Reading Gettysburg by Stephen Sears

Proof of purchase.

For Christmas in 2004 my in-laws gave me a nice hardback copy of Gettysburg by Stephen W. Sears.  I was grateful for the gift.  Sears is one of the outstanding Civil War historians of my time.  I found his earlier books to be terrific, especially Landscape Turned Red, his outstanding telling of the Battle of Antietam.

As I have mentioned before, I have an extensive collection of books on the War Between the States.  I was pleased to add Gettysburg to my shelves.  But the truth is the last thing the world needs is another history of the Battle of Gettysburg.  It is the most written about moment in American history and the bloodiest battle of the bloodiest American war (hence the interest).  

For that reason I own several works about the battle.  I own the trilogy of books by the late Harry W. Pfanz on the subject, a book of essays on Pickett’s Charge edited by Gary Gallagher, and the classic The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command by Edwin B. Coddington.  This last work is still considered by many today to be the best single source on the battle.  Other than that, the battle appears, in varying detail, via various biographies, studies, and general histories in my library.

For most of this century, however, my interest on the Civil War has not been as focused as it was back in the 1980’s and 1990’s.  I was a member of the Atlanta Civil War Round Table, for example, from 1991-1994.  I’ll have to blog about those experiences sometime.  Anyway, I thumbed through the Sears book, marked a couple of pages that interested me, and placed it on my shelf where it sat for about 16 years until mid-June when I picked it up and, at long last, decided to read it cover to cover.

Since my Chasing Battlefields trips (see posts one, two, three) I have renewed my younger interest in the war and have been either rereading or enjoying for the first time a number of books.  Knowing how much I appreciated the work of Sears and that his Gettysburg was just sitting there, it seemed as good a time as any to delve into it.

The book does not disappoint.  While Coddington’s work is top-notch history, Sears compares very favorably to it.  In fact, Sears “modern” style of presenting and analyzing information is more readable, his conclusions more forceful, than the classic work that preceded it.

The books starts with alternating chapters featuring the challenges facing Generals Robert E. Lee and Joseph Hooker with their respective armies.  The former had to address a contingent of generals and politicians in the Southern Confederacy that wanted to send part of Lee’s army, fresh from its stunning victory at Chancellorsville, west to take pressure off of the Union advance against Vicksburg.  The latter was dealing with a lack of confidence among senior Army of the Potomac officers who felt that Hooker had mismanaged the Battle of Chancellorsville and should be replaced.  (Ironically, the Confederate Army of Tennessee was going through the same crisis in command as the Army of the Potomac in 1863.  But I’ve kind of already blogged about that.)

Ultimately, Lee argued that the troops which might be sent west would be better used in an offensive into Pennsylvania which, if successful, would threaten Washington, Baltimore, and possibly Philadelphia, thereby reducing the perceived importance of Vicksburg, regardless of what happened there.  Meanwhile, President Abraham Lincoln refused to dismiss Hooker, if for no other reason than he had already replaced the army’s commanding general four times and didn’t feel a fifth time would be good for the army or the country.

Lee invaded the North with 67,000 infantry, 12,400 cavalry, and the Confederacy’s largest contingent of artillery.  He had a lot of command questions, however.  General Stonewall Jackson was killed at Chancellorsville, leaving an enormous void to fill.  Lee dealt with this by splitting Jackson’s former command into two corps to be lead by Richard S. Ewell, who had just recovered from a wound, and A. P. Hill.  Both officers had previously served under Jackson.  Neither general had any previous experience at managing a corps-level force.

Hooker was dealing with a different sort of problem.  No fewer than 33 regiments of his army had originally volunteered for two years service.  In addition, almost 17,000 troops had signed up for only nine months service.  All these men would be mustering out as Lee moved forward.  In total, Hooker was about to lose 48,000 men precisely as the North was being invaded.  

He was begging Washington for more troops but the bureaucracy was not as responsive as Hooker thought it should be.  This incensed Hooker who did not hesitate to inform Lincoln of his displeasure.  Long story short, Hooker soon resigned as the campaign was just getting started.  General George Meade took over command only a few days before the battle was fought.

So the situation was far from ideal on either side.  One of the positive things Hooker accomplished before he left was to reorganize the Army of the Potomac’s cavalry forces under a centralized command.  This resulted in better than expected performance by the Federal horsemen against General Jeb Stuart’s cavalry in the Battle of Brandy Station at the opening of the campaign. 

For the first time in his career, Stuart was surprised by the Yankees and, even though the battle was, according to Sears, “tactically inconclusive,” it was the first time the Federal cavalry had held its own against the Rebel horsemen.  It gave the Yankees reason for optimism.

Brandy Station had another consequence.  It had embarrassed Stuart, making him anxious to do something spectacular in order to put that battle behind him.  Lee gave Stuart free rein, as it were, to replicate his famous “ride around McClellan” during the Seven Days’ Battles.  Sears questions why the “ride around (at the time) Hooker” was even attempted at all.

According to Sears, “…by Lee’s design he needed to have the enemy follow him if he was to shift the seat of war into Northern territory.” (page 105)  Hence, there was no rationale for Stuart to threaten Washington and confuse the enemy.  Then Sears answers his own question by stating that “General Lee’s contempt for fighting Joe Hooker and for Hooker’s army had only been reinforced by Chancellorsville…The very concept of Stuart’s expedition was fueled by overconfidence and misjudgment at the highest command level.” (pp. 105-106)

Sears goes into some detail as to the effectiveness of Meade’s intelligence during the Gettysburg campaign.  The Federals knew almost everything about Lee’s army in terms of size and location.  In contrast, since Stuart was gallivanting all over the countryside, Lee’s cavalry could neither screen the Confederate army nor provide intelligence.  Lee was blind, Meade was not.  

Be that as it may, the Battle of Gettysburg opened on July 1, 1863 seemingly with Confederate victory at hand.  Ironically, neither Meade nor Lee wanted to fight at Gettysburg.  Meade wanted to form his army south of there along Pipe Creek so that he could receive Rebel attacks on defensive ground he had chosen.  Lee didn’t want to fight simply because he did not know how scattered or concentrated the Union army was.  Until he had a better sense of the Federal disposition (i.e. until Stuart showed up), he told his officers not to bring on a general engagement.

But the fight got away from both commanders.  The Confederates ran into stiff resistance from Union cavalry and decided to push harder.  Two Rebel brigades were mauled by the cavalry and Federal infantry reinforcements (led by the vaunted “Iron Brigade”).  But, as fate would have, more of the Southern army arrived on the field before the Northerners and they routed the Yankees through the town.  This is perhaps the most critical moment in the whole battle.

“As bad as this Gettysburg scene was for the Federals that afternoon, it could have been even worse.  The exceedingly high cost of the fighting for McPherson’s Ridge and Seminary Ridge blinded A.P. Hill to a bright opportunity to seal the day’s victory.  In the brigades of James Lane, then tightly skirmishing with the Yankee cavalry, and Edward Thomas, which had yet to fire a shot, Dorsey Pender had 3,000 fresh troops with which he might have blocked the southern exits through Gettysburg.  A prompt advance of only a mile by such a force would surely have swept up most of the First Corps survivors, and perhaps a number of Eleventh Corps stragglers as well.  But Lane and Thomas were not called out, leaving the pursuit to two of Abner Perrin’s bloodied and exhausted South Carolina regiments.” (pp. 222-223)
  
Instead, the beaten Yankees were able to withdraw to the high ground south of Gettysburg.  Hill was new to corps command.  He was navigating a difficult situation in trying to obey Lee’s orders not to bring on a general battle and still fight a battle in front of him.  He failed the task.  The Federals retreated and tried to reorganize.  Meanwhile, the Confederates were almost as disorganized.  Over in Ewell’s corps, Generals Robert Rodes and Jubal Early had routed the Yankees north of town but the cantankerous Early insisted that his division had no fight left in it and the continued attack should await reinforcements.

“Dick Ewell now made his first mistake of the day.  Instead of ordering the immediate occupation of the (supposedly) unoccupied Culp’s Hill, he humored Early and let his men stand down, and assigned the task to [Edward] Johnson’s division whenever it might arrive.

“Ewell’s decision had momentous consequences…with some 2,400 men to confront the few hundred weary survivors of the Iron Brigade, and with as much as two hours of daylight to work with, and with Johnson’s reinforcements soon at hand to secure the hill, the outcome would seem assured.” (page 230)

As it was, no Southern forces followed through their initial success and the Northerners were allowed to regroup on the high ground south of town.  Meade, fuming that his Pipe Creek plan was now irrelevant and that a different battle was forced upon him, arrived on the field about 3AM on July 2.  Characteristically, he was in a foul mood yet he was also highly methodical.  He immediately took an assessment of his situation.

“The First Corps was in ruins.  It had taken just over 9,000 men into action on July 1, and lost some 5,600 of them – more than 62 percent…The Eleventh [Corps] put five of its six brigades, 7,000 men, into a mere hour’s action that Wednesday afternoon and lost 3,200 of them.  Almost half that number were prisoners.  In its flight north of Gettysburg the corps had made a better stand than at Chancellorsville, certainly, but nevertheless it was again roundly defeated.  It suffered four-plus casualties for every one it inflicted.” (page 244)

Meade ordered his Sixth Corps, his largest contingent of infantry still hours away, to force march toward Gettysburg.  He arranged his remaining corps to take advantage of the defensive terrain but General Dan Sickles, a politically appointed general, was left situated with terrain suited for defense on his flanks but not upon his center.  Of his own initiative, Sickles advanced his line beyond where Meade had instructed.  This was reported to Meade by a member of his staff.

“Army commander Meade, before riding off to see Sickles’s folly for himself, had taken two critical rapid-fire decisions.  First, he ordered [George] Sykes's Fifth Corps, two miles to the rear and his only infantry reserve, to march to the left with all speed and at all hazards to reinforce the now vulnerable Third Corps. Second, he dispatched chief engineer Gouverneur Warren to Little Round Top to check on what force Sickles had assigned to guard that vitally important piece of high ground.” (page 269)

Meade was confident of understanding the situation.  He knew all the high ground had to be held.  Warren soon reported back that when we reached Little Round Top he found few troops at all.  Sickles had not only advanced without instructions, he had abandoned the very spot Meade ordered him of anchor upon.  Fortunately for the Federals, Meade’s hasty order to bring Sykes forward brought his First Brigade to within Little Round Top fairly quickly.  They were ordered to defend the top.

Earlier that same morning, July 2, Lee and his senior subordinate, James Longstreet, were discussing the Rebel strategy for the day.  Lee wanted Longstreet to send his crops toward Little Round Top and drive up the Yankee left flank.  Longstreet disagreed.  Ever since his late arrival on the field, Longstreet advocated moving away from Gettysburg altogether.  To force march the army and get between Meade and Washington, thus forcing the Federals to attack Lee’s army.

This, in reverse, was precisely what Meade had envisioned for his army at Pipe Creek.  Lee would have had to attack there.  Longstreet understood that by forcing the Union to attack it would allow Lee to repeat what happened at the Battle of Fredericksburg where the Yankees were slaughtered.  Lee was feisty and stated he would not abandon the enemy situated before him on the field.  Longstreet then proposed a shorter movement with a large part of the army to turn the Union left flank.  Lee grew tired of Longstreet repeatedly trying to talk him out of what Lee had already (confidently, even arrogantly) planned. 

“General Lee now took a startling and quite uncharacteristic action.  It had been his habit, since taking command of the Army of Northern Virginia, to follow a strict battlefield protocol: He would deliver an overall tactical plan to his lieutenants, then leave it to them to carry out its specific workings.  Now, as Longstreet paced back and forth within ear-shot, Lee called [LaFayette] McLaws to him and proceeded to lay out exactly where he was to go and exactly what he was to do in the forthcoming offensive.  This intrusion into Longstreet’s prerogatives was Lee’s deliberate signal to his reluctant lieutenant that he was in no temper to brook further disputation and was thereby taking full direction of the offensive.” (page 255) 

John Bell Hood was Longstreet’s other division commander.  He does not seem to have spoken directly with Lee but he received precise orders nonetheless.  Longstreet was left in charge of very little except for managing the attack after it started and roll-up the Union left. Hood, upon arriving at his position to launch the attack, sent scouts forward.  They climbed Little Round Top and reported it was unoccupied.  Obviously, the Federal brigade had yet to arrive at that point.  This is a critical time in the battle.  Hood reported back to Longstreet.

“Hood then sent a flurry of pleading messages to Longstreet to allow him to change the plan of attack.  Hood captured the gist of these appeals in a postwar letter to Longstreet: ‘I considered it my duty to report to you at once my opinion, that it was unwise to attack up Emmitsburg Road, as ordered, and to urge that you allow me to turn Round Top and attack the enemy in flank and rear.’

“This kind of turning movement was exactly what Old Pete earlier had urged on Lee.  The problem was that instead of undertaking it with a sizable fraction of the army, as Longstreet had proposed, Hood wanted to attempt it with his single division – and with only McLaws’s division, already in contact with the enemy, for support.  And already the day was too far gone.  Three times Hood sought Longstreet’s agreement for the change.  Three times he was denied.  It was close to 4 o’clock and Confederate batteries had already opened when Major John Fairfax of Longstreet’s staff delivered to Hood the final and peremptory order: ‘It is General Lee’s order – the time is up – attack at once.’” (page 262)

Meanwhile, Meade was beside himself with what Sickles had done. “Meade’s temper was now on the boil as he rode out to inspect the Third Corps’ new line from a vantage point behind the Peach Orchard.  He cut short Sickles’s explanation that he had merely acted within the scope of Meade’s earlier instructions.  Pointing to the ground to the ground where they set their horses, Meade said, ‘General Sickles, this is neutral ground, our guns command it, as well as the enemy’s.  The very reason you cannot hold it applies to them.’  Sickles asked if he should pull his divisions back to their original line.  He might try, Meade said, but delivered a warning: ‘You cannot hold this position, but the enemy will not let you get away without a fight…’” (page 263)

While McClaws attacked the Peach Orchard and drove Sickles back, Hood’s division took Devil’s Den and then assaulted Little Round Top.  After losing ground, the Federals were low on ammunition so they made a famous bayonet charge counterattack at Little Round Top and halted the Confederate advance.  The left was not rolled-up, the Union line ultimately held.  Supporting attacks by A.P. Hill and, later, Ewell were beaten back.

Although Longstreet labeled the fighting by his troops as “the best three hours’ fighting ever done by any troops on any battle-field,” ultimately they retreated.  Sears gives a gripping account of this intense battle without diving too deeply into the minutia.  His framing of Meade’s frustration with Sickles and Lee’s frustration with Longstreet is extraordinary military scholarship.  He also does a better job of explaining the context for why Hood’s requests to Longstreet were denied than anyone I have read before.  This has been one military moment that I have given considerable thought to throughout my life.  What if Hood had attacked behind Sickles on July 2?  Now I understand much better why Longstreet denied the requests thanks to Sears.

“What Longstreet did accomplish was to grievously damage the Army of the Potomac.  Dan Sickles’s Third Corps was wrecked beyond further use on this field, with a casualty rate of just under 40 percent and stragglers to the Taneytown Road and the Baltimore Pike and beyond.  The Fifth Corps, too, was heavily damaged, with the divisions of [James] Barnes and [Romeyn] Ayers each losing a quarter of their strength.  Before Longstreet was finally subdued, he had attacked, in addition to the Third and Fifth corps, substantial elements of the Second, Sixth, and Twelfth corps, and most of the army reserve.” (pp. 350-351) 

Stuart finally arrived about mid-day on July 2, far too late to be Lee’s eyes on the battlefield.  He endured the barely contained wrath of Lee who admonished him for being out of communication for so long.  Because of this, Lee thought the Yankees were scattered more than they actually were.  Because of this, Lee was unaware of what Hood later discovered.  (If Stuart’s cavalry had commanded the field, the absence of Union troops on Little Round Top would have been known to Lee before ordering the July 2 attack.)  The Federal left flank was exposed.  Because of this, Lee knew nothing and his guesses were all wrong.  Lee’s next guess was to attack the Union center, which surely must have been weakened to reinforce the left against Longstreet’s vigorous attack.

It was not weakened.  Meade had General Winfield Hancock’s corps there, perhaps his best subordinate commander.  Sears gives a wonderful account of what history remembers as Pickett’s Charge, though, in fact, Pickett only directed a part of it.  It began with the largest artillery barrage of the war, with more cannons aligned against one another than in any other battle.  Due to faulty Confederate fuses and mistakes in alignment the vast majority of their shells exploded behind the Union line and accomplished little.

Colonel Arthur Fremantle was traveling with Lee’s headquarters as a British military observer.  When he looked down upon the mass of Confederates attacking the Union center through a thick haze of artillery smoke he marveled to Longstreet: “I wouldn’t have missed this for anything!”  Indeed, the sheer pageantry of it was a spectacle.  Sears again describes the action in detail without getting too granular like many accounts I’ve read.  The author takes stock of the price of the grand charge.

“By the best estimate, better than half of the 13,000 Confederates who made Pickett’s Charge were casualties – 6,600.  And just over half that number, 3,300 (wounded and unwounded), became prisoners of the Yankees.  The count of the dead came to some 1,900.  Thus 35 percent of the men who made the charge were immediately removed from the Confederate rolls through death or capture.” (pp. 467-468)

Quite simply, Meade out-generaled Lee at Gettysburg, managing to steady his army after defeat on the first day.  July 2 was a close fight, but a tactical Union victory.  On July 3, Meade won a decisive victory, however.  Lee retreated on July 4, the same day that Vicksburg, the city his invasion was supposed to impact, surrendered.  Strategically, instead of another resounding Confederate victory minimizing Ulysses  S. Grant’s brilliant capture of Vicksburg, Lee’s defeat accentuated the North’s complete control of the Mississippi River.

As Sears explains, Lincoln was displeased that Meade did not immediately follow-up Lee’s retreat and attempt to capture the Rebel army while still on Northern soil.  But Meade put the matter to a vote among his commanding generals and a large majority were opposed to offensive action.  The Union army was almost as beat up as the Confederates were.  Tardily, as Sears tells it, Lincoln congratulated Meade on the victory even though Lee escaped to fight another day.

Sears places most of the responsibility for how the campaign turned out upon the failures of Lee.  Allowing Stuart to do as he pleased only resulted in Meade being better informed about his enemy than Lee was about Meade’s position.  According to Sears, Lee was not clear enough with Ewell about what to do on the first day’s battle whereas Lee strongly imposed his (faulty) will upon Longstreet on the other two days, thus minimizing the input of his senior subordinate, his “old warhorse.”  

This left both Lee and Meade in ironic positions after the fighting was over.  “While General Lee sought to excuse his defeat at Gettysburg, General Meade was in the peculiar position of having to defend his victory there.” (page 505)  But, the victory was most definitely Meade’s.

“For the most part, then, - and for the first time ever – the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac had received the leadership they deserved.  The victory won as a result became of surpassing importance to the rank and file.  On that account it had perhaps more lasting meaning to the army than to the country at large.  ‘What do people think now of the demoralized Army of the Potomac,” Lieutenant Charles Brewster, 10th Massachusetts, asked in a letter home on July 12.  ‘If growlers could have seen that desperate fighting on that battlefield at Gettysburg I think they would shut up their potato traps about this Army…’” (page 507) 

Most of this information is available in a host of other books including Coddington’s and Pfanz’s.  But Sears brings to light many small facts to better flesh-out and explain the frustrating nature of the campaign and the battle for both sides.  The author’s overall balanced perspective shows how close the battle was to a Confederate victory while simultaneously shining clarity upon Meade’s competence for turning Lee’s missteps into what was probably the greatest Northern triumph of the war.  This is a must-read book and I’m grateful I finally got around to doing so after all these years.