mercer failed to turn the exposed left of Blake’s Union brigade. They were ultimately rebuffed by Bradley’s brigade and Union artillery. Newton, his brigadiers, and the entire division performed well, shifting reserves and patching holes, but if Hardee had been able to achieve anything like Stewart’s success the Federals would have been overwhelmed.” (page 452) That’s how close the Battle of Peach Tree Creek actually was.

Powell explores Hardee’s responsibility in the account of things. He knows Hardee felt command of the army should have come to him, as he outranked Hood. Did he drag his feet in executing the last-minute shift of frontage? Hardee had the authority necessary to halt the move and attack but he chose instead to just go with it. Hardee had made such orders in the past. He was certainly not aggressive, that’s my observation, Powell never actually says that. But it is clear he feels Hardee under-performed at Peach Tree Creek compared to Stewart, who was far more successful.

Here’s an extended quote to show how Powell’s mind works in considering situations...

“Historian Albert Castel has argued that Hood’s decision to shift Hardee and Stewart to the right had one very large benefit because it placed Hardee’s entire corps opposite Newton’s small division and Stewart’s brigades directly opposite Hooker’s unentrenched and unready XX Corps instead of facing Palmer’s entrenched XIV Corps line. There is some merit to this argument, since Stewart’s would not have fared nearly as well against Palmer. However, if the movement had not occurred, the attack would have been delivered much sooner (about 1 p.m.) when Palmer’s defenses were less complete. As it was, Palmer’s Federals lacked adequate breastworks even as late as 4 p.m. because the men expected to be themselves advancing soon. While it is true that without a shift to the right the Rebels would not outflank Newton, Hardee’s Corps would have instead struck Hooker’s entirely unprepared corps with much more combat power than Stewart brought to bear.” (page 455) This is just brilliant analysis of the possibilities of the moment in Powell’s descriptive voice and I’ll come back to this.

Of interest is the fact that Sherman completely misread the situation. He thought his eastern forces (McPherson and Schofield) were up against the bulk of the Army of Tennessee. Over two hours after the battle started Sherman wrote Thomas “all report the enemy in their front so strong that I was in hopes that none were left for you…” Sherman’s confusion is worth noting as is his impression of what McPherson and Schofield were up against.

The book fittingly concludes with a chapter entitled “Could Johnston Have Held Atlanta?” As I have said, Powell is more into regimental actions than playing what-if but this is one of the biggest questions in the whole War Between the States. Powell basically questions whether Johnston’s character would allow him to take enough risk to have held the city. He believes that Johnston would have done whatever necessary to preserve the army, if the choice ever came down to that.

Powell measures out plenty of criticism of Johnston for failing to comprehend the possibilities given him by Shoup’s impressive and even innovative River Line of defenses. Here I am comfortably in his court. Powell admits that Johnston took a risk by pausing his retreat twice before the Chattahoochee River. But the Southern commander did not see anything new he could do with his army, which is precisely what Shoup had intended him to see.

So I finished reading this outstanding history and immediately thought of my old lifelong question about this part of the war. What happens on July 19 if Johnston is not removed from command? Powell states that Hood could not consider attacking on Peach Tree Creek on the 19th because at 2 p.m. he learned out of nowhere that Wheeler was encountering heavy skirmishing that was slowly pushing him back, approaching Decatur.

Let’s see what else Powell tells us. Well, just above he told us that on July 20 Sherman misread the situation and thought the Rebels were mostly north east of the city. The resistance against McPherson was “strong.” By the 20th Cheatham’s corps had shifted east to meet him. But on the 19th, though Hood dispatched Cleburne and Brown to Wheeler, neither of them were deployed in combat. All the resistance McPherson met that day was coming from Wheeler. Though Powell does not connect the dots this way, it is what he reports in his book.

So, it seems like an interesting fact that Wheeler alone slowed McPherson enough to alarm everyone. One might see where Hood might possibly have overreacted to Wheeler’s admittedly poorly communicated alert. Cleburne, the army’s elite division, never needed to be sent. He would still be under Hardee’s direct command as his reserve.

And it would be July 19 so Wheeler would be further from Decatur. Though it is important to note that he was not indicating the pressure he was already under, which would have been a failure on his part even if Johnston were left in command. Johnston would have been just as surprised and maybe as spooked by the news as Hood was.

Only this is now Johnston’s attack and he has probably ordered it early on the 19th, that is conjectural I’ll admit. But Powell does paint the picture of Johnston being offensively minded in the moment of his dismissal. And he was willing to take some risk just by the way he conducted himself with a river to his back after Kennesaw Mountain.

The positions Hood inherited were positions Johnston made with expectation of attacking as the Yankees crossed Peach Tree Creek. Striking on July 19 would have meant not panicking at the awareness of Wheeler’s situation. It was a risk that needed to be taken. As things turned out most everything Hood did in reaction to Wheeler’s report took Johnston’s intent completely out of context.

Johnston could have ordered that attack and it would have had the whole day before he would ever have to even consider his right flank. Wheeler would hold out. In no small part because the Union was somewhat slowed by the requirement to destroy the railroad. So, Johnston would have attacked anyway, maybe around noon. He would have swept the Yankees into the Chattahoochee River and captured thousands of prisoners. It would be a military coup and the big hit he had been trying to give Sherman since the campaign started.

Except I don’t really think any of that. That is a fantasy that probably never would have happened anyway. But Powell does seem to (unintentionally) support the possibility of a Johnston attack on July 19, because the army would not be basically frozen waiting to see who is in command of what. President Davis responded promptly but it was several precious hours later. Hood would take command.

But a Johnston attack on July 19 has an interesting factor of benefiting from an army attacking from chosen ground and unquestioned command. The XIV and XX Corps mentioned above on July 20 were not fully deployed over the creek on July 19. This is important and I never really considered it in this way until I read Powell’s literally thought-provoking book.

General Thomas drew a map for Sherman on his dispositions at Peach Tree Creek late on July 19. He had gotten four divisions over the creek at separate points. These were to await the rest of their respective corps to cross in the morning. Had Johnston attacked at, say noon, he would have struck not two entire corps that were there on the 20th but something less than four full divisions, each with elements still crossing to join them.

Now Thomas could have certainly hurried reinforcements across the creek. Or he could have withdrawn unentrenched units and held a foothold. Or he could have been mauled by the weight of two full Confederate corps with its elite division in reserve. Or it could have been a combination of things, as is usually the case. The point is, as things turned out, the best chance the Southerners had of inflicting a major defeat was on the very day Hood took command. The timing could not have been worse.

Understanding a situation well enough to explore it in this way is part of my joy of reading military history. I am so lucky to be alive when a writer of Powell’s prowess is so expertly tackling my lifelong puzzles of the Atlanta Campaign. Two more volumes will complete the series in the coming years and maybe an atlas as well. Collectively, the first three volumes are mind-blowingly insightful and energized with the passion for detail of their author. More! Yes, please more.