The Campaign for Atlanta Begins
By 1864 our nation was showing signs of fatigue with respect to the Civil War that had engulfed it since early 1861. In the North, men who enlisted earlier in the war were letting their term of service end, refusing to reenlist. Draft riots would take place in New York City that summer. The desire to subdue the rebellious South was at its lowest point since the war began. Despite numerous Federal victories on battlefields from Gettysburg to Vicksburg, the heart of the Confederacy and its capital, Richmond, were no closer to surrender than it had been the previous three years.
Meanwhile, Southerners were discouraged by one military defeat after another and by the economic hardship, high inflation, and a general lack of basic goods wrought by the successful Union blockcade of Southern ports. But there was also cause for hope. The election of 1864 was coming up. President Abraham Lincoln was as unpopular in the North as ever. Could it be possible to find peace through his defeat in the November election? Hopes for a continued stalemate dissolving what was left of Northern will to fight were not unfounded.
So it was that Lincoln summoned his most reliable general, Ulysses S. Grant, to Washington in order to direct the overall war effort. In the east he would accompany General George Meade's Army of the Potomac in relentlessly attacking General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. In the west, Grant elevated General William T. Sherman to command of three armies, totaling 110,000 men against the Confederate Army of Tennessee with the dual objectives of preventing the Southerners from reinforcing Lee and to capture the major Southern transport hub at Atlanta. It was hoped that meeting these combined objectives would be enough to give swift victory to the North.
Against Sherman, the Confederacy placed General Joseph E. Johnston in command of about 53,000 troops. Entrenched around Dalton, Georgia, the Southerners rebuilt their army, shattered by the overwhelming defeat at Missionary Ridge in late 1863, into a force capable of delivering telling blows and tenacious defense, even if their numbers did not allow for an offensive into Tennessee for which politicians in Richmond hoped.
Sherman had three "armies" arrayed against Johnston. The largest was the Army of the Cumberland commanded by General George H. Thomas with about 60,000 troops, larger than the entire Southern army and comprising over half of the total Northern force. This was complimented by the Army of the Tennessee (Union armies were typically named for rivers while Confederate ones were name for States) under the command of General James B. McPherson, brought east from Mississippi. The Army of the Ohio (in fact little more than a reinforced corps) served under General John M. Schofield to round out the Union ranks.
Sherman's plan was pretty simple. Fix the Confederates with probing attacks, keep them in place with the bulk of his forces while sending McPherson's army around Johnston's left flank to either cut it off from its communications and kill it or to force the Southerners to retreat.
By May 7, Sherman's armies approached Johnston's strong defenses along the ridge lines around Dalton. By May 9, as heavy skirmishing continued at Dalton, McPherson emerged from Snake Creek Gap, an unguarded minor road leading through the mountainous area into the valley below. McPherson approached the rail station at Resaca with the intent of driving the Confederate rearguard away and effectively cutting off Johnston's supply line and best route of retreat.
McPherson grew cautious, however, when he discovered Resaca more fortified than he had previously thought. Sherman failed to send more than a single regiment of cavalry with McPherson. Without these "eyes" to scout and gather intelligence about the surrounding terrain, McPherson feared his attacking troops would be cut off from Snake Creek Gap, thus becoming trapped by their own maneuver.
In reality, Johnston knew something was up near Resaca, though he had no clue as to the extent of the danger. While the bulk of his army skirmished against the Federals around Dalton, he dispatched General John Bell Hood to command the assorted regiments assembled there and he sent a large Confederate division south to either reinforce Resaca if needed or return to Dalton if Sherman decided to launch a heavier assault.
Meeting heavy artillery and gun fire at Resaca from what appeared to be numerous troops in a heavily fortified position, McPherson decided to retreat back to the safety of Snake Creek Gap in order to protect his flank. When he learned of McPherson's choice, Sherman chastised his subordinate that he had missed "the opportunity of a lifetime." In fact, on May 9 the Federal troops outnumbered the Rebels at Resaca by more than 4 to 1. That would soon change.
On May 10, Sherman decided to begin a general maneuver south. If he could not take Resaca by surprise, he would attempt attempt to assault it with force, while making the most of his superior numbers to seek a crossing of the Oostanaula River and, once again, threaten Johnston's fragile and exposed line of communications.
The first major battle of the Atlanta Campaign was only a few days away. This is the situation depicted in the photo above. First contact in the campaign occurred 154 years ago today.
A couple of weeks ago, just in time for the historical recreation of the campaign, Multi-Man Publishing released Atlanta Is Ours! a game from their excellent Great Campaigns of the American Civil War series. I own most of this series, which began to be published in the 1990's, and have played these games off and on for the past 25 years. In future posts I will detail the Campaign for Atlanta as it historically unfolded and compare that history with what is depicted in the game. My intent is to cover the history and the game in a series of blog posts all the way through the fall of Atlanta and beyond.
Meanwhile, Southerners were discouraged by one military defeat after another and by the economic hardship, high inflation, and a general lack of basic goods wrought by the successful Union blockcade of Southern ports. But there was also cause for hope. The election of 1864 was coming up. President Abraham Lincoln was as unpopular in the North as ever. Could it be possible to find peace through his defeat in the November election? Hopes for a continued stalemate dissolving what was left of Northern will to fight were not unfounded.
So it was that Lincoln summoned his most reliable general, Ulysses S. Grant, to Washington in order to direct the overall war effort. In the east he would accompany General George Meade's Army of the Potomac in relentlessly attacking General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. In the west, Grant elevated General William T. Sherman to command of three armies, totaling 110,000 men against the Confederate Army of Tennessee with the dual objectives of preventing the Southerners from reinforcing Lee and to capture the major Southern transport hub at Atlanta. It was hoped that meeting these combined objectives would be enough to give swift victory to the North.
Against Sherman, the Confederacy placed General Joseph E. Johnston in command of about 53,000 troops. Entrenched around Dalton, Georgia, the Southerners rebuilt their army, shattered by the overwhelming defeat at Missionary Ridge in late 1863, into a force capable of delivering telling blows and tenacious defense, even if their numbers did not allow for an offensive into Tennessee for which politicians in Richmond hoped.
Sherman had three "armies" arrayed against Johnston. The largest was the Army of the Cumberland commanded by General George H. Thomas with about 60,000 troops, larger than the entire Southern army and comprising over half of the total Northern force. This was complimented by the Army of the Tennessee (Union armies were typically named for rivers while Confederate ones were name for States) under the command of General James B. McPherson, brought east from Mississippi. The Army of the Ohio (in fact little more than a reinforced corps) served under General John M. Schofield to round out the Union ranks.
Sherman's plan was pretty simple. Fix the Confederates with probing attacks, keep them in place with the bulk of his forces while sending McPherson's army around Johnston's left flank to either cut it off from its communications and kill it or to force the Southerners to retreat.
By May 7, Sherman's armies approached Johnston's strong defenses along the ridge lines around Dalton. By May 9, as heavy skirmishing continued at Dalton, McPherson emerged from Snake Creek Gap, an unguarded minor road leading through the mountainous area into the valley below. McPherson approached the rail station at Resaca with the intent of driving the Confederate rearguard away and effectively cutting off Johnston's supply line and best route of retreat.
McPherson grew cautious, however, when he discovered Resaca more fortified than he had previously thought. Sherman failed to send more than a single regiment of cavalry with McPherson. Without these "eyes" to scout and gather intelligence about the surrounding terrain, McPherson feared his attacking troops would be cut off from Snake Creek Gap, thus becoming trapped by their own maneuver.
In reality, Johnston knew something was up near Resaca, though he had no clue as to the extent of the danger. While the bulk of his army skirmished against the Federals around Dalton, he dispatched General John Bell Hood to command the assorted regiments assembled there and he sent a large Confederate division south to either reinforce Resaca if needed or return to Dalton if Sherman decided to launch a heavier assault.
Meeting heavy artillery and gun fire at Resaca from what appeared to be numerous troops in a heavily fortified position, McPherson decided to retreat back to the safety of Snake Creek Gap in order to protect his flank. When he learned of McPherson's choice, Sherman chastised his subordinate that he had missed "the opportunity of a lifetime." In fact, on May 9 the Federal troops outnumbered the Rebels at Resaca by more than 4 to 1. That would soon change.
On May 10, Sherman decided to begin a general maneuver south. If he could not take Resaca by surprise, he would attempt attempt to assault it with force, while making the most of his superior numbers to seek a crossing of the Oostanaula River and, once again, threaten Johnston's fragile and exposed line of communications.
The first major battle of the Atlanta Campaign was only a few days away. This is the situation depicted in the photo above. First contact in the campaign occurred 154 years ago today.
A couple of weeks ago, just in time for the historical recreation of the campaign, Multi-Man Publishing released Atlanta Is Ours! a game from their excellent Great Campaigns of the American Civil War series. I own most of this series, which began to be published in the 1990's, and have played these games off and on for the past 25 years. In future posts I will detail the Campaign for Atlanta as it historically unfolded and compare that history with what is depicted in the game. My intent is to cover the history and the game in a series of blog posts all the way through the fall of Atlanta and beyond.
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