Reading David Glantz's Stalingrad: Part One

Proof of purchase.

The work of David Glantz has been of interest to me since the 1990’s.  Today he is perhaps the foremost authority on previously unavailable Russian documents pertaining to the Eastern Front of World War Two.  I own a number of his works on the Soviet military prior to and during the war.  Some of them are translations Soviet General Staff Studies of operations conducted during the Russo-German War.

In addition to his own writings, Glantz teamed with military historian Jonathon M. House on two excellent histories I have in my library, When Titan’s Clashed (1995), a general history of the Eastern Front, and The Battle of Kursk (1999), one of the best accounts of that pivotal operation.  Earlier this century, Glantz and House wrote a series of highly detailed books on the campaigns surrounding the battle of Stalingrad, which I did not purchase due to other priorities.  But, in 2017, the two published Stalingrad, a single-volume 500-page overview of the information contained in the more lengthy series.  I acquired it when it was originally published but have only recently had time to read it.

Just because Glantz has opened the door on previously unreleased Soviet military documents does not mean he is completely Soviet-centric in his approach.  Naturally works like Stumbling Colossus (1998) and Colossus Reborn (2005) look objectively at the Russian side of the war.  But most of his works, including Titans and Kursk, are balanced and insightful from both the German and the Soviet perspective. Stalingrad is in that same spirit, making it probably the most evenhanded and insightful history available on this important historical subject.

“Opposing Forces,” the opening chapter, presents as fine a summary of the initial period of the war in the East as any I have ever read.  It gives the reader some indication of the rebuilding, reorganization, leadership, and planning by both sides following the end of Operation Barbarossa up to the beginning of Operation Blau, the prelude to Stalingrad.

Operation Blau was originally planned in April 1942 to be executed in four phases.  Its ultimate objective was the Soviet oil production region in the Caucasus which “…produced about 80 percent of all Soviet petroleum products;  seizing them would not only strike a major blow against the USSR but also solve the greatest limitation on the German economy and war machine.” (page 27) 

Glantz makes it very plain that at no time during the planning for Blau was Stalingrad considered a special objective.  Meanwhile, on the Russian side, General Georgii Zhukov and other major military commanders believed the Germans would renew their attack on Moscow and made their plans according to that mistaken assumption.  Stalin and his planners wanted an offensive solution and launched a large offensive with the goal of encircling the German Sixth Army in the Kharkov area during May 1942.  Like virtually all previous Soviet attacks, however, it was poorly planned and executed.  At a cost of about 20,000 casualties the Germans inflicted a total defeat upon the Soviets, who lost more than 260,000 troops and some 650 tanks during the failed operation over the course of about two weeks.

Also in May, the Soviets suffered a complete defeat on the Kerch Straits at the hands of the German 11th Army commanded by General Erich von Manstein in the brilliantly executed Operation Bastard Hunt.  This one-sided affair was the prelude to Manstein’s capture of the major Crimean port city of Sevastopol during June.  Poor Soviet preparation and leadership made Manstein’s competence seem extraordinary.  Indeed, these victories all served to feed the entire German military and political leadership with the same overconfidence they had experienced the previous summer with the failed Barbarossa campaign.

With this heady belief in their own invincibility, the Germans launched Blau on June 28, 1942.  The first phase, Blau I, was over in less than two weeks.  A large Soviet armored counterattack mounted by 5th Tank Army was repulsed with ease, again mostly due to incompetent Russian execution and superior German tactical skill.  By the time it came to Phase Two of Blau the Germans were already running into logistical problems.  Short on fuel and faced with numerous river crossings, operations soon began to slow in the face of pesky, largely ineffectual Soviet counterattacks.  The German split their enormous organization into Army Groups A and B.  The first was tasked to take the oil fields much further south while the second would protect the ever extending eastern flank of the advance.

Meanwhile, the Soviets adjusted to the strategic situation.  They created a new Front command for Stalingrad to resist the German eastward advance.  Where possible they avoided mass encirclement, instead giving up ground in preparation for better opportunities in the future. “As a result, most German maneuvers came up empty-handed in the quest for prisoners.  [General Rodion] Malinovsky skillfully used his rear guard to enable more than half the troops of his 12th, 18th, and 56th Armies to withdraw southward toward Rostov.  In fact, during the first two weeks of its existence, Army Group A captured only 54,000 Soviet soldiers, a far cry from the huge encirclements of the previous year.” (page 82)

As Hitler became increasingly frustrated with the lack of large encirclements and generally steady but unimpressive progress, Blau’s original four-phased approach was soon altered.  On July 30, he made Stalingrad a high priority for the first time.  Army Group A was to continue southward while Army Group B was to secure the Stalingrad area.  The Italian 8th Army, which originally was supposed to help storm the mountains of the Caucasus, was diverted to protect the German left flank, freeing up four additional German infantry divisions to assist General Friedrich Paulus’ Sixth Army.

In essence, Hitler gradually began to shift the primary objective away from the oil fields.  Even though he insisted upon their capture he also wanted to take Stalingrad as well.  He mistook the Soviet withdrawals for an indication that they were near the end of their strength. His Chief of Staff, General Franz Halder, disagreed and believed the Soviets were simply committing “phased withdrawals.”  That was indeed the case; nevertheless, it took everything the Soviets had to stay ahead of the Germans and to counterattack where appropriate.   

In one such case, the Soviet 63rd and 21st Armies counterattacked along the Don River in late August.  These attacks were, like all the others, cut-off and contained.  Only this time some critical bridgeheads were formed which the Germans and Italians did not have the strength or supply to destroy.  One near Serafimovich was about 50 kilometers wide and 25 deep.  A smaller one at Kletskaia also held by the Soviets.  Although they seemed inconsequential at the time (recall that Hitler thought the Soviet army was on the verge of collapse), these would become two critical launch points for the Soviet counteroffensive in November.

Glantz/House write engagingly and thoroughly without getting bogged down in details.  Although many readers enjoy military histories that feature diaries and reports from the grunts in the field, the operations examined in Stalingrad were immense.  Keeping the narrative thorough, balanced, comprehensible and insightful requires that the authors focus on the operational and strategic aspects of the war, with an occasional nod to the tactical.  They perform this expertly, in my opinion, in a thought-provoking manner.  This is the way I prefer military history to be written.

Part Two of the book details the simultaneous German advances into the Caucasus and toward the Volga River. Glantz begins by explaining that Hitler ordered most of Fourth Panzer Army away from General [Wilhelm] List’s Army Group A to strength the attack on the Stalingrad region.  Nevertheless, List initially made great strides with only three panzer and two motorized divisions – “about 350 tanks.” The Germans plunged deep into Caucasus with Operation Edelweiss.   They captured the small oil field at Maikop in August and Hitler looked like a genius.

“This victory proved an empty one, as the Soviets had destroyed most of the wellheads and storage tanks and removed key components from the refineries…The Germans has succeeded in denying this oil to their enemies, but they did not solve their own pressing fuel problems.” (page 132)

Glantz then briefly details the context for that was unfolding around Stalingrad.  He offers the reader superbly abbreviated details about another Soviet counterattack much further north around Voronezh, a major attack on the so-called “Rzhev Salient,” fighting around Demyansk even further north.  All of these efforts, some larger than others, failed due to “inadequate planning, cohesion, experience, and air support.” (page 144)  So far, every offensive the Soviets attempted had failed leaving the (mistaken) impression that they could never succeed against the Germans.

In September the Paulus’ forces reached the outskirts of Stalingrad.  Almost immediately Zhukov attacked, “…attempting to pierce the narrow corridor connecting the Don River to the forward elements of Sixth Army in order to reestablish land contact with the 62nd Army.  But these attacks were repulsed, the ground largely retaken by the Germans." (page 153)  Again, failure.

62nd Army fought a long, heroic, and bloody battle inside Stalingrad.  The city was never completely taken by the Germans, though they controlled over 95% of it before they were encircled in November.  Without getting bogged down in personal accounts, which are numerous and all horrific, Glantz follows the methodical approach Paulus took at capturing the city.  First, the suburbs fell, then central and southern parts of the city.  

Zhukov continued to marshal strength and threw another offensive, just like the previous one, at the German line.  Three times altogether throughout September and October the Soviets attacked and were defeated.  The Sixth Army took the Worker’s Villages and the factories within the city.  Stalingrad was a large industrial complex, which was another strategic reason it assumed more importance. 

The 62nd Army fought the Sixth Army yard by yard for weeks and weeks.  It was horrible attrition warfare for both sides.  The Volga flowed by the city’s eastern side and was much too great and wide for the Germans to cross successful.  But the Russians were more resourceful and, despite being dive-bombed by German planes, kept a trickle of men and supplies coming.

“Despite frequent reinforcements, 62 Army might have had fewer than 15,000 combatants on the western bank at the end of October.  German forces had divided the bridgehead into three separate enclaves, leaving only narrow strips of land in Soviet hands around the various landing stages.  As winter arrived, ice floes on the partially frozen Volga River would soon increase the already daunting problems of resupply and reinforcement.  Still, as long as [General Andrei] Eremenko provided a minimum number of troops and supplies, [General Vasilii] Chuikov could deny Paulus victory simply by condemning his troops to die in place.” (page 240)

Meanwhile, after initial sweeping success in the Caucasus, List’s Army Group A was slowly grinding to a halt.  Hitler could not understand this.  The Russians were "finished" and progress should be more rapid.  He was playing against time and needed those oil fields captured.  On September 9, just as the initial battles for Stalingrad were beginning, Hitler removed List from command and, incredibly, took command of the Army Group personally. Not that it made much difference.  Hitler had far too much on his mind to direct the advance toward what used to be the only objective of the campaign, which he left to the two army commanders coordinated by the Army Group’s chief of staff. 

“In early November 1942 German Army Group A ground to a halt some 70 kilometers short of the refineries of Groznyi and even further away from the main oil fields of the Caucasus.  Persistent if clumsy Soviet counterattacks, in conjunction with challenging terrain and weather, had finally stopped the invaders and had come within a hair’s breadth of destroying [General Eberhard von] Mackensen’s III Panzer Corps.  At the same time, Paulus’ Sixth Army came up short, only a few hundred meters from the ice strewn Volga River.  Considering the enormous challenges of logistical shortages, Red Army defenses, and hostile terrain, the Wehrmacht had turned in an astonishing performance by coming so close to its absurdly ambitious objectives.” (pp. 282 – 283)

“The defeat of Operation Blau came at a terrible cost.  Leaving aside the battles in the Caucasus, the Soviets suffered some 1.2 million casualties on the Voronezh and Stalingrad axis from 28 June through 17 November 1942, compared with roughly 200,000 Axis casualties.  During the same time and in the same areas, the Soviets lost in excess of 4,862 tanks, as opposed to German losses of fewer than 700.” (page 284)

German tactical superiority was no match for the strategic prowess of the Soviets.  Stalin was now ready to unleash the largest Russian offensive of the war so far.  And the Germans were almost totally unprepared, still thinking the Soviets were at the end of their rope. 

(To be continued)