Reading For Cause & For Country: Part Two
Note: This is a continuation of the previous post.
The task of delaying the Confederates fell to Colonel Emerson Opdycke’s brigade. Not only did his seven regiments have to content with Forrest’s probes but the brigade was also assigned the task “to bring forward all stragglers belonging to the army.” Many of Schofield’s troops were new recruits and draftees with little experience in soldiering. Opdycke’s men had forced marched all night, were fighting off Rebel cavalry, and now had to round up hundreds of Yankee stragglers along the road toward Franklin.
Now it was time for some command confusion on the Union side. Wagner’s other two brigades (Lane’s and Colonel Joseph Conrad’s) were holding the hills south of Franklin in advance of the rest of Schofield’s force while it entrenched. Eventually, Wagner pulled his men back to a small rise a few hundred yards in front of the rest of the Union troops. Here he ordered both brigades to dig-in. Jacobson suggests that Wagner may have been drunk as he issued these ridiculous orders. There is no way to account for his “erratic” behavior. Stanley’s intent was clear. The men were to be brought back and held in reserve behind the Federal entrenchments. But, for whatever reason, Wagner either disregarded these instructions or did not understand them.
Then something surreal happened. When Wagner ordered Opdycke to join the other two brigades in their advanced position, Opdycke loudly objected. The orders were absurd, he said, needlessly exposing men to the coming attack. His men were tired and needed to rest and would not stop outside of Franklin. The two officers barked back and forth at each other as Opdycke’s column continued to march past Wagner’s other brigades all the way through the main Federal line. “If the situation had not been so serious and decidedly intense, it might have actually been comical.” (page 230)
When Hood arrived he immediately decided to attack rather than attempt another flanking maneuver. Jacobson does not believe this was out of anger over Spring Hill. Instead, Hood reasoned: “The country around Franklin for many miles is open and exposed to the full view of the Federal army, and I cannot mask the movement of my troops so as to turn either flank of the enemy, and if I attempt it he will withdraw and precede me to Nashville.” (page 243)
Cleburne arrived and scoped out the Union entrenchments, made a few notes in a notebook, and proceeded to play several games of checkers with his staff improvised out of various colored leaves upon a board scratched in the dirt. Federal skirmishers were sent far out from the main line so that they encompassed even Wagner’s two exposed brigades. The Confederates lined up basically straight across, east to west, a choice that “grossly mismanaged” their attack according to Jacobson. As they approached Franklin they would inevitably converge upon one another because of the way the Harpeth River angled in toward the town, like a funnel. This does not seem to have been accounted for.
Furthermore, Hood’s placement of Bate’s division took considerable time his army did not have. Once again the sunset was approaching. During this time, Cleburne personally reconnoitered the Yankee positions. He then conferenced with Hood and convinced the Confederate commanding general to permit the infantry to advance in columns rather than in line. This would allow for a faster approach and greatly reduce the amount of fire that the Rebels would have to endure. Hood made it clear that the Federal were to be driven into the river. Shortly afterwards the grand, reckless attack began.
“Like an enormous human wave eighteen Confederate brigades of infantry stepped forward and some one hundred battle flags sprung into the air…For the first and only time that anyone on either side could remember, army bands accompanied the fighting troops to the front. The brass band belonging the Missouri Brigade of Samuel French’s Division made a good deal of noise as the musicians let loose with ‘The Bonnie Blue Flag.’ Nearby another brigade band could be heard playing ‘Dixie.’ The music made the scene almost ethereal.” (pp. 256 - 257)
Heavy skirmishing and long-ranged cannon fire broke out. It was only now that Wagner came to his senses and decided that Lane and Conrad should pull back. But it was too late. “Conrad quickly decided that the order made little sense at this point. The Rebels were nearly on top of him and Conrad feared that if he ordered a withdrawal the troops would panic, causing all sense of order to dissolve.” (page 275) But that happened anyway. The forward brigades were smashed and flanked by the wide Confederate onslaught and Wagner’s soldiers ran for their lives toward the main line. Why General Stanley or some other ranking Union officer did not intervene in this absurd placement is not discussed by Jacobson.
The Federal troops in the primary entrenchments could not fire for fear of hitting the chaotic wave of Wagner’s men that preceded the Southern charge. Union artillery managed to shoot over the routed Yankees and blow holes in the Rebel advance. General Francis M. Cockrell, commanding a the Missouri brigade of French’s division, was one of the first officer’s wounded. The brigade did not quit and would ultimately suffer 419 casualties out of 696 men committed. This gives the reader some idea of how deadly this massive charge was.
Soon thereafter Cleburne fell, killed by a single shot in his chest, after ordering his men to follow closely upon the routed Yankees and “follow them into the trenches.” Jacobson is insightful here: “As a division commander, Patrick Cleburne did not need to be on the front line at Franklin. He seemed to approach the battle with ‘wild abandon.’ Even Frank Cheatham said years after the battle that Cleburne ‘was a little more daring than usual…’” (page 309) This would not be the only example of daring, suicidal Confederate leadership that evening.
“Like a gigantic tidal wave four Southern brigades, with three others in close support, crashed into the Union center. Over thirty regiments, although inferior in size to their blue counterparts, caused a cataclysm that buckled the heart of Jacob Cox’s defensive perimeter. At the gap on the pike, a breach almost immediately opened in the Federal line when men from Brown’s and Cleburne’s divisions began streaming through.” (page 310)
Hood’s men capture about 200 yards of the of the main Federal line and drove through them back toward Franklin. Jacobson describes a “stampede” of recruits pouring into town past Opdycke’s weary encamped brigade. Quickly, Opdycke organized his men and marched forward, steamrolling through the routed troops, enabling some of them to rally. A six-gun battery was captured by the Rebels but before it could be turned and used against the Union troops, Opdycke’s men recaptured it. Jacobson: “Preventing the Confederates from capturing these guns and widening their advantage was a key turning point in the battle.” (page 324)
Jacobson now shifts to the regimental level and describes the fighting, arguably the most intense of the entire war, with impressive minutia. The battle at the center focused on the Carter House to the west of the pike and the cotton gin to the east. The Northerners at the gin pushed back the Southern troops and regained their trenches. Meanwhile, the breakthrough held around the house. The Rebels relentlessly attacked on both sides of the pike but the Federals to the east, being advanced with their counterattack, were able to direct some of their fire into the Confederate right flank around the Carter House, which made matters even more deadly.
Then there is the bizarre story of General John Adams, leading his Mississippi brigade. Trapped by an abatis and in difficult terrain in a galling crossfire of rifles and artillery, Adams spotted a small opening for his men. On his horse, he yelled for his men to follow him. Without hesitation or even bothering to verify he was being followed, Adams headed for the opening and kept riding. He rode parallel to the Union line through the twilight and thick smoke of the battle then turned right into the opening.
“Most could not believe what they were seeing. Without breaking stride, Adams headed straight for the Federal works…Apparently a number of Yankees actually held their fire as they watched the surreal drama play out right in front of them…It did not take long for it to become obvious that Adams was not going to stop.” (pp. 342 – 345) Adams was killed in a hail of gunfire at the last moment. His Mississippians followed him and assaulted the works. That attack was as bloody as all the others.
Bate’s division was the last of the line to make contact. The Union trench line before Bate angled back northward so that the Confederates had as much as an additional 300 yards to cover. Only one of his brigades made contact and engaged in the same hand-to-hand fighting that marked the entire Battle of Franklin.
By now it was dark. Incredibly, despite everything, Hood was determined to renew his attack the next day. Lee’s corps and the all the Southern artillery were now reaching the field. On the Federal side, Schofield wanted to get out of Franklin. Cox couldn’t believe it. He felt a great victory had been won and that it was an opportunity to possibly destroy Hood right then and there. But Schofield was uneasy and wanted to join the main forces at Nashville. The Yankees would retreat during the night.
As is obvious from this summary of Jacobson’s excellent factual narrative, Franklin was a distinctive battle in the War Between the States. It was, perhaps, the most intense fighting of the war in terms of concentration and duration. From start to finish the attacks and counterattacks lasted about five hours. “The ratio of killed to wounded was exceptionally high at Franklin. What had happened was that many of those who were wounded early in the fighting were shot again and again as they lay hapless on the ground.” (page 391)
A late night council of war found that none of his generals supported Hood’s decision to attack again come daylight, though Lee admitted that he had some fresh troops and would do as ordered. General Henry D. Clayton sent a brigade to where Wagner’s men had been stationed as preparation for a possible advance. General Carter Stevenson was told the entire army would attack the next morning.
But by then Schofield was gone. Jacobson admits that it is difficult to get a full accounting of the dead and wounded at Franklin. He offers the likely number of “at least 8,500” which he calls “shocking” since the most intense fighting lasted only two hours. (An historic marker at Franklin puts the figure at "perhaps as many as 9,500...") The vast majority were Confederate casualties. “More Rebels were killed than in two days of fighting at Shiloh and George McClellan lost fewer men during the entire Seven Days Campaign. More Southerners were killed than either Robert E. Lee or John Pope lost at Second Manassas and there were more dead than Ambrose Burnside lost at Fredericksburg.” (page 417)
Eric Jacobson’s research and writing in For Cause & For Country is top-notch. This is a remarkable story well-documented and well-told, much of it made available to the reader for the first time. I can’t believe I didn’t find this book years ago. But better late than never. The Spring Hill/Franklin story did not affect the outcome of the American Civil War. In the grand scheme of the war, Hood’s raid was really just a footnote compared with the campaigns of Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Atlanta. Yet, none of these more studied campaigns match the confusion, strangeness, and sustained, concentrated intensity captured in this fine addition to any serious military history enthusiast’s library.
The task of delaying the Confederates fell to Colonel Emerson Opdycke’s brigade. Not only did his seven regiments have to content with Forrest’s probes but the brigade was also assigned the task “to bring forward all stragglers belonging to the army.” Many of Schofield’s troops were new recruits and draftees with little experience in soldiering. Opdycke’s men had forced marched all night, were fighting off Rebel cavalry, and now had to round up hundreds of Yankee stragglers along the road toward Franklin.
Now it was time for some command confusion on the Union side. Wagner’s other two brigades (Lane’s and Colonel Joseph Conrad’s) were holding the hills south of Franklin in advance of the rest of Schofield’s force while it entrenched. Eventually, Wagner pulled his men back to a small rise a few hundred yards in front of the rest of the Union troops. Here he ordered both brigades to dig-in. Jacobson suggests that Wagner may have been drunk as he issued these ridiculous orders. There is no way to account for his “erratic” behavior. Stanley’s intent was clear. The men were to be brought back and held in reserve behind the Federal entrenchments. But, for whatever reason, Wagner either disregarded these instructions or did not understand them.
Then something surreal happened. When Wagner ordered Opdycke to join the other two brigades in their advanced position, Opdycke loudly objected. The orders were absurd, he said, needlessly exposing men to the coming attack. His men were tired and needed to rest and would not stop outside of Franklin. The two officers barked back and forth at each other as Opdycke’s column continued to march past Wagner’s other brigades all the way through the main Federal line. “If the situation had not been so serious and decidedly intense, it might have actually been comical.” (page 230)
When Hood arrived he immediately decided to attack rather than attempt another flanking maneuver. Jacobson does not believe this was out of anger over Spring Hill. Instead, Hood reasoned: “The country around Franklin for many miles is open and exposed to the full view of the Federal army, and I cannot mask the movement of my troops so as to turn either flank of the enemy, and if I attempt it he will withdraw and precede me to Nashville.” (page 243)
Cleburne arrived and scoped out the Union entrenchments, made a few notes in a notebook, and proceeded to play several games of checkers with his staff improvised out of various colored leaves upon a board scratched in the dirt. Federal skirmishers were sent far out from the main line so that they encompassed even Wagner’s two exposed brigades. The Confederates lined up basically straight across, east to west, a choice that “grossly mismanaged” their attack according to Jacobson. As they approached Franklin they would inevitably converge upon one another because of the way the Harpeth River angled in toward the town, like a funnel. This does not seem to have been accounted for.
Furthermore, Hood’s placement of Bate’s division took considerable time his army did not have. Once again the sunset was approaching. During this time, Cleburne personally reconnoitered the Yankee positions. He then conferenced with Hood and convinced the Confederate commanding general to permit the infantry to advance in columns rather than in line. This would allow for a faster approach and greatly reduce the amount of fire that the Rebels would have to endure. Hood made it clear that the Federal were to be driven into the river. Shortly afterwards the grand, reckless attack began.
“Like an enormous human wave eighteen Confederate brigades of infantry stepped forward and some one hundred battle flags sprung into the air…For the first and only time that anyone on either side could remember, army bands accompanied the fighting troops to the front. The brass band belonging the Missouri Brigade of Samuel French’s Division made a good deal of noise as the musicians let loose with ‘The Bonnie Blue Flag.’ Nearby another brigade band could be heard playing ‘Dixie.’ The music made the scene almost ethereal.” (pp. 256 - 257)
Heavy skirmishing and long-ranged cannon fire broke out. It was only now that Wagner came to his senses and decided that Lane and Conrad should pull back. But it was too late. “Conrad quickly decided that the order made little sense at this point. The Rebels were nearly on top of him and Conrad feared that if he ordered a withdrawal the troops would panic, causing all sense of order to dissolve.” (page 275) But that happened anyway. The forward brigades were smashed and flanked by the wide Confederate onslaught and Wagner’s soldiers ran for their lives toward the main line. Why General Stanley or some other ranking Union officer did not intervene in this absurd placement is not discussed by Jacobson.
The Federal troops in the primary entrenchments could not fire for fear of hitting the chaotic wave of Wagner’s men that preceded the Southern charge. Union artillery managed to shoot over the routed Yankees and blow holes in the Rebel advance. General Francis M. Cockrell, commanding a the Missouri brigade of French’s division, was one of the first officer’s wounded. The brigade did not quit and would ultimately suffer 419 casualties out of 696 men committed. This gives the reader some idea of how deadly this massive charge was.
Soon thereafter Cleburne fell, killed by a single shot in his chest, after ordering his men to follow closely upon the routed Yankees and “follow them into the trenches.” Jacobson is insightful here: “As a division commander, Patrick Cleburne did not need to be on the front line at Franklin. He seemed to approach the battle with ‘wild abandon.’ Even Frank Cheatham said years after the battle that Cleburne ‘was a little more daring than usual…’” (page 309) This would not be the only example of daring, suicidal Confederate leadership that evening.
“Like a gigantic tidal wave four Southern brigades, with three others in close support, crashed into the Union center. Over thirty regiments, although inferior in size to their blue counterparts, caused a cataclysm that buckled the heart of Jacob Cox’s defensive perimeter. At the gap on the pike, a breach almost immediately opened in the Federal line when men from Brown’s and Cleburne’s divisions began streaming through.” (page 310)
Hood’s men capture about 200 yards of the of the main Federal line and drove through them back toward Franklin. Jacobson describes a “stampede” of recruits pouring into town past Opdycke’s weary encamped brigade. Quickly, Opdycke organized his men and marched forward, steamrolling through the routed troops, enabling some of them to rally. A six-gun battery was captured by the Rebels but before it could be turned and used against the Union troops, Opdycke’s men recaptured it. Jacobson: “Preventing the Confederates from capturing these guns and widening their advantage was a key turning point in the battle.” (page 324)
Jacobson now shifts to the regimental level and describes the fighting, arguably the most intense of the entire war, with impressive minutia. The battle at the center focused on the Carter House to the west of the pike and the cotton gin to the east. The Northerners at the gin pushed back the Southern troops and regained their trenches. Meanwhile, the breakthrough held around the house. The Rebels relentlessly attacked on both sides of the pike but the Federals to the east, being advanced with their counterattack, were able to direct some of their fire into the Confederate right flank around the Carter House, which made matters even more deadly.
Then there is the bizarre story of General John Adams, leading his Mississippi brigade. Trapped by an abatis and in difficult terrain in a galling crossfire of rifles and artillery, Adams spotted a small opening for his men. On his horse, he yelled for his men to follow him. Without hesitation or even bothering to verify he was being followed, Adams headed for the opening and kept riding. He rode parallel to the Union line through the twilight and thick smoke of the battle then turned right into the opening.
“Most could not believe what they were seeing. Without breaking stride, Adams headed straight for the Federal works…Apparently a number of Yankees actually held their fire as they watched the surreal drama play out right in front of them…It did not take long for it to become obvious that Adams was not going to stop.” (pp. 342 – 345) Adams was killed in a hail of gunfire at the last moment. His Mississippians followed him and assaulted the works. That attack was as bloody as all the others.
Bate’s division was the last of the line to make contact. The Union trench line before Bate angled back northward so that the Confederates had as much as an additional 300 yards to cover. Only one of his brigades made contact and engaged in the same hand-to-hand fighting that marked the entire Battle of Franklin.
By now it was dark. Incredibly, despite everything, Hood was determined to renew his attack the next day. Lee’s corps and the all the Southern artillery were now reaching the field. On the Federal side, Schofield wanted to get out of Franklin. Cox couldn’t believe it. He felt a great victory had been won and that it was an opportunity to possibly destroy Hood right then and there. But Schofield was uneasy and wanted to join the main forces at Nashville. The Yankees would retreat during the night.
As is obvious from this summary of Jacobson’s excellent factual narrative, Franklin was a distinctive battle in the War Between the States. It was, perhaps, the most intense fighting of the war in terms of concentration and duration. From start to finish the attacks and counterattacks lasted about five hours. “The ratio of killed to wounded was exceptionally high at Franklin. What had happened was that many of those who were wounded early in the fighting were shot again and again as they lay hapless on the ground.” (page 391)
A late night council of war found that none of his generals supported Hood’s decision to attack again come daylight, though Lee admitted that he had some fresh troops and would do as ordered. General Henry D. Clayton sent a brigade to where Wagner’s men had been stationed as preparation for a possible advance. General Carter Stevenson was told the entire army would attack the next morning.
But by then Schofield was gone. Jacobson admits that it is difficult to get a full accounting of the dead and wounded at Franklin. He offers the likely number of “at least 8,500” which he calls “shocking” since the most intense fighting lasted only two hours. (An historic marker at Franklin puts the figure at "perhaps as many as 9,500...") The vast majority were Confederate casualties. “More Rebels were killed than in two days of fighting at Shiloh and George McClellan lost fewer men during the entire Seven Days Campaign. More Southerners were killed than either Robert E. Lee or John Pope lost at Second Manassas and there were more dead than Ambrose Burnside lost at Fredericksburg.” (page 417)
Eric Jacobson’s research and writing in For Cause & For Country is top-notch. This is a remarkable story well-documented and well-told, much of it made available to the reader for the first time. I can’t believe I didn’t find this book years ago. But better late than never. The Spring Hill/Franklin story did not affect the outcome of the American Civil War. In the grand scheme of the war, Hood’s raid was really just a footnote compared with the campaigns of Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Atlanta. Yet, none of these more studied campaigns match the confusion, strangeness, and sustained, concentrated intensity captured in this fine addition to any serious military history enthusiast’s library.
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