Chasing Battlefields: Chattanooga - Part Two

This is a shot I took of Missionary Ridge from Orchard Knob during my January trip to the Chattanooga battlefield.  While quite steep, the ridge can hardly be called imposing.  Generals Grant and Thomas had this same view of the ridge (minus all the development) during the battle.  Facing east, this is roughly the area of the initial Northern breakthrough.

The Battle of Missionary Ridge was one of the most decisive battles of the War Between the States.  On November 25, 1863 the Army of the Cumberland routed the Army of Tennessee from the heights of the ridge overlooking Chattanooga and ended the two-month siege known as the Chattanooga Campaign.  

General Ulysses S. Grant, after his triumph at Vicksburg about five months earlier, achieved another resounding victory for the Union, furthering solidifying the admiration of the Lincoln Administration.  The only thing is, in reality, Grant’s plan of attack did not work at all and only the remarkably spontaneous heroics of rank and file Federal soldiers won the day. 

My January trip to Chattanooga touched on the Union victories against the left flank of the Confederates at Brown’s Ferry, Wauhatchie, and Lookout Mountain.  It also touched on the Federal advance against the Southern picket line running across Orchard Knob.  It was from Orchard Knob that Grant and General George Henry Thomas observed General Joseph Hooker’s successful attack on Lookout Mountain on November 24.

That action was intended only to be a diversionary attack to confuse Southern General Braxton Bragg and draw his attention away from the main Yankee attack which would be delivered by General William T. Sherman’s Army of the Tennessee, just arrived from Mississippi as reinforcements.

As Hooker’s divisions drove back two Rebel brigades around Cravens House, Sherman was aligning his divisions and preparing to attack the northern end of Missionary Ridge.  Suddenly, Sherman realized that he was not where he thought he was.  As his advance upon Missionary Ridge began he discovered that his maps were faulty and his army was, in fact, a couple of hills north of the ridge.  He captured one hill from Rebel skirmishers with relative ease but upon the second hill, known as Tunnel Hill, was the extreme right flank of the Confederate army, entrenched and with solid artillery support.  Disoriented, Sherman did not know what to do.  He decided to entrench and plan for an attack the next day.

Facing Sherman was General Patrick Cleburne commanding not only his division but several ad-hoc regiments of other Southern brigades as Bragg decided to reinforce his right.  Cleburne was technically under the supervision of General William J. Hardee, but Bragg and Hardee allowed Cleburne a free hand to deal with Sherman.  When the Federals attacked on the morning of November 25, 1863 it was in an unimaginative, piecemeal fashion.  

Cleburne was able to use the classic military advantage of “interior lines” to repulse every Yankee attack and, in many cases, he counterattacked and drove the Federal units back.  He displayed a knack for maximizing his force through the careful use of terrain and coordinated activity of his brigade commanders.  Sherman’s attack was pathetic and stalled.

Grant’s plan, that Sherman would drive the Confederate right flank down Missionary Ridge while Hooker diverted attention, was a complete failure.  Instead, almost exactly the opposite thing happened.  Hooker was a total success and Sherman got nowhere.  At mid-afternoon on that clear November day Bragg firmly held Missionary Ridge.

The high point on Tunnel Hill held by Cleburne's troops despite repeated, though uncoordinated, Union attacks.  This is the open space you walk in to when you visit the Sherman Reservation.  This view is looking northeast.

The same space looking north along the clearing in the middle of the otherwise heavily wooded area.  The 7th Texas regiment and some consolidated dismounted cavalry held the ground in the immediate front against several Federal regiments from Illinois, Ohio and Iowa.

The Iowa Monument stands in the distance, the largest monument on this northernmost section of the battlefield.

Looking back at the hill held by Cleburne's command from the Federal perspective.  Several attacks were made upon this hill but Sherman failed to unify his efforts so they were all repulsed by Cleburne.  The primary attack in Grant's plan to take Missionary Ridge failed.

A closer look at the Iowa Monument.  A smaller monument to the 103rd Illinois regiment is on the right.

Back up on the hill facing southwest.  Lookout Mountain is in the distance.  Several Northern attacks were repulsed by the 3rd and 45th Tennessee regiments in this direction.

A steady uphill hike through wooded terrain is required to reach the clearing from the meager parking area for the Sherman Reservation.  Rebel troops formed a line of battle to the left of this path all along the slope.

But Bragg was worried.  Hooker’s victory the previous day had caused the Southern general to pull his troops back from the mountain, out of the valley and reform on Missionary Ridge.  As Sherman began his attack against Cleburne word reached Bragg that Hooker was advancing across the valley.  The only thing slowing Hooker down at that point was the difficulty in crossing the wetlands surrounding Chattanooga Creek.  

Bragg was forced to pullback because he had an inadequate number of men to cover the ridge, let alone try to maintain his presence in the valley.  He stretched his army thinly in several places to cover all three miles of Missionary Ridge.  He did not know where Hooker might attack once he eventually crossed the significant creek obstacle.  He lined his divisions all the way down to Rossville Gap just across the state line in Georgia.  By sending troops to both Cleburne and toward the gap, Bragg was reinforcing both of his flanks simultaneously.  As a result, his center became weaker, less concentrated.  

Meanwhile, on Orchard Knob, Grant was chewing his cigar and looking north.  He could plainly see on that clear day that Sherman’s Army of the Tennessee was not advancing just a couple of miles to the north of his panoramic view.  Around 3PM, with the “main attack” stalled, Grant suggested that Thomas order his Army of the Cumberland to make a demonstration against Missionary Ridge to divert Rebels back toward the center and away from Sherman.

Thomas was hesitant, concerned the 23,000 men he had available for the assault would be butchered in a frontal assault as long as the Confederate flanks held.  He was less inclined to order the attack because Sherman was being repulsed.  Eventually, Grant, anxious to assist his friend Sherman, directly ordered Thomas to order an attack. 

Along the base of Missionary Ridge was a rather elaborate network of rifle pits constructed by the Rebels.  In fact, the Confederates had put more thought into these defenses than the actual defense of the ridge itself, owing to the incorrect assumption that the Federals would never try to mount the ridge in a frontal assault.  Grant barked out an order that the attack would capture this network of rifle pits.

But things were slightly confusing on this matter.  Most understood that the rifle pits were the only objective but some Northern brigade commanders thought the order was to take the ridge or to push on as far as possible.  Thomas arrayed his thousands of troops in the valley by 3:30PM.  To the Confederates atop Missionary Ridge it was an incredible sight.  23,000 bluecoats stood in battle formation, just as they had two days earlier to advance on Orchard Knob.  The spectacle was so grand that many Rebels atop the ridge thought Thomas’ force numbered over twice that many men.  It was unnerving to some.

The Yankees attacked and the first thing many of them noticed was that the Rebels were rising up out of their rifle pits and running up the ridge, away from them.  This inspired the Union troops and they began to break ranks and double-time forward.  Momentum built.

There were several reasons for the Southern withdrawal from the rifle pits.  First of all, not every Confederate withdrew.  The men in the pits at the base of the ridge were basically skirmishers sent down by their brigade commanders atop the ridge.  No one was ever completely clear on exactly how the defense was intended to work.  Obviously the pits were to be used – but how exactly seems to have been left up to the division commanders themselves.  In some divisions they were ordered to fire a volley and retire.  In others they were ordered to fight as long as possible for the pits.

Still other Southern commanders, seeing the vast pageantry of Thomas’ troops on full display and rushing forward, changed orders and wanted their men at the top of the ridge immediately.  The combination of this ordered withdraw and the rapid, shouting advance of the Federals caused other Rebels to lose heart and scramble for the top, which, in turn, gave the Yankees more confidence.

Those that defended the rifle pits were soon driven up the ridge or captured.  The Union army had easily won its objective, but there was still that uncertainty about Grant’s orders among some commanders.  Generals Philip Sheridan and Thomas J. Wood, for example, didn’t see the point of attacking the rifle pits at all.  It made no sense to them.

That is because, with thousands of Yankees clustered at the base of the ridge, it was like shooting fish in a barrel for the Confederates at the top.  They were aiming straight down into the seething mass of bluecoats.  In several cases Confederate artillery was blasting away at them as well, though many Southern batteries were useless.  They could not depress their barrels to fire at this low angle.  

It was an indication of the slipshod condition and careless inattention to detail of the defensive line at the top.  This was Bragg's biggest tactical mistake.  According to Wiley Sword, the Confederate commanding general did not officially order the summit of the ridge's crest fortified until the Union took Orchard Knob on November 23.  His thinking was muddled.  He was concerned about an attack on one of his flanks and simply didn't foresee an attack upon the ridge.  The hasty earthworks were an after-thought.

Still, Sheridan and Wood were just sitting there being fired upon.  Instinctively many men rushed as close to the ridge as possible, using outcroppings and knolls to protect themselves.  No one is certain why what happened next happened but many of the Yankees started racing up the ridge, perhaps initially to seek cover.  These were primarily the brigades of Generals George D. Wagner and William Bobcock Hazen (see my visit to the Hazen Monument).  But when this was seen by others still in the open and being shot at, the Northern line suddenly, spontaneously surged forward.

The DeLong Reservation has even less parking available.  Lucky for me no one was out touring on this cold, windy Friday afternoon.  This marks the spot where the 2nd Minnesota regiment ascended the ridge and captured a Confederate artillery position on this knoll.  Again, you can see Lookout Mountain on the left in the distance.

A closer view of the 2nd Minnesota Monument.

There was no parking available for this small site.  I pulled up on the curb and quickly walked over to take this shot.  This is a marker commemorating Captain H.S. Dent's Rebel artillery battery which was scattered near this point.  The battery's six guns were divided into three pairings.  Two guns were placed just south of here and four were placed in two different locations just north.  The distance between the guns was about 1,000 feet.  What happened to these artillery pieces is a typical story for the Confederates on Missionary Ridge.  All six guns (two in each paring) shelled the Northern troops as they advanced to the ridge.  After that, the guns only fired sporadically as the Yankees sought cover against the uneven slope of the ridge.  One pairing could not fire at all at this point because it could not depress its guns enough from its higher location.  The leftmost pairing shifted to point southward as the Confederate line was breached in that direction.  The flanking attack of the Federals swept the Southerners from the ridge.  All of Dent's cannons were captured.

This gives you some idea of how accessible most of the signage is along the ridge.  If you are driving, you can only glimpse it as you proceed.  There is no parking available and barely room to even stand and read this marker.  In this case, this is the point where Colonel Francis Trowbridge Sherman's (no relation to William Tecumseh) brigade reached the summit, driving away all Confederate opposition.

The Ohio Monument commemorates all Ohio troops that fought on the battlefield.  This splendid marker is located in the Ohio Reservation on the ridge.  There is no parking here either, the space is flanked by private homes.

The base of the Ohio Monument is a work of classic art.

The Bragg Reservation is one of the highest points on Missionary Ridge.  This was the location of Bragg's headquarters.  There was very little fighting here.  Bragg was unable to rally any of his troops and they all ran away as the Yankees ascended the summit.  The large Illinois Monument dominates this space.  Plenty of parking here.

The base of the Illinois Monument at the Bragg Reservation.  Another work of art.

The Iowa Monument at Rossville Gap.  This marks the southern extreme of the battle.  Hooker flanked the ridge with three divisions here late on November 25, 1863. Facing north.

The same monument facing west.  Lookout Mountain is in the distance.  Apparently, that gas station offers free diesel ; ) .

This grand charge disintegrated into disorganization.  Regiments became intermingled on their way up the ridge.  Grant was astonished and demanded that Thomas order the men back down the ridge.  This was to be a demonstration only.  Sherman was still supposed to deliver the main blow.  It seems that the initial surge of men were from Sheridan’s and Wood’s divisions.  With difficulty the commanders managed to recall their men and they retreated down the ridge under fire from above.  

They were seething with frustration when they obeyed.  Back down at the base they were sitting ducks again.  At this point, Wood gave-in to the repeated requests by his brigade commanders and his men to assault the ridge.  Back up they went for the second time.  Only this time the entire Union line moved forward and up.  There was no holding the ordinary Union soldier back.  Grant was enraged: “Well, somebody will suffer if they don’t [take the ridge]!”

But they did take the ridge.  First near the thin Confederate center.  Then the Union troops turned atop the ridge to face both north and south and began to enfilade the Rebels both ways.  The Confederates suddenly, almost beyond their comprehension, were attacked both front and flank.  Within the span of an hour most of the Army of Tennessee broke and ran down the east side of Missionary Ridge toward Ringgold, Georgia.

Hooker finally arrived at Rossville Gap and pushed the Confederates back north from there.  While one of his divisions attacked the ridge directly, the other two maneuvered around the eastside and swept north to further disrupt and capture many of the thousands of fleeing Rebels. It was a stunning, spontaneous and overwhelming Northern victory. 

All that remained of the Confederate line was Hardee’s and Cleburne’s formations on the north end, still resolutely defending against Sherman’s army.  In a difficult maneuver, with the entire army panicking behind him, Cleburne, General Arthur Middleton Manigault and a few others managed to withdraw in an orderly fashion without being captured.  

The next day Bragg was worried about his wagon train of supplies.  Hooker was advancing aggressively and Bragg’s army was in no condition to defend the slow moving wagons.  Thousands of the ragged stragglers who were streaming southward had dropped their rifles to make a run for it.  With much of its artillery captured on the ridge and many soldiers unarmed, Bragg’s army was badly disorganized, demoralized, and unable to fight.  

Yet without those wagons the army could not be supplied.   The Army of Tennessee would effectively cease to exist and the road to Georgia would be wide open.  Bragg called upon Cleburne’s division to buy time for the passage of his train southward.  Cleburne’s 4,000 men took up positions around Ringgold Gap, the most accessible route southward.

On the morning of November 27, 1863, Cleburne was ready when Hooker attacked the gap to force a passage.  Hooker did so before his artillery had had time to be brought up and placed.  For several hours Cleburne once again repulsed every Yankee attack.  He held the gap though he faced 12,000 Federal troops.  It was another heroic stand by Cleburne in what was an otherwise disastrous campaign for the Southern Confederacy; so heroic that Cleburne’s actions received a special commendation from the congress of the Confederate States.  He literally saved the Army of Tennessee.

A roadside historical space marking the ground upon which the Confederates successfully contested Hooker's attempt to force the passage at Ringgold Gap. Taylor Ridge is in the background, where two Southern regiments were attacked and held their ground.

A close-up of the statue dedicated to Patrick Cleburne.  The piece offers wonderful detail and a superb likeness of the general who basically saved the Army of Tennessee by fighting on this ground.

The full Cleburne statue.  Unfortunately, it was backlit by the angle of the winter sun which darkened the front of the piece which faces north, of course.

Near that location, on a dead end side road, is a marker commemorating the New York regiments that participated in the Battle of Ringgold Gap.

The White Oak Mountain ridgeline from the perspective of the Ringgold Depot, which is where Hooker made his headquarters during the battle for the gap.  Facing east.  From this location 5 or 6 Union regiments assaulted the ridge held by 3 or 4 Confederate regiments.  The ridge extends much further to the left (north).  The attacked was repulsed.

The interpretative signage at the Ringgold Depot.  It shows you the location of the previous shot in relation to the battle.

Bragg was disgraced and asked to be relieved of command.  His request was quickly accepted by Richmond.  The Confederates would entrench and reorganize around Dalton, Georgia in the winter of 1863-1864.  Grant was honored for the great victory at Missionary Ridge even though his plan was a complete failure and only the disobedience of his line infantry led to the attack’s success.  Later he took as much credit as possible, of course, and was transferred to the Virginia front for a final bloody campaign against General Robert E. Lee.

Sherman, whose performance displayed what Peter Cozzens described as “a degree of incompetence that bordered on gross negligence,” was promoted over Thomas to command the entire western theater.  He proved to be a far better strategic thinker than a fighter.  Meanwhile, Sheridan, whose troops swept over the ridge and down the other side giving chase to the routed Rebels, was also elevated to command over the Shenandoah Valley in 1864.  His performance there was exemplary. 

To that extent, the Battle of Missionary Ridge set the stage for the North’s final conquest of the South in 1864-1865.  The South was not beaten quite yet.  But it might as well have been.  For that reason the battles around Chattanooga in 1863 were known as “the death knell of the Confederacy.”

This past Friday, Kudo and I ventured back up to Chattanooga to complete my tour of the battlefields there.  This time my concentration was on the “main event” of Missionary Ridge and the resulting Battle of Ringgold Gap.  The weather in February was ridiculously wet and I was getting antsy to complete my battlefield travels there.

But Friday was sunny and remarkably clear after four days of almost continuous rain. It was cold and windy, at times, but I did not care.  I wanted to see the battlefield on a sunny day in winter and I took advantage of the opportunity.  I waited until 10AM for the temperature to at least rise above freezing then headed north on I-75.  I stopped at Ringgold first to stand on the field of Cleburne’s successful rearguard action.  Then, fittingly perhaps, I drove directly from there to the Sherman Reservation north of Missionary Ridge to visit the location of Cleburne’s equally harrowing achievement in that battle.

The reservation is 50 acres, mostly wooded with a long clearing in the center, making it the largest preserved portion of the Battle of Missionary Ridge.  It is also a comparatively remote space, road-wise, located amidst a lower middle class residential area.  The reservation offers only a handful of parking spaces and requires a fairly decent uphill hike through woods to even see anything.  Kudo and I had the entire space to ourselves which was wonderful on that gloriously sunny clear winter day.  It was definitely the highlight of the trip to leisurely explore the Confederate and Federal battle lines on this field and to appreciate Cleburne’s valiant defense against Sherman.

After that, Kudo and I drove southward along the crest of the ridge.  There are a few much smaller “reservations” along the way but few of them offer any parking at all.  What I drove on was more of a street than a road with dense, usually upper class, houses on my left and the drop-off of the ridge to my right.  On both sides there were numerous historical markers for the battle.  Some folks even had artillery pieces placed in their front yards because a battery actually occupied that location during the battle.

The only proper way to conduct this roughly 3-mile tour and be able to read all the signage available is on foot or bike rather than by driving.  Nevertheless, I was able to pick out a few sites worth photographing.  Once I had to simply park up on the curb.  Once I had to park in someone’s driveway.  I did not linger at either location, of course, so I didn’t get the same effect as I received earlier in the day at Ringgold and on the Sherman Reservation.  Like the battlefields I visited in Nashville and Franklin, development just overran where the battle was fought.

Eventually, I made it to the heights of the Bragg Reservation.  It was windy and cold up there but the view was tremendous even though leafless trees blocked a lot of it.  I thought about how incredible it must have been in that moment upon this ground when the Rebels realized they had to run away from here or be captured.  How incredible for the Yankees to climb up this far and take this part of the summit without a fight.  Then I drove on down to Rossville Gap where Hooker joined in the making of the grand rout.  

There are many impressive monuments on the battle grounds around Chattanooga.  Several of these are works of art and I enjoy marveling at their beauty as much as I take pleasure in the feeling of history under my feet – or, in this case, under my vehicle too.  It should be noted that the massive Iowa Monument at the Sherman Reservation to the north is akin to the large Iowa Monument at Rossville Gap thus marking the northern and southern extremity of the Battle of Missionary Ridge.  Further, these two are joined by a third Iowa Monument that I photographed in Part One near Cravens House.  Truly, these three Iowa monuments triangulate all the major fighting for Chattanooga. 

Reading, hiking, driving, seeing and studying the battles for Chattanooga has given me a lot to consider this winter.  I was lucky enough to have two fine sunny days to enjoy these spaces even as I had to contend with modern development to discover the fullness of the battlefields that were fought upon in late-1863.  Once thousands died fighting upon this very ground where now so many lay their heads each night to sleep.  Knowing that makes getting out there and experiencing that ground seem even more special or, at the very least, worthwhile. 

The Ringgold Depot proudly flies the flag of Cleburne's Division (which is the old flag of Hardee's Corps) along with the Stars and Stripes at the entrance.  You can see it was a windy, crisp winter day for my visit.

Note: There is an interesting back-story to the Chattanooga Campaign that involves General James Longstreet’s strained relationship with Bragg.  It doesn’t really pertain much to my battlefield visits (Longstreet's troops had long departed by the battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge) so I’ll blog about that in the future.  

I also want to take a closer look sometime soon at the dismal state of Confederate morale during the campaign.  One reason the Union soldiers were so resilient in the face of defeat at Chickamauga and the resulting desperate supply situation while besieged in Chattanooga was that Confederates deserted by the hundreds every week.  How was it that the victorious army experienced so much desertion?  It’s an fascinating story and the foundation for the Army of Tennessee’s abject defeat at Chattanooga.